01-28-2017, 01:07 PM
Due to a quirk in my browsing history, the default landing site for this website that autocomplete provides me is the "Who's Online" page. As a result of that, I would like to thank Dave Horn for cluing me into the existence of this thread in the first place, where I was referenced by name (or nom de keyboard, as it were), twice no less. Thanks, Dave!
Mike,
I don't necessarily agree with the sharp distinctions you are drawing between flavors of turnings, though the idea of categorizing them according to the dominant thread is an interesting one which I support.
I mean, many of the domestic reorderings, be they through civil war or overwhelming political victory of one side over another, involved a strong foreign component as well. And even the Elizabethan era involved internal tensions, plots, rebellions, and other "domestic issues". Old Bess and her ministers just happened to be unusually competent. And the Armada crisis was part of a rising on Britain's part, whereas I don't think we are in the same situation. A better example of a successfully managed crisis with a strongly foreign component would be the British one in the mid-to-late 19th century (1850s-1871 or so). I am not sure we have that sort of leadership in place, although it is possible.
And given the extent of our assets and industry overseas, any foreign crisis of any significance could bring about a strong domestic restructuring as well.
I can see the similarities to the Civil War build-up as well, but since we should be well into the Bloody Kansas period in that case the only equivalent I could see would be if BLM actually morphed into a general uprising (as the occasional provocateur has tried to spark already), which I don't think would have the tenor and outcome a lot of left-wing people here and elsewhere would be hoping for.
So, I generally view 4Ts as having components of all of the above, and it is only the relative proportion and importance of those segments that changes from crisis to crisis.
Warren,
I appreciate the sentiment. As I noted above, like you, I question whether our institutions have the skill and foresight to bring a positive conclusion about. I suppose we'll have to wait and see.
PBrower,
Over-extension and hubris have traditionally been the methods of hegemonic decline. So, in a gross breach of my standard operating procedures, I am going to agree with you here. Don't let it go to your head.
Eric,
Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?). It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort. A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s? Also a possibility.
Dave Horn,
I agree that DJT's prime chance of consolidating his political victory rest in successfully managing a big infrastructure buildout, and that automation and GW could (and probably will) become salient issues a little further down the line, though I don't think they will play as much of a role in the next 10 years as they will in another 20-30 years or so.
Mike,
I don't necessarily agree with the sharp distinctions you are drawing between flavors of turnings, though the idea of categorizing them according to the dominant thread is an interesting one which I support.
I mean, many of the domestic reorderings, be they through civil war or overwhelming political victory of one side over another, involved a strong foreign component as well. And even the Elizabethan era involved internal tensions, plots, rebellions, and other "domestic issues". Old Bess and her ministers just happened to be unusually competent. And the Armada crisis was part of a rising on Britain's part, whereas I don't think we are in the same situation. A better example of a successfully managed crisis with a strongly foreign component would be the British one in the mid-to-late 19th century (1850s-1871 or so). I am not sure we have that sort of leadership in place, although it is possible.
And given the extent of our assets and industry overseas, any foreign crisis of any significance could bring about a strong domestic restructuring as well.
I can see the similarities to the Civil War build-up as well, but since we should be well into the Bloody Kansas period in that case the only equivalent I could see would be if BLM actually morphed into a general uprising (as the occasional provocateur has tried to spark already), which I don't think would have the tenor and outcome a lot of left-wing people here and elsewhere would be hoping for.
So, I generally view 4Ts as having components of all of the above, and it is only the relative proportion and importance of those segments that changes from crisis to crisis.
Warren,
I appreciate the sentiment. As I noted above, like you, I question whether our institutions have the skill and foresight to bring a positive conclusion about. I suppose we'll have to wait and see.
PBrower,
Over-extension and hubris have traditionally been the methods of hegemonic decline. So, in a gross breach of my standard operating procedures, I am going to agree with you here. Don't let it go to your head.
Eric,
Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?). It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort. A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s? Also a possibility.
Dave Horn,
I agree that DJT's prime chance of consolidating his political victory rest in successfully managing a big infrastructure buildout, and that automation and GW could (and probably will) become salient issues a little further down the line, though I don't think they will play as much of a role in the next 10 years as they will in another 20-30 years or so.