10-04-2016, 12:34 PM
(10-03-2016, 08:18 PM)Mikebert Wrote:(10-03-2016, 09:15 AM)Warren Dew Wrote:For your first point exactly. For you second, eventually, but not right away:(10-03-2016, 07:02 AM)Odin Wrote:(10-02-2016, 01:13 PM)Mikebert Wrote: What I have found intriguing is how all the articles I have seen have mentioned the 1850's (i.e. the building to the Civil War 4T) as a key thing in the book, yet Turchin as this as a mid-cycle burst of instability, like the 13th century Baron's wars or the mid-Tudor crisis, which are not major episodes of unrest according to secular cycle theory.
I see the Civil War as a big deal, an example of state breakdown that marks the boundary of a secular cycle. That is I think in modern industrial societies, Turchin's secular cycle is essentially the same as S&H's saecular cycle. It is clear he hasn't changed his views, but how does he see the Civil War? Another reason why I am eager the read the book.
What is important about this question is, Turchin's first secular cycle spans TWO saecula. Does he think we are nearing the end of the second one (1930- ) soon (which would mean this secular cycle is ONE saecula long) or not?
I'm guessing because the Civil War was followed by the Gilded Age and that despite the destruction of the Southern elite it did not result in a significant reduction in inequality, it just shifted a good portion of the wealth from Southern planters to Northern industrialists? Given the various thinking here of a double-saeculum pattern I suspect that Turchin's cycle really is 2 saecula long, and our current time is akin to the Civil War and the next 1T will be akin to the Gilded Age.
At least part of the concentration of wealth prior to the Civil War consisted of concentration of slave ownership. Elimination of slavery resulted in a considerable reduction in concentration of wealth, as you can think of the economics as redistribution of the wealth, not just back to smaller slave owners, but to the ex-slaves themselves.
Was continued concentration of wealth in the North enough to outweigh that? Do you have any figures, preferably with references but without would also be okay, on concentration of wealth in the North before and after the Civil War?
The figure shows an estimate of GDP per worker than is not captured by the worker as a measure of inequality. THe drop at the Civil war mostly reflects a 13% share of GDP (reflecting the portion of GDP produced by slaves) shifting from being the property of capital (their owners) to workers (the slaves themselves). Other measures of inequality such as the faction of estate wealth in selected cities held by the top decile did not show much change.
Thanks - very interesting graph. Can you say what the vertical dashed lines are? And is there a source for more information?
It seems a bit strange that there was a spike upward after the start of the Civil War; the increasing concentration of slave ownership I mentioned happened before that. Overall, the graph tends to confirm a conjecture I had that crises happen when inequality reaches a maximum value.