Report Card for Donald Trump

[Mikebert]

(01-02-2017, 10:51 AM)Warren Dew Wrote: Warren Dew
That's not how GDP works.  GDP is a measure of final goods and services; intermediate goods and services used to produce those final goods and services aren't counted.  When technological advances mean some of those intermediate goods and services are no longer needed and their cost can be saved, that in itself doesn't change GDP at all.

The reduction in inputs does reduce the revenues of the source of the inputs, which reduces their employment and income.  This in turn negatively impacts aggregate demand, which feeds back in GDP.

[Mikebert]

(01-02-2017, 03:12 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:I took a look. You wrote:

The United States is number 7 on the list, and the top three countries all have manufacturing work forces that make up over 20% of their labor force, roughly double the United States' 12%.

The same source you used for these three countries also has the US with more than 20%.  But it is true than these these other countries all have large shares than the US.  Then again, they industrialized later and I believe all three run trade surpluses, which we do not as a matter of policy.

You're only interested in the automation bit?  Fair enough.

To that end, look at the sources most closely.  

I did and I see the 12% so I see where you got that.  But this is for manufacturing whereas the others are for industry.  I suspect the categories for the other three countries are more broadly defined (as there are fewer of them).  The GDP figures are for industry for all four and each shows the same number of categories.  So the GDP sector comparisons are more likely apples to apples than the labor comparisons.

[Mikebert]

(01-02-2017, 03:12 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: You're only interested in the automation bit?  Fair enough.

No, but this aspect was what we had been discussing.

[Mikebert]

Quote:The subjective theory of value has been well-established for well over a hundred years.  No one would ever exchange anything if they did not value what they were getting more than what they actually had, which means both parties must value the commodities being exchanged as being worth either less or more than the actual price, with the parties having differing opinions on which is which.

But the people producing the free stuff need income, which has to come from somewhere. You cannot feed your family on subjective value.

[Mikebert]

Some Guy Wrote:Part of the problem was the total system participating in this K-wave was expanded by trade policy, which meant that much of the manufacturing income that would previously have gone to American laborers was instead sourced to factories overseas.  Consumers (and certain companies) benefited, but for many those benefits did not exceed the costs from lost income and investment.

There is also the issue that the information economy cluster of leading sectors is quite a bit smaller than its predecessor. Back in 2003 I estimated it at one-third the size. Evidence of this was the relatively slow growth in the 1980's and 1990's compared to previous growth booms.  And then the growth in the cycle leading up to 2007 was positively anemic.  Growth should have been very strong as high speed internet, B2B and internet II rolled out.

[Warren Dew]

(01-02-2017, 05:14 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-02-2017, 10:51 AM)Warren Dew Wrote: That's not how GDP works.  GDP is a measure of final goods and services; intermediate goods and services used to produce those final goods and services aren't counted.  When technological advances mean some of those intermediate goods and services are no longer needed and their cost can be saved, that in itself doesn't change GDP at all.

The reduction in inputs does reduce the revenues of the source of the inputs, which reduces their employment and income.  This in turn negatively impacts aggregate demand, which feeds back in GDP.

That's a different argument than you were making before, and may or may not be true depending on the extent to which the inputs are labor.  Reducing the demand for timber for making newsprint due a shift to electronic media, for example, wouldn't result in much if any negative feedback.

And there's still the issue of positive feedback from spending the money that is saved, if it is indeed spent.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:I did and I see the 12% so I see where you got that.  But this is for manufacturing whereas the others are for industry.  I suspect the categories for the other three countries are more broadly defined (as there are fewer of them).  The GDP figures are for industry for all four and each shows the same number of categories.  So the GDP sector comparisons are more likely apples to apples than the labor comparisons.

The point is well taken, but measuring by GDP doesn't speak to the issue of employment vis automation, which is what we are discussing.  Nonetheless, by any measure, their share of industry as a share of the labor force is at least as high of ours despite significantly higher levels of automation, showing that an increase in automation does not necessarily lead to a drop in the size or share of the labor force devoted to it, even in this day and age.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:But the people producing the free stuff need income, which has to come from somewhere. You cannot feed your family on subjective value.

So we are conceding the earlier claim concerning value?  Glad to hear of it.
As for the need for income, of course, this is where the whole sideline about advertising came in.  And while giants like Facebook and Google do derive the majority of their revenue from advertising, others like Microsoft and Apple derive their from traditional sales of hardware and software.  And this only covers the big headliners.  What of the corporate spending on IT services, increased electrical consumption, routers, devices, infrastructure, etc.  You have already acknowledged that these things constitute the sort of spending on new demand that traditionally constitutes a K-wave, so why do you keep circling around to the advertising issue?

Quote:There is also the issue that the information economy cluster of leading sectors is quite a bit smaller than its predecessor. Back in 2003 I estimated it at one-third the size. Evidence of this was the relatively slow growth in the 1980's and 1990's compared to previous growth booms.  And then the growth in the cycle leading up to 2007 was positively anemic.  Growth should have been very strong as high speed internet, B2B and internet II rolled out.

Yes, but you haven't covered the extent to which this was distorted by trade policy.  Manufacturing employment stalled in the 80s and 90s here in the US, and has fallen off a cliff since 2000, even as manufacturing in East Asia set up to service US demand soared.  Or about the rise of IT services in India, again servicing the US market.  The growth in the use of H1B visas and evidence of collusion between firms in Silicon Valley to suppress wages?
Also, and I haven't read Leading Sectors in a while, but how far back are you going?  The previous couple of K-Waves coincided with a tremendous surge in population growth and the sudden availability of vast new energy supplies.  By contrast, the 19th (IT) K-wave has coincided with a decline or outright stagnation in the rate of change for both, at least here in the developed world.
I'd be interested in reading and discussing the actual work you did on this, if you don't mind.

[Mikebert]

(01-02-2017, 07:44 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:But the people producing the free stuff need income, which has to come from somewhere. You cannot feed your family on subjective value.

 What of the corporate spending on IT services, increased electrical consumption, routers, devices, infrastructure, etc.  You have already acknowledged that these things constitute the sort of spending on new demand that traditionally constitutes a K-wave, so why do you keep circling around to the advertising issue?

I'd be interested in reading and discussing the actual work you did on this, if you don't mind.

Corporate spending ultimately must be paid for by revenue that comes from consumer spending.  If the new corporate spending is paid from with new consumer spending then it is part of a leading sector. If the corporate spending is paid for by savings then it doesn't act as a leading sector. This is because the growth is IT infrastructure is offset by shrinkage elsewhere in the economy. The advertising is simply an easy to identify example of this cost shifting.

Some of this spending does constitute a leading sector. For example online gaming requires good network infrastructure and a lot of hardware.  I paid a premium for my PC simply so I could play my favorite game at a reasonable pace. This is real leading sector stuff.  I'm sure we could think of many other examples. 

The only online material I have on this stuff is the two links I game above. The size concept is only in my fourth book.

https://www.amazon.com/Cycles-American-P...0595327214

I stopped looking into this stuff around 2004, as I was starting to shift into looking at this stuff from a political-economic pov as opposed to economic-political.

[Mikebert]

(01-02-2017, 07:20 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:I did and I see the 12% so I see where you got that.  But this is for manufacturing whereas the others are for industry.  I suspect the categories for the other three countries are more broadly defined (as there are fewer of them).  The GDP figures are for industry for all four and each shows the same number of categories.  So the GDP sector comparisons are more likely apples to apples than the labor comparisons.

The point is well taken, but measuring by GDP doesn't speak to the issue of employment vis automation, which is what we are discussing.  Nonetheless, by any measure, their share of industry as a share of the labor force is at least as high of ours despite significantly higher levels of automation, showing that an increase in automation does not necessarily lead to a drop in the size or share of the labor force devoted to it, even in this day and age.

It doesn't show that.  To do that you would have to look at how employment and automation evolved over time in all four countries.  Industrialization began in the US earlier than any of these countries, also Japan and Germany received a set back in WW II, which likely results in the loss of a decade or two worth of development, making their starts effectively later than they actually were.  That is, where the US is could simply reflect that fact that the US is further along its development track.  To check this out you might look at Britain, who is further past the Industrial Revolution than are we.

[Warren Dew]

(01-03-2017, 09:00 AM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-02-2017, 07:20 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:I did and I see the 12% so I see where you got that.  But this is for manufacturing whereas the others are for industry.  I suspect the categories for the other three countries are more broadly defined (as there are fewer of them).  The GDP figures are for industry for all four and each shows the same number of categories.  So the GDP sector comparisons are more likely apples to apples than the labor comparisons.

The point is well taken, but measuring by GDP doesn't speak to the issue of employment vis automation, which is what we are discussing.  Nonetheless, by any measure, their share of industry as a share of the labor force is at least as high of ours despite significantly higher levels of automation, showing that an increase in automation does not necessarily lead to a drop in the size or share of the labor force devoted to it, even in this day and age.

It doesn't show that.  To do that you would have to look at how employment and automation evolved over time in all four countries.  Industrialization began in the US earlier than any of these countries, also Japan and Germany received a set back in WW II, which likely results in the loss of a decade or two worth of development, making their starts effectively later than they actually were.  That is, where the US is could simply reflect that fact that the US is further along its development track.  To check this out you might look at Britain, who is further past the Industrial Revolution than are we.

This is a weak argument considering that the opposite argument - that Germany and Japan leapfrogged ahead in technology due to having to replace obsolescent factories that were destroyed, rather than keeping those obsolescent factories running as in the US - has more often been made.  You were much better off with your argument that the difference is because they are export economies and we aren't.  That of course begs the question of why we aren't an export economy, which probably comes down to the fact that exporting virtual dollar bills is more economically advantageous than exporting actual goods.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:Corporate spending ultimately must be paid for by revenue that comes from consumer spending.

Or from equity markets, or exports, etc.

Quote:If the new corporate spending is paid from with new consumer spending then it is part of a leading sector. If the corporate spending is paid for by savings then it doesn't act as a leading sector. This is because the growth is IT infrastructure is offset by shrinkage elsewhere in the economy. The advertising is simply an easy to identify example of this cost shifting.

Some of this spending does constitute a leading sector. For example online gaming requires good network infrastructure and a lot of hardware.  I paid a premium for my PC simply so I could play my favorite game at a reasonable pace. This is real leading sector stuff.  I'm sure we could think of many other examples.  

The only online material I have on this stuff is the two links I game above. The size concept is only in my fourth book.

https://www.amazon.com/Cycles-American-P...0595327214

I stopped looking into this stuff around 2004, as I was starting to shift into looking at this stuff from a political-economic pov as opposed to economic-political.

So what you're saying is that you haven't really done any work on this for over a decade, and you have no way of telling how much of it constitutes new demand, how much is new demand diverted overseas by trade policy, how much is cost shifting, etc.?  Then what has all of this been about?

Quote:It doesn't show that.  To do that you would have to look at how employment and automation evolved over time in all four countries.  Industrialization began in the US earlier than any of these countries, also Japan and Germany received a set back in WW II, which likely results in the loss of a decade or two worth of development, making their starts effectively later than they actually were.  That is, where the US is could simply reflect that fact that the US is further along its development track.  To check this out you might look at Britain, who is further past the Industrial Revolution than are we.

It clearly shows higher level of manufacturing employment.  And Germany clearly industrialized at the same time as US, with its big spurt in the late 19th century.  You're just making things up, here.  If the US were further along some inevitable manufacturing track than the others, and the UK further still, wouldn't they have HIGHER levels of automation?  Where is this claim that manufacturing has a defined lifecycle coming from?

[Mikebert]

I first look at innovation wave/leading sector stuff in the 1990's.  Back then I saw the K-peaks in 1864, 1920 and 1981 and the period of strong growth afterward 4.7% (1866-73) 4.8% (1921-29) and 4.4% (1982-89) as the same points of time in the K-cycle.  These periods were followed by downturns and then a period of very strong growth afterward: 8.9% (1877-81) and 9.4% (1933-37). Both of these periods occurred during growth phase of cluster of leading sectors, or "new economy" as Harry Dent puts it. The previous growth phases ended in 1888 and 1937 for the industrial and mass-market economy, respectively and the current one was forecasted to end in 2007. Based on this concept I anticipated strong growth in the late 1990's, not as strong as in 1877-81 or 1933-37, since these were coming off economic lows, but still stronger than what was saw in the 1980's.  Didn't happen, growth over 1996-2000 was the same as in the 1980's.

This was all before generations. In 2000-1 I added the idea of generations to my thinking and concluded that the K-cycle was longer today than its historic 50-60 year length. Based on a correlation between the start of K-winter and the 4T in 1929, I took the apparent 2001 start of the 4T as evidence that K-winter began in 2000.  This makes the economic boom over the 1982-2000 bull market cycle equivalent to the 1861-81 and 1921-29 bull markets, for which growth averaged 4.9% and 4.8%, respectively.  Growth over the 1982-2000 bull averaged only 3.7%, a bit less but not way out of line.

But that wasn't right.  We now think 2008 is a 4T start and I did confirm that 2008 was a 1929-equivalent economic event.  So this means the analog to 1921-29 is now 1982-2007 for which average growth was only 3.2% due to poor growth of 2.7% over the 2001-2007 expansion.  In other words during the growth phase of the information economy growth was strongest in the 1980's before the internet, when PCs and floppy disks were cutting edge. The addition of much more capable machines, capable hard drives, and the internet (which changed everything so said the stock market boosters in the nineties bubble) gave us slightly slower growth.  Then after 2000, broadband, B2B and social media, brought us even slower growth. Adding smart phones since 2007 and a lot more social media hasn't helped--growth over 2009-15 was even slower at 2.2%.  These leading sectors aren't powering growth like they used to.  If what you say is true about all this huge spending on IT infrastructure creating growth, then it would show up in the numbers.

Back in 2004 when I counted up total employment in the industries I was using to track the information economy compared to 1970 employment in those I was using to track the mass-productive economy it appeared that the current cluster was about a third the size of the old one.  The GDP growth figures also point to a much smaller size. If you wish to assert that out current leading sectors are as big as ever, where is the missing growth?  We are taking about $6-7 trillion in GDP that should be here, but isn't.
**********************************************************************
Also Germany did not begin industrialization when we did.  Britain was first, they began the industrial revolution in ca. 1765.  We followed about 30 years later. German industrialization did not get underway until mid 19th century and Japan a bit later.  Korea started after WW II.  The US never saw sustained growth levels much above 3-4%, whereas Japan and Korea saw faster growth rates and China faster yet The leading sector explanation for this is that the US exploited each leading sector cluster one at a time, as we had to wait for the net one to be innovated.  Not so for the late comers.  China is still industrializing like we did in the 19th century, until recently they were showing big growth in iron, steel, cement and commodity chemical production.  At the same time they are rolling our their consumer good manufacturing economy like we did in the early and mid 20th century.  But simultaneously they are rolling out the information and service economy, just as we are. So they have triple the leading sectors and so they see much stronger growth than we did when we were industrializing.

[SomeGuy]

Mike,

3 things:

One - Keep in mind that Modelski et al. traced 19 different k-waves going back several centuries.  Just because we don't have quite the same growth we did during the Industrial Revolution (when populations and energy use was soaring) doesn't mean this (IT) isn't an innovation complex driving growth.

Two - You keep dancing around the issue of trade.  You keep staring at US growth numbers and completely ignore the burgeoning electronics sector in East Asia built to service US demand.  Had those factories been built here, you would have seen it in the US growth and inflation numbers.  You can't keep fixating on one country's numbers and just completely ignore the enormous wave of globalization that occurred during that same period.

Three - Where are you getting your dates for industrialization?  What does this have to do automation?

[SomeGuy]

Quote:Er ... uh ... "The Singularity" 'n stuff? ..... 

You mean the Rapture of the Nerds?  Wasn't the whole point of that idea that we would all be downloaded into computers or something, or that hyper-intelligent AI would emerge to destroy us/solve all of our problems/make us all dress in black leather and mirrorshades?

So, if the Singularity is a real thing, and not just Ray Kurzweil dealing with his father's and his own (impending) death, all of this discussion will be moot, then, won't it?

[SomeGuy]

Mike,


Oh, and:

Four - Given this shift in manufacturing (even of the high-value added stuff like Iphones and computer chips that we were originally supposed to hold on to when this outsourcing thing got started) to East Asia, the extent to which IT/telecommunications has enabled the emergence of these sorts of global supply chains, the tremendous growth in China's IT sector, the general pattern of hegemons only holding on for one or at most two k-waves, you can make a substantial argument, as you begun to in your last post, that China may in fact be the locus of the next k-wave/future hegemony, and the chief beneficiary of the tail-end of this one.

Just something to consider.

[Warren Dew]

(01-03-2017, 02:07 PM)Mikebert Wrote: I first look at innovation wave/leading sector stuff in the 1990's.  Back then I saw the K-peaks in 1864, 1920 and 1981 and the period of strong growth afterward 4.7% (1866-73) 4.8% (1921-29) and 4.4% (1982-89) as the same points of time in the K-cycle.  These periods were followed by downturns and then a period of very strong growth afterward: 8.9% (1877-81) and 9.4% (1933-37). Both of these periods occurred during growth phase of cluster of leading sectors, or "new economy" as Harry Dent puts it. The previous growth phases ended in 1888 and 1937 for the industrial and mass-market economy, respectively and the current one was forecasted to end in 2007. Based on this concept I anticipated strong growth in the late 1990's, not as strong as in 1877-81 or 1933-37, since these were coming off economic lows, but still stronger than what was saw in the 1980's.  Didn't happen, growth over 1996-2000 was the same as in the 1980's.

This was all before generations. In 2000-1 I added the idea of generations to my thinking and concluded that the K-cycle was longer today than its historic 50-60 year length. Based on a correlation between the start of K-winter and the 4T in 1929, I took the apparent 2001 start of the 4T as evidence that K-winter began in 2000.  This makes the economic boom over the 1982-2000 bull market cycle equivalent to the 1861-81 and 1921-29 bull markets, for which growth averaged 4.9% and 4.8%, respectively.  Growth over the 1982-2000 bull averaged only 3.7%, a bit less but not way out of line.

But that wasn't right.  We now think 2008 is a 4T start and I did confirm that 2008 was a 1929-equivalent economic event.  So this means the analog to 1921-29 is now 1982-2007 for which average growth was only 3.2% due to poor growth of 2.7% over the 2001-2007 expansion.  In other words during the growth phase of the information economy growth was strongest in the 1980's before the internet, when PCs and floppy disks were cutting edge. The addition of much more capable machines, capable hard drives, and the internet (which changed everything so said the stock market boosters in the nineties bubble) gave us slightly slower growth.  Then after 2000, broadband, B2B and social media, brought us even slower growth. Adding smart phones since 2007 and a lot more social media hasn't helped--growth over 2009-15 was even slower at 2.2%.  These leading sectors aren't powering growth like they used to.  If what you say is true about all this huge spending on IT infrastructure creating growth, then it would show up in the numbers.

Why do you think the k cycle and the generational cycle have to be aligned?

[Mikebert]

(01-03-2017, 03:27 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Mike,


Oh, and:

Four - Given this shift in manufacturing (even of the high-value added stuff like Iphones and computer chips that we were originally supposed to hold on to when this outsourcing thing got started) to East Asia, the extent to which IT/telecommunications has enabled the emergence of these sorts of global supply chains, the tremendous growth in China's IT sector, the general pattern of hegemons only holding on for one or at most two k-waves, you can make a substantial argument, as you begun to in your last post, that China may in fact be the locus of the next k-wave/future hegemony, and the chief beneficiary of the tail-end of this one.

Just something to consider.

That was obvious in the 1990's. Who else had the potential?  But my analysis suggested China would not emerge a hegemon until mid-century.  Typically a new hegemon first reaches economic dominance (US in the 1880's) then financial dominance (US after 1914) and then finally hegemony (US in 1943).  Since China was not scheduled to overtake the US in GDP until the 2020's or so, I wouldn't except this to translate to hegemony until around 2060.  At this time I was operating with a 70 years cycle: 1918-1991 and 1992-2060.  Hence a second round of US hegemony.  I showed you all this already Jordan, so why are you rehashing it?

And why come back as an alias?  Why not use your old handle?

[Mikebert]

(01-03-2017, 03:57 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-03-2017, 02:07 PM)Mikebert Wrote: I first look at innovation wave/leading sector stuff in the 1990's.  Back then I saw the K-peaks in 1864, 1920 and 1981 and the period of strong growth afterward 4.7% (1866-73) 4.8% (1921-29) and 4.4% (1982-89) as the same points of time in the K-cycle.  These periods were followed by downturns and then a period of very strong growth afterward: 8.9% (1877-81) and 9.4% (1933-37). Both of these periods occurred during growth phase of cluster of leading sectors, or "new economy" as Harry Dent puts it. The previous growth phases ended in 1888 and 1937 for the industrial and mass-market economy, respectively and the current one was forecasted to end in 2007. Based on this concept I anticipated strong growth in the late 1990's, not as strong as in 1877-81 or 1933-37, since these were coming off economic lows, but still stronger than what was saw in the 1980's.  Didn't happen, growth over 1996-2000 was the same as in the 1980's.

This was all before generations. In 2000-1 I added the idea of generations to my thinking and concluded that the K-cycle was longer today than its historic 50-60 year length. Based on a correlation between the start of K-winter and the 4T in 1929, I took the apparent 2001 start of the 4T as evidence that K-winter began in 2000.  This makes the economic boom over the 1982-2000 bull market cycle equivalent to the 1861-81 and 1921-29 bull markets, for which growth averaged 4.9% and 4.8%, respectively.  Growth over the 1982-2000 bull averaged only 3.7%, a bit less but not way out of line.

But that wasn't right.  We now think 2008 is a 4T start and I did confirm that 2008 was a 1929-equivalent economic event.  So this means the analog to 1921-29 is now 1982-2007 for which average growth was only 3.2% due to poor growth of 2.7% over the 2001-2007 expansion.  In other words during the growth phase of the information economy growth was strongest in the 1980's before the internet, when PCs and floppy disks were cutting edge. The addition of much more capable machines, capable hard drives, and the internet (which changed everything so said the stock market boosters in the nineties bubble) gave us slightly slower growth.  Then after 2000, broadband, B2B and social media, brought us even slower growth. Adding smart phones since 2007 and a lot more social media hasn't helped--growth over 2009-15 was even slower at 2.2%.  These leading sectors aren't powering growth like they used to.  If what you say is true about all this huge spending on IT infrastructure creating growth, then it would show up in the numbers.

Why do you think the k cycle and the generational cycle have to be aligned?

I don't anymore.  Back in the 1990's and early 2000's it looked promising. There was a correspondence between turnings 1929-1946, 1946-1964, 1964-1984 and 1984-  and K-cycle seasons 1929-1946, 1946-1966, 1966-1982, 1982-2008.  It was driven by the correspondence between the 1980's and the 1920's in economic and political terms, and the 1990's and the 1920's in new innovation/new economy terms.  Roy Neuberger, who shorted Radio at its peak in '29, still active a nearly 100 in the late nineties noted the similarity between the late 1920's and the current times.  So yeah I thought there was a connection 10-20 years ago.  Now?  Not so much.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:That was obvious in the 1990's. Who else had the potential?  But my analysis suggested China would not emerge a hegemon until mid-century.  Typically a new hegemon first reaches economic dominance (US in the 1880's) then financial dominance (US after 1914) and then finally hegemony (US in 1943).  Since China was not scheduled to overtake the US in GDP until the 2020's or so, I wouldn't except this to translate to hegemony until around 2060.  At this time I was operating with a 70 years cycle: 1918-1991 and 1992-2060.  Hence a second round of US hegemony.  I showed you all this already Jordan, so why are you rehashing it?

I seem to remember not accepting your new timeframe vs that actually outlined in the book.  I am kinda noticing a trend here...

How are you determining your dates?  Why are you only going back one cycle?  Are you referring to nominal or PPP GDP?  On a per capita or absolute basis?

Quote:And why come back as an alias?  Why not use your old handle?

Because my old handle was actually my name, and I decided that I didn't necessarily want to nail my colors to the mast, as it were.  In particular, when I was first browsing this new site, I noticed that PBrower had practiced a vile bit of thread necromancy on his "Is Connecticut the best state" where he selectively quoted me from the old thread and then threw in new responses (while leaving out all the bits where I showed that he didn't actually know what things like the Law of Large Numbers meant, that his just-so stories had serious logical inconsistencies, etc.) to make it look like he wasn't a complete idiot grinding an axe.  And, since it had my name attached, it was particularly offensive, as at the time that he did this here I was no longer posting and thus not able to raise a complaint.  So, when I decided that I had the time and desire to discuss certain issues here again, I decided to protect myself from future involuntary association with creeps, cranks, and losers by using an alias.