Flavors of 4Ts

[Eric the Green]

(01-28-2017, 07:24 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 07:20 PM)Eric the Green Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 01:07 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Eric,

Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?).  It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort.  A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s?  Also a possibility.

Distinctly possible, and predicted as possible by me already.

Although the left is definitely ideological, it has taken a social-justice slant big time because of who the major party nominees were in 2016 and who is president now. But I don't see an out-of-power violent left wing revolution as likely to succeed in the USA. The resistance to Trump is on, but it's mostly non-violent, and whether it can depose Trump before 2020 or even 2024 depends largely on Trump's own behavior. So I think an unsuccessful right-wing violent revolt against a left government that succeeds Trump is more likely, especially since the right-wing is focused on keeping their guns and thus is more-violent. And again, not until 2025-26.

And one side or another seceding is distinctly possible. William Strauss posted here long ago that the borders of the USA after this 4T might not be the same as before it. This prediction of mine dates back 4 decades. I don't say I am certain of it, but what I predicted is that people might be proposing it. This was unthinkable back in the 20th century. Now, it's not.

Oh, there's plenty of violence on the left, too.  But we are in agreement that both are possibilities for which one could draw plausible scenarios.  The question is indeed how the next 4 years go.

Yes, in agreement, and that's the question. I don't see where you get "plenty of violence on the left" though, and I doubt it will be effective. Consider its history. The Black Panthers? Riots that burn down neighborhoods? Black lives matter protests? Not very powerful, except to turn the people against the Left or empower repression. The Right wing has been gearing up with militias since the 1990s, and the gun proponents will fight to keep their guns whether they are under threat or not. If either happens though, and it's true either could happen, the prospects are not bright on either side. The winner of this Crisis will win at the ballot box, despite protests or resistance. 

Of course that happened last time too; Lincoln won at the ballot box; right-wing rebellion broke out, and it was quelled, but at great cost that time. This time, I am predicting there will be no great urgency to "uphold the Union," as there was under Lincoln. If Texas or California wants to leave, let them go-- I think will be the sentiment.

Trump would not let that happen; he would fight. That's because he wants to "make America great again."

[SomeGuy]

What happened to those Trump rallies in Chicago and San Jose?  Who shot those cops in Dallas and Baton Rouge?  How many people were arrested in those DC protests just past?  How about violence associated with some of the BLM protests in Baltimore, Ferguson, and elsewhere?


I agree that that sort of thing is foolish and counterproductive (and in some cases downright evil), just as the Weathermen, Eldridge Cleaver, and the like were back in their day.  That doesn't mean they don't happen.

The US government is pretty good at riddling radical movements with informants and provocateurs, and there is yet little real desire among the mass of people for violent revolution.  So I agree that things will ultimately be decided at the ballot box.

Trump and the Republicans just won a major battle.  In remains to be seen whether they can consolidate their position, and how the left responds.

[Mikebert]

Some Guy Wrote:Some points.  I do NOT see the turning cycle as operating on a global scale, I think it roughly corresponds to nation states.  I am just noting that a lot of countries seem to have their cycles roughly aligned, most particularly Western Europe/the US outside Ireland.

Not global, world system.  I assumed you knew the term, my bad.  A world system is a portion of the world that is linked by dense trade and cultural links so that it can be treated as a single system for certain types of historical analyses the way people do for nation-states.  After all, in Europe there really weren’t nations until quite recent times. Western Europe, sans Ireleand roughly corresponds to a world system that arose in the Medieval times through a combination of the Hansa cities and the overland trade route from the Mediterranean to Bruges.  Later this route was replaced by an oceanic route along the Atlantic coast.  It tended to bind Northern Italy, France, Germany, the low countries, Scandinavia, Britain, Spain and Portugal, and portions of Poland and the Baltic region into a world system. 
 
So if you look at the frequency of peasant revolts in Europe you find at times there are simultaneous peaks in a variety of countries suggesting that their historical cycles are in sync.   For example, below is a giant cluster of events in the 1376-84 period. This clustering of events was noticed by the authorities who wondered if there was a conspiracy.  They noted that the Ciompi had resulted in the spread of radical ideas and that Italians had been seen in London before the Peasants Revolt (this event really got a rise out of the English elite, sort of like 911), but others noted that there was always Italians in London.  The spirit of Trump was there 650 years ago, people continue to be people  
 
1376-1376   HRE                   Knochenhauerauftstand
1376-1376   HRE                   Urban Insurrenction
1378-1378   France               Urban Riots
1378-1378   HRE                   Urban Insurrenction
1378-1378   Italy                   Revolt of the Ciompi
1378-1378   Teut.Order          Urban Insurrenction
1379-1379   France                Urban Uprising
1379-1382   HRE                   Revolt of Ghent
1380-1380   France               Peasant Revolt in Midi
1380-1380   France                Tax Revolt
1380-1380   HRE                   Guild Revolt
1380-1380   Switzerland         Peasant Revolt in Weggis
1381-1381   England              Revolt in Essex
1381-1381   England              Revolt in Kent
1381-1381   England              The English Peasants' Revolt
1381-1381   France                Urban Riots
1382-1382   France                Harelle Riots
1382-1382   France                Maillotin Riots
1382-1382   France                Riot at Beziers
1383-1383   France                Conflicts in Paris
1384-1384   HRE                    Urban Riots
 

Quote:I largely agree with your remaining assessment.  Britain in the 1850s-1860s is unusual, in that it had lots of things going on overseas, but managed to avoid getting tangled in any of them.  The Chartist movement kind of evaporated in this time frame, and the economy was booming (This period is generally thought of as the "Golden Age" of Victorian Britain.

The Chartist movement pretty much had had it after the debacle of 1848. From my secular cycles paper:

me Wrote:The 1848 revolution on the continent spurred the last major expression of Chartist protest. Economic downturn had spawned riots in London, Glasgow, Manchester and other cities. The Chartists had decided to convene a mass demonstration on Kennington Common to submit to Parliament their petition for political rights. About 150,000 gathered on April 10 for the demonstration and the leaders submitted the petition, which was ignored (Royle 2000:126). Popular anger did not dissipate. There were reports of workingmen forging pikes, conducting military drills, and dangerously inflammatory rhetoric at political meetings (Royle 2000:129). Secretary to the Privy Council Charles Grenville recorded in his diary on June 3 that “it was quite new to hear any Englishman coolly recommend assassination” and that “it was impossible not to feel alarm when we consider the vast amount of the population as compared to any repressive power that we possess” (Royle 2000: 130). The Chartist movement was infiltrated with spies and the government was able to thwart the “1848 conspiracy” with mass arrests, ending the last revolutionary attempt of the era (Royle 2000:134).

Royle, Edward. 2000. Revolutionary Britannia? Reflections on the threat of revolution in Britain 1789-1848. Manchester University Press, New York.

Some Guy Wrote: So, since the US and Britain were presumably on the same secular track up through the Revolution, and then again with WWII, and have had similar social movements since (the 60s in both places, Thatcher/Reagan, Blair/Clinton, Trump/Brexit), we are left with the conclusion that Britain either decided to take the rest of the 19th century off, or it just had unusually competent leadership during the period when the rest of the West was in crisis, defusing both social movements like the Chartists and war scares with the US, France, Prussia, or what have you.

Well it’s not just the mid-19th century 4T for which evidence of its existence is absent. There is also the 4T corresponding to the American Revolution.  Britain had a revolutionary crisis era, it was just later than the one in the US:

me Wrote: The mutinies, invasions and armed uprisings over 1797-1803 suggested revolution was possible, even likely, at least in the eyes of the authorities (Royle 2000:25). Charles Tilly lists this episode as a revolutionary situation (Tilly 1995, Table 4.2). The realization that measures were needed to control Ireland and to reduce tensions led to the one major constitutional reform of the period, the 1800 Act of Union with Ireland (Royle 2000:25). The beginning of this crisis in 1797 was used to date the shift from integrative to disintegrative trend for the mercantile cycle.

Crime rates soared during the second decade of the 19th century to an initial peak in 1817-19 (Figure 7). At about the same time (1816-20) was a spate of sociopolitical instability twice as severe (by the Sorokin measure) as one of the Jacobite revolts of the 18th century (an integrative trend conflict). After a brief decline, crime rates rose to a second peak which occurred at about the same time as another outburst of sociopolitical instability over 1829-32 that was even more severe than the 1817-1819 violence. Over this same period two more constitutional reforms were adopted: Catholic Emancipation in 1829 and the Reform Act of 1832. After a decline to 1836, crime rates rose to a 19th century peak in 1842. A sharp rise in riotous offenses were also seen in that year, presumably associated with the Chartist-inspired 1842 general strike (Figure 7). The disturbances of 1842 were the most intense of any that occurred in Britain from the time of the French Revolution to the Chartist détente of 1848 (Royle 2000:113).

You have this revolutionary period which shows up in the instability database as a pair of peaks around 1800 and 1840.  During this time four “constitutional-type” changes occurred over the 1801-1831 period. You also saw the end of a ruling monarch: George III sill had power, his sons George III and William IV decreasing amounts and his granddaughter Victoria was a figurehead, as have been all her successors. Inequality as measured by the ratio of wages to per capita GDP peaked around 1800, as did agrarian elites (proxied by British peers). Both fell as the 19th century proceeded.  Political power shifted from agrarian elites to the rising capitalist class as demonstrated by the passage of and the repeal of the Corn laws.  The suite of secular rearrangements characteristic of a trend change in Turchin's secular cycle occurred in the first half of the 19th century.

In other words it was a time of significant reordering of institutions that is the hallmark of a 4T. We have what looks like three 4Ts over a period when the US had four.  Unlike the US ones, the British ones are more closely aligned with the M&T cycle. This is why I am no longer as sure of the idea of alignment of cycles (the world-system as a unit of analysis).

[pbrower2a]

(01-28-2017, 07:52 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: What happened to those Trump rallies in Chicago and San Jose?  Who shot those cops in Dallas and Baton Rouge?  How many people were arrested in those DC protests just past?  How about violence associated with some of the BLM protests in Baltimore, Ferguson, and elsewhere?


I agree that that sort of thing is foolish and counterproductive (and in some cases downright evil), just as the Weathermen, Eldridge Cleaver, and the like were back in their day.  That doesn't mean they don't happen.

The US government is pretty good at riddling radical movements with informants and provocateurs, and there is yet little real desire among the mass of people for violent revolution.  So I agree that things will ultimately be decided at the ballot box.

Trump and the Republicans just won a major battle.  In remains to be seen whether they can consolidate their position, and how the left responds.

He will find it far easier to implement his plutocratic agenda than what he won on -- his populist appeal. Indeed it will be far easier, ironically, for this godless man to implement the fundamentalist agenda of the VP.

It will not make him more popular. It could cause many of the sorts of people who might have voted for Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton but also Donald Trump to reassess whether they are in line with the GOP.  Democrats need to quit looking down upon the folk culture of disadvantaged white people in the Mountain and Deep South; that culture is as valid as, for example, Japanese-American culture or the culture of Ashkenazim.

Addendum: Americans seem to loathe political chaos.

[SomeGuy]

Mikebert,

Oh, I get it.  Sorry, Wallerstein is on my list, but I haven't gotten around to him yet.  Huh, it's an interesting argument.  Do you have a working hypothesis to explain the 19th century divergence?

[Mikebert]

(01-29-2017, 11:19 AM)SomeGuy Wrote: Mikebert,

Oh, I get it.  Sorry, Wallerstein is on my list, but I haven't gotten around to him yet.  Huh, it's an interesting argument.  Do you have a working hypothesis to explain the 19th century divergence?

I am not sure that Britain is divergent, it might be America that is divergent.  If we consider the 1798-1803 period and the the 1926 General Strike as revolutionary moments, then we can identify a series of revolution/civil wars: 1470, 1688, 1801, 1926 spaced 2x109, 113 and 125 years apart, with an average saecula of 113 years, consistent with the old saeculum identified by S&H.

It is only after S&H shift to America that saeculum length plummets from over 100 years down to as short as 64 years (1844-1908).  Maybe the general pattern is the long cycle and America, as the first democratic republic (America established full white male suffrage about a century before Britain did) pioneered the shorter saeculum.  This is Kurt Horner's idea.  Generation length in the old saeculum of ca. 27 years reflected the average age at which elites inherited their wealth and titles.  With the emergence of mass suffrage, it shifted down to about 20 years.  As a result turnings shortened.  But this is just speculation.

[SomeGuy]

(01-29-2017, 01:22 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-29-2017, 11:19 AM)SomeGuy Wrote: Mikebert,

Oh, I get it.  Sorry, Wallerstein is on my list, but I haven't gotten around to him yet.  Huh, it's an interesting argument.  Do you have a working hypothesis to explain the 19th century divergence?

I am not sure that Britain is divergent, it might be America that is divergent.  If we consider the 1798-1803 period and the the 1926 General Strike as revolutionary moments, then we can identify a series of revolution/civil wars: 1470, 1688, 1801, 1926 spaced 2x109, 113 and 125 years apart, with an average saecula of 113 years, consistent with the old saeculum identified by S&H.

It is only after S&H shift to America that saeculum length plummets from over 100 years down to as short as 64 years (1844-1908).  Maybe the general pattern is the long cycle and America, as the first democratic republic (America established full white male suffrage about a century before Britain did) pioneered the shorter saeculum.  This is Kurt Horner's idea.  Generation length in the old saeculum of ca. 27 years reflected the average age at which elites inherited their wealth and titles.  With the emergence of mass suffrage, it shifted down to about 20 years.  As a result turnings shortened.  But this is just speculation.

So you're arguing that the period concluding in 1871 wasn't a 4T on the Continent?  You also seem to be referencing an entirely different set of saecular dates with which I am not familiar.  Oh, and it looks like you're missing a date between 1470 and 1688, as well.  Presumably the Armada time frame?

[Mikebert]

Quote: You also seem to be referencing an entirely different set of saecular dates with which I am not familiar.

It should be clear than the 1688 date refers to the Glorious Revolution, and I stated the 1926 date was the general strike.  It should be obvious that the 1801 date refers to the 1798-1803 period considered by Tilly to be a revolutionary period in Britain.

Quote:So you're arguing that the period concluding in 1871 wasn't a 4T on the Continent?

Where do you get his idea? Do you have a reference for the idea that there was a 4T than ended in 1871?
It appears you are making the mistake of assuming (without evidence) that the turnings mapped out by S&H (which I pointed out have LOTs of empirical support) map into turnings elsewhere at the same times.  The problem for this is for Britain (the closest analog to the US cycle) there is NO evidence for a turning structure contemporaneous with the one in America after the GR (when America was still essentially an extension of Britain).  We just had a discussion about facts and now you seem to be treating your opinion as fact. J

Quote:Oh, and it looks like you're missing a date between 1470 and 1688, as well.  Presumably the Armada time frame?

Precisely.  I think there is a 4T there, I can cite S&H for support, but I cannot make a positive case for one being there based on the definition of a 4T. So, I did not include it.
Here’s the issue.  I think there is something to this S&H generational cycle thing.  It is one thing to post all sorts of unsupported speculation on an online forum.  I’ve done my share of this. It’s another thing to submit a paper to a peer-reviewed journal making these sorts of claims.  My first paper introduced the idea of generational cycles driven by a demographic mechanism.  Basically, times of below-trend price level would see less famine and hardship and less unrest than periods of above trend price level which would show the opposite.  The former period would be non-social moments (i.e. Highs and Unravelings) and the later would be social moments (Awakenings and Crises).  It was ripped to pieces and rejected.  I then went in with another manuscript that was returned needing major revisions.  I made these and the changes made were so great it was considered a new paper, it was reviewed a second time, I addressed the comments and it was published.  The stuff of mine I referenced is in the peer-reviewed literature, and so is a valid reference.

[SomeGuy]

Mike, 

You're trying to be clever again, it doesn't suit you.

Let's just have a nice conversation about something we both like talking about, instead.

Quote:It should be clear than the 1688 date refers to the Glorious Revolution, and I stated the 1926 date was the general strike.  It should be obvious that the 1801 date refers to the 1798-1803 period considered by Tilly to be a revolutionary period in Britain.

Hmm, I'm sorry, you're doing that thing where you are mapping your theories onto S & H terms again.  So, you have some sort of indicator of for violence/political turmoil/what-have-you, and you're measuring from peak to peak as one saeculum?  Am I reading that right?

Quote:Where do you get his idea? Do you have a reference for the idea that there was a 4T than ended in 1871? 

It appears you are making the mistake of assuming (without evidence) that the turnings mapped out by S&H (which I pointed out have LOTs of empirical support) map into turnings elsewhere at the same times.  The problem for this is for Britain (the closest analog to the US cycle) there is NO evidence for a turning structure contemporaneous with the one in America after the GR (when America was still essentially an extension of Britain).  We just had a discussion about facts and now you seem to be treating your opinion as fact. J

Please don't put words in my mouth, especially when I am here and you can just ask me.  No, I went from around the end of WWII, when a dramatic 4T looking thing happened that realigned the political structures, I counted back about 80 years, and I saw a similar thing, likewise going back to the Revolutionary Wars.  I am using it as a working hypothesis.  It may or may not be feasible, and I asked you if you were working under a different one.  At no point did I assert it as a fact, nor deride you for not considering it likewise.

Like I said, this sort of thing doesn't suit you.

Quote:Precisely.  I think there is a 4T there, I can cite S&H for support, but I cannot make a positive case for one being there based on the definition of a 4T. So, I did not include it.

Here’s the issue.  I think there is something to this S&H generational cycle thing.  It is one thing to post all sorts of unsupported speculation on an online forum.  I’ve done my share of this. It’s another thing to submit a paper to a peer-reviewed journal making these sorts of claims.  My first paper introduced the idea of generational cycles driven by a demographic mechanism.  Basically, times of below-trend price level would see less famine and hardship and less unrest than periods of above trend price level which would show the opposite.  The former period would be non-social moments (i.e. Highs and Unravelings) and the later would be social moments (Awakenings and Crises).  It was ripped to pieces and rejected.  I then went in with another manuscript that was returned needing major revisions.  I made these and the changes made were so great it was considered a new paper, it was reviewed a second time, I addressed the comments and it was published.  The stuff of mine I referenced is in the peer-reviewed literature, and so is a valid reference.

Thanks.  I will take a look at that. Is this "definition of a 4T" contained in the paper you linked to?

[JonLaw]

(01-27-2017, 04:51 PM)Mikebert Wrote: I believe that this 4T (if the concept is valid) will involve a domestic re-ordering to be accomplished politically, not through internal war (that is, the Depression & WW II model).

Many have pointed out a similarity of tone to the Civil War 4T.  I see the similarity, but are they saying this 4T will be resolved through internal military conflict (i.e. civil war/revolution)?

Please weigh in.

The tone today doesn't seem to be "North" vs. "South" as much as it is "urban" vs. "rural".

I suspect that the election of Trump significantly reduced the probability of internal military conflict, since the "rural" group got their Andrew Jackson into office. 

The "4T" concept is definitely valid, although I think it makes more sense to look at it as the end result, or deployment into time, of the impulse of the Awakening/2T.

[Mikebert]

(01-29-2017, 05:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Please don't put words in my mouth, especially when I am here and you can just ask me.  No, I went from around the end of WWII, when a dramatic 4T looking thing happened that realigned the political structures, I counted back about 80 years, and I saw a similar thing, likewise going back to the Revolutionary Wars.  

It is easy to see a periods that looks like a 4T around 1940 and 1870 for Germany and Italy. But go back another 80 years and you don't see another obvious one.  Two events do not make a cycle.  Thus they are not 4Ts, because the concept of a 4T implies a cycle.  For America there were three obvious 4T-like period, the bare minimum to suggest a cycle.

[SomeGuy]

(02-03-2017, 04:53 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-29-2017, 05:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Please don't put words in my mouth, especially when I am here and you can just ask me.  No, I went from around the end of WWII, when a dramatic 4T looking thing happened that realigned the political structures, I counted back about 80 years, and I saw a similar thing, likewise going back to the Revolutionary Wars.  

It is easy to see a periods that looks like a 4T around 1940 and 1870 for Germany and Italy. But go back another 80 years and you don't see another obvious one.  Two events do not make a cycle.  Thus they are not 4Ts, because the concept of a 4T implies a cycle.  For America there were three obvious 4T-like period, the bare minimum to suggest a cycle.

Well, there's the whole Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, but that's not quite 70 years further back.  And the 4T probably looked like it came early, if such a concept existed at the time, in the period from WWI to the mid-30s or so.

Those macrodecision phases do kind of skew things, IMO.

[freivolk]

(02-03-2017, 04:53 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-29-2017, 05:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Please don't put words in my mouth, especially when I am here and you can just ask me.  No, I went from around the end of WWII, when a dramatic 4T looking thing happened that realigned the political structures, I counted back about 80 years, and I saw a similar thing, likewise going back to the Revolutionary Wars.  

It is easy to see a periods that looks like a 4T around 1940 and 1870 for Germany and Italy. But go back another 80 years and you don't see another obvious one.  Two events do not make a cycle.  Thus they are not 4Ts, because the concept of a 4T implies a cycle.  For America there were three obvious 4T-like period, the bare minimum to suggest a cycle.

Really, you don´t see anything obvious? Like, for an example, the end of the 1000-years old Holy Roman Empire or the complete restructing of the german territories? Take a closer look!

[SomeGuy]

(02-03-2017, 05:27 PM)freivolk Wrote:

(02-03-2017, 04:53 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-29-2017, 05:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Please don't put words in my mouth, especially when I am here and you can just ask me.  No, I went from around the end of WWII, when a dramatic 4T looking thing happened that realigned the political structures, I counted back about 80 years, and I saw a similar thing, likewise going back to the Revolutionary Wars.  

It is easy to see a periods that looks like a 4T around 1940 and 1870 for Germany and Italy. But go back another 80 years and you don't see another obvious one.  Two events do not make a cycle.  Thus they are not 4Ts, because the concept of a 4T implies a cycle.  For America there were three obvious 4T-like period, the bare minimum to suggest a cycle.

Really, you don´t see anything obvious? Like, for an example, the end of the 1000-years old Holy Roman Empire or the complete restructing of the german territories? Take a closer look!

I think the quibble there is that the timing was a little off.  Those things happened after the turn of the century, rather than the 1780s.

[freivolk]

Even the american 4T goes till 1794. Why shouldn´t the continental 4T last till 1800? I personal think the continental 4T ends with the War of the Second Coalition. The French Revolution has ended, the new order of Napoleon is full established and the old order of the HRE is destroyed.

[SomeGuy]

(02-03-2017, 05:49 PM)freivolk Wrote: Even the american 4T goes till 1794. Why shouldn´t the continental 4T last till 1800? I personal think the continental 4T ends with the War of the Second Coalition. The French Revolution has ended, the new order of Napoleon is full established and the old order of the HRE is destroyed.

The argument that the Revolutionary Wars is a 4T and the Napoleonic era (with attendant wars) was a 1T is common on this site.  That still ignores that the things you are talking about in Germany didn't occur in the (proposed) 4T, they happened after 1806.  And the German Confederation that was the dominant political order in what would become Germany, wasn't instituted until 1815.

[freivolk]

(02-03-2017, 05:56 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

(02-03-2017, 05:49 PM)freivolk Wrote: Even the american 4T goes till 1794. Why shouldn´t the continental 4T last till 1800? I personal think the continental 4T ends with the War of the Second Coalition. The French Revolution has ended, the new order of Napoleon is full established and the old order of the HRE is destroyed.

The argument that the Revolutionary Wars is a 4T and the Napoleonic era (with attendant wars) was a 1T is common on this site.  That still ignores that the things you are talking about in Germany didn't occur in the (proposed) 4T, they happened after 1806.  And the German Confederation that was the dominant political order in what would become Germany, wasn't instituted until 1815.

1806 is just the formalisation of the end of the HRE. After the french victory in both coalition wars it was obvious, that the structure the empire was build upon was destroyed. Instead hundereds of imperial principalities we have now roughly 3 dotzend states. We have also keep in mind, that continental Europe is dominated by France, which enforce his vision of the 1T on the german states. This napoleonic 1T was cut short by the War of the Fifth Coaltion, which leaded to the need of a new political structure for Europe after the collapse of the french dominance. 1815 is therefore not the beginning of a german 1T, it is the beginning of the continental 2T, because the prophets which fought in the Wars of 1813/15 never really acccepts the restauratives insti´tution of 1815.

[SomeGuy]

(02-04-2017, 10:25 AM)freivolk Wrote:

(02-03-2017, 05:56 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

(02-03-2017, 05:49 PM)freivolk Wrote: Even the american 4T goes till 1794. Why shouldn´t the continental 4T last till 1800? I personal think the continental 4T ends with the War of the Second Coalition. The French Revolution has ended, the new order of Napoleon is full established and the old order of the HRE is destroyed.

The argument that the Revolutionary Wars is a 4T and the Napoleonic era (with attendant wars) was a 1T is common on this site.  That still ignores that the things you are talking about in Germany didn't occur in the (proposed) 4T, they happened after 1806.  And the German Confederation that was the dominant political order in what would become Germany, wasn't instituted until 1815.

1806 is just the formalisation of the end of the HRE. After the french victory in both coalition wars it was obvious, that the structure the empire was build upon was destroyed. Instead hundereds of imperial principalities we have now roughly 3 dotzend states. We have also keep in mind, that continental Europe is dominated by France, which enforce his vision of the 1T on the german states. This napoleonic 1T was cut short by the War of the Fifth Coaltion, which leaded to the need of a new political structure for Europe after the collapse of the french dominance. 1815 is therefore not the beginning of a german 1T, it is the beginning of the continental 2T, because the prophets which fought in the Wars of 1813/15 never really acccepts the restauratives insti´tution of 1815.

It's certainly an interesting argument, one I don't necessarily disagree with (at least in broad strokes).  Where are you trying to date the 4T/1T transition in "Germany" then, the Peace of Basel?

[Eric the Green]

A good date for the French Revolution 4T was from 1781, when the French victory over Britain in the American Revolution left the state finances in shambles, to 1799 when Napoleon declared the Revolution over.

[SomeGuy]

(02-04-2017, 11:51 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: A good date for the French Revolution 4T was from 1781, when the French victory over Britain in the American Revolution left the state finances in shambles, to 1799 when Napoleon declared the Revolution over.

Yes, but are we sure Germany's 4T lined up exactly with France's?