I am finishing a draft of a new paper. This one is on long cycles, fifty-year (two generation) cycles. Examples include Kondratieff cycles, the War cycle, the Klingberg foreign policy cycle, the Turchin "fathers and sons cycle" in sociopolitical instability, and Huntington's periodic creedal passion periods. The S&H saeculum is a pair of inner-directed and outer-directed long cycles.
Turchin’s social contagion model characterizes “fathers and sons” periods of violence as resulting from outbreaks of a violence-promoting radical social mood. These are considered as analogous to disease outbreaks at the beginning of an epidemic and are modeled using a similar approach. The politically-active population, consisting of people aged 21 to 21+C is divided into C age cohorts. Each cohort is divided into three categories: naïve individuals (N), radicals ®, and moderates (M). Those entering the first age cohort (age 21) are naïve. Each year naïve individuals may become radicalized by contact with radicals (this is analogous to the uninfected contracting an infectious disease by contact with the infected). Similarly, radicals in that cohort may become disenchanted with radicalism after spending a certain amount of time (τ) as a radical in which case they become a moderate (this is analogous to an infected recovering from the disease). After a year has passed, the cohort moves to the next higher age with the proportion of naïve individuals, radicals and moderates adjusted for the effects of naïve radicalization and recovery from radicalism.
Radicalization occurs from contact with radicals, but the effectives of this contact is negatively affected by the presence of moderates. I implemented the model on a spreadsheet and the plot shows nice fifty year cycles in radical number and moderate number that are out of phase by τ years (τ is the time for recovery from radicalism).
The model fits the sociopolitical instability (SPI), a combination of SPI and religious event frequency (an awakening measure) I call sociopolitical and cultural instability (SPCI) and the Klingberg cycles of alternating extroverted/introverted American foreign policy. I also found it did a good job of fitting the war cycle and the associated Kondratieffs, here in place of radicalism, I use “hawkishness” or “war fever”. John Xenakis has a somewhat similar “social mood” operative in his cycle, but I think (IIRC) it is mechanistically somewhat different. I don’t think “contagion” would be a good analogy to his cycle dynamics.
Anyways I am pleased with Turchin’s model. It’s the first pretty useful math model I have encountered that can explain a number of these long cycles.
It doesn’t work for the saeculum though. Dynamically the saeculum is similar to political cycles, which interestingly enough, can be modeled with an explicitly generational model inspired by S&H. However, the saeculum is not the same as the political cycle, which has six “turnings” over a period roughly corresponding to the Civil War saeculum (1789-1877) instead of the four over 1794-1865. What makes the political cycle and saeculum different from the long cycles is the Depression and WW II is a crisis era in these cycles, whereas its not in the long cycles. For example, WW II is anomalous in the war-hegemony cycle theories, whereas it is a key feature in S&H, the political cycles and Generational Dynamics.
So SCM is useful but its only a piece of the puzzle. long. Examples include Kondratieff’s, the War cycle, Klingberg's foreign policy cycle, Turchin's "fathers and sons cycle" in sociopolitical instability, and Huntington's periodic creedal passion periods etc. The S&H saeculum is a double long cycle, one inner-directed and one outer.
Turchin’s social contagion model characterizes “fathers and sons” periods of violence as resulting from outbreaks of a violence-promoting radical social mood. These are considered as analogous to disease outbreaks at the beginning of an epidemic and are modeled using a similar approach. The politically-active population, consisting of people aged 21 to 21+C is divided into C age cohorts. Each cohort is divided into three categories: naïve individuals (N), radicals ®, and moderates (M). Those entering the first age cohort (age 21) are naïve. Each year naïve individuals may become radicalized by contact with radicals (this is analogous to the uninfected contracting an infectious disease by contact with the infected). Similarly, radicals in that cohort may become disenchanted with radicalism after spending a certain amount of time (τ) as a radical in which case they become a moderate (this is analogous to an infected recovering from the disease). After a year has passed, the cohort moves to the next higher age with the proportion of naïve individuals, radicals and moderates adjusted for the effects of naïve radicalization and recovery from radicalism.
Anyways I am pleased with Turchin’s model it’s the first pretty useful math model I have encountered that can explain a number of these long cycles.
It doesn’t work for the saeculum though. Dynamically the saeculum is similar to political cycles, which interestingly enough can be modeled with an explicitly generational model inspired by S&H. However, the saeculum is not the same as the political cycle, which has six “turnings” over a period roughly corresponding to the Civil War saeculum (1789-1877) instead of the four over 1794-1865. What makes the political cycle and saeculum different from the long cycles is the Depression and WW II is a crisis era in these cycles, whereas its not in the long cycles. WW II is anomalous in the war-hegemony cycle theories, whereas it is a key feature in S&H, the political cycles and Generational Dynamics. So SCM is useful but its only a piece of the puzzle.
Turchin’s social contagion model characterizes “fathers and sons” periods of violence as resulting from outbreaks of a violence-promoting radical social mood. These are considered as analogous to disease outbreaks at the beginning of an epidemic and are modeled using a similar approach. The politically-active population, consisting of people aged 21 to 21+C is divided into C age cohorts. Each cohort is divided into three categories: naïve individuals (N), radicals ®, and moderates (M). Those entering the first age cohort (age 21) are naïve. Each year naïve individuals may become radicalized by contact with radicals (this is analogous to the uninfected contracting an infectious disease by contact with the infected). Similarly, radicals in that cohort may become disenchanted with radicalism after spending a certain amount of time (τ) as a radical in which case they become a moderate (this is analogous to an infected recovering from the disease). After a year has passed, the cohort moves to the next higher age with the proportion of naïve individuals, radicals and moderates adjusted for the effects of naïve radicalization and recovery from radicalism.
Radicalization occurs from contact with radicals, but the effectives of this contact is negatively affected by the presence of moderates. I implemented the model on a spreadsheet and the plot shows nice fifty year cycles in radical number and moderate number that are out of phase by τ years (τ is the time for recovery from radicalism).
The model fits the sociopolitical instability (SPI), a combination of SPI and religious event frequency (an awakening measure) I call sociopolitical and cultural instability (SPCI) and the Klingberg cycles of alternating extroverted/introverted American foreign policy. I also found it did a good job of fitting the war cycle and the associated Kondratieffs, here in place of radicalism, I use “hawkishness” or “war fever”. John Xenakis has a somewhat similar “social mood” operative in his cycle, but I think (IIRC) it is mechanistically somewhat different. I don’t think “contagion” would be a good analogy to his cycle dynamics.
Anyways I am pleased with Turchin’s model. It’s the first pretty useful math model I have encountered that can explain a number of these long cycles.
It doesn’t work for the saeculum though. Dynamically the saeculum is similar to political cycles, which interestingly enough, can be modeled with an explicitly generational model inspired by S&H. However, the saeculum is not the same as the political cycle, which has six “turnings” over a period roughly corresponding to the Civil War saeculum (1789-1877) instead of the four over 1794-1865. What makes the political cycle and saeculum different from the long cycles is the Depression and WW II is a crisis era in these cycles, whereas its not in the long cycles. For example, WW II is anomalous in the war-hegemony cycle theories, whereas it is a key feature in S&H, the political cycles and Generational Dynamics.
So SCM is useful but its only a piece of the puzzle. long. Examples include Kondratieff’s, the War cycle, Klingberg's foreign policy cycle, Turchin's "fathers and sons cycle" in sociopolitical instability, and Huntington's periodic creedal passion periods etc. The S&H saeculum is a double long cycle, one inner-directed and one outer.
Turchin’s social contagion model characterizes “fathers and sons” periods of violence as resulting from outbreaks of a violence-promoting radical social mood. These are considered as analogous to disease outbreaks at the beginning of an epidemic and are modeled using a similar approach. The politically-active population, consisting of people aged 21 to 21+C is divided into C age cohorts. Each cohort is divided into three categories: naïve individuals (N), radicals ®, and moderates (M). Those entering the first age cohort (age 21) are naïve. Each year naïve individuals may become radicalized by contact with radicals (this is analogous to the uninfected contracting an infectious disease by contact with the infected). Similarly, radicals in that cohort may become disenchanted with radicalism after spending a certain amount of time (τ) as a radical in which case they become a moderate (this is analogous to an infected recovering from the disease). After a year has passed, the cohort moves to the next higher age with the proportion of naïve individuals, radicals and moderates adjusted for the effects of naïve radicalization and recovery from radicalism.
Anyways I am pleased with Turchin’s model it’s the first pretty useful math model I have encountered that can explain a number of these long cycles.
It doesn’t work for the saeculum though. Dynamically the saeculum is similar to political cycles, which interestingly enough can be modeled with an explicitly generational model inspired by S&H. However, the saeculum is not the same as the political cycle, which has six “turnings” over a period roughly corresponding to the Civil War saeculum (1789-1877) instead of the four over 1794-1865. What makes the political cycle and saeculum different from the long cycles is the Depression and WW II is a crisis era in these cycles, whereas its not in the long cycles. WW II is anomalous in the war-hegemony cycle theories, whereas it is a key feature in S&H, the political cycles and Generational Dynamics. So SCM is useful but its only a piece of the puzzle.