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(01-24-2017, 05:31 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I don't think they preclude a more conventional conflict a little later on, and I don't think that conflict would necessarily escalate to a full-on nuclear exchange. Probably wouldn't, really, for much the same reason the Korean War didn't.
No. There was no nuclear capability in the modern sense during the Korean War. Fusion-based explosions had just been achieved, but had not yet been weaponized. Fission bombs existed, but could only be delivered to the USSR by bomber. They could not be delivered to the US because the Russians did not, as yet, have a delivery system. Red China did not have the bomb, but the US lacked the many hundreds of atomic bombs that would be necessary to completely destroy China (or Russia). The fact is, non of the belligerents at the time had the capability to go nuclear in a big way. I would not use Korea as an example.
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(01-27-2017, 03:00 PM)Mikebert Wrote: (01-24-2017, 05:31 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I don't think they preclude a more conventional conflict a little later on, and I don't think that conflict would necessarily escalate to a full-on nuclear exchange. Probably wouldn't, really, for much the same reason the Korean War didn't.
No. There was no nuclear capability in the modern sense during the Korean War. Fusion-based explosions had just been achieved, but had not yet been weaponized. Fission bombs existed, but could only be delivered to the USSR by bomber. They could not be delivered to the US because the Russians did not, as yet, have a delivery system. Red China did not have the bomb, but the US lacked the many hundreds of atomic bombs that would be necessary to completely destroy China (or Russia). The fact is, non of the belligerents at the time had the capability to go nuclear in a big way. I would not use Korea as an example.
Yeah, Dave already dinged me on it, and I conceded the example. I think the larger point stands, in the sense that it is wholly possible for the major powers to engage in a conventional conflict without having an incentive to trade queens, as it were, and a substantial incentive (vis megadeath of their respective populations) not to.
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Type faster, Mike! 
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(01-26-2017, 02:25 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: (01-25-2017, 05:41 PM)Mikebert Wrote: (01-24-2017, 04:07 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Seriously, detail me the scenario that leads directly from something like Taiwan to either country launching their missiles at the other in the full knowledge of a corresponding attack on their own facilities and populations, and explain to me why it would be the only outcome.
The issue is simple. What is the point of engaging in a military conflict in which you cannot win? Suppose Trump decided to blockcade these islands. Can you show a path where he can win? I don't see it, and if I see this, so do the Chinese. They can keep pushing until Trump gives up, after all, is he going to end civilization over some fucking islands in the South China Sea? The US considers the Carribean an American lake--what's the difference?
And this is the problem. In the old days such issues would be resolved by all-out great power coalition wars (read Kennedy's book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers). You can't do that now, an all-out conflict would go nuclear. So the great powers resorted to a minuet, with proxy wars to make their point. Most of the great powers, (except for the strongest two) got a clue and pulled out, seeing it was a fools game. Does China want to play this game? No! They want what I would want, sure things--like the Spratley's. (The islands no, the principle, yes).
I literally just finished rereading Paul Kennedy. You might want to read it again. The middle powers tried desperately to hold on to their status, they dropped out because they could no longer compete.
You keep referencing an escalation to nuclear weapons, but you don't explain why one would occur. Flashpoints in the region are Taiwan, the SCS, Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the Korean Penisula, issues of trade, all overlying the root issues of "fear, honor, and interest", per Thucydides. All of those things are visibly factors in US/China tensions, and tensions between China and many of its neighbors. What would those sorts of conflicts look like? Nuclear launches within minutes/days of first contact? I don't think so.
I was referring to Kennedy's thesis that the rise and fall of the great powers were settled with great power coalition wars (GPCW) in which the side with the military potential won. Many years later, I saw that the GPCW wars that decided things were M&T's Global Wars. The very concept of a GPCW is that each side throws in everything (including the kitchen sink) to win. A great power war that does not go nuclear cannot end, because both sides will remain able to carry. If this ability were to be threatened (i.e. one side stood ready to conquer the other) the losing side would come under tremendous pressure to go nuclear. Since nobody wants a nuclear war, it makes no sense for great powers to actually go to war with each other. They will prefer to use proxies, like Vietnam and Korea when policymakers could not think in anything other than military terms, or more subtle strategies like cyber warfare and interfering in another great powers election.
Trump wants to clamp down on free trade and globalization. How would YOU do that? Maybe a clever strategy would be to buddy up with Russia, who do not export goods than compete with US manufacturers, and become cold with China in the hope that you can get them to do something that sufficiently provocative to justify a trade war in response. Such a war would crater our economy in the short term. If we can blame it on China and point out that a recession (even a serious one) is preferable to a nuclear war, maybe Trump's base won't abandon him.
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Worse every day. Basically if you disagree with his agenda he will hit you harder with it.
He's a sore winner.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the dedicated Communist but instead the people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction, true and false, no longer exists -- Hannah Arendt.
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(01-27-2017, 03:05 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I think the larger point stands, in the sense that it is wholly possible for the major powers to engage in a conventional conflict without having an incentive to trade queens, as it were, and a substantial incentive (vis megadeath of their respective populations) not to.
But where is the incentive to start the conventional conflict in the first place if there can be no winner.?
I would point out that the USSR engaged in military measures against the US after WW II up to the start of Korean in 1950--all at a time when the US did not yet have a sizable nuclear capability. They stopped doing so when this changed. After the change they operated strictly within their own sphere--backing down the one time they tried to do otherwise in Cuba. Now I see the Chinese actions in the South China Sea as them acting in their own sphere--its like the US in the Caribbean or the USSR in Hungary. I think they probably see this as their affair to be handled by diplomacy with the affected SE Asia nations--and none of America's business.
That is, this issue is for us what the Cuban crisis was for the Soviets. We can't win, because they are in the geopolitical right. Since there can be no ultimate resolution (which would require nuclear war) why would the US decide a hot war response would make sense? Any hot war would give the results of a trade war, plus more lots of American servicemen getting killed for no damn good reason, why no just opt for the trade war, and keep all those American servicemen (that Trump says he cares about) still breathing?
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01-27-2017, 04:18 PM
(This post was last modified: 01-27-2017, 04:19 PM by Mikebert.)
(01-27-2017, 03:40 PM)X_4AD_84 Wrote: The problem with the MX and for that matter, US land based ICBMs in general is that for some strange reason, the US, even with our wonders of Motor City technology, completely sucks at TELs. We've never had a TEL that can support ICBMs. Meanwhile, Russia and the PRC have really good TELs. Not only can a TEL drive anywhere there are passable roads, it can be put on a plane, a train, or a ship. That is excellent flexibility. For example, what if, airlift suddenly set up a bunch of SS-18s or DF-41s on TELs in some African country. Talk about a chess move. We can't do that. The best we can do is have a sub slowly putt its way to a point in navigable waters.
When you use an acronym (TEL) you should spell it out in the first use, so the reader knows to what your are referring. Otherwise what you write is incomprehensible.
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(01-27-2017, 04:18 PM)Mikebert Wrote: (01-27-2017, 03:40 PM)X_4AD_84 Wrote: The problem with the MX and for that matter, US land based ICBMs in general is that for some strange reason, the US, even with our wonders of Motor City technology, completely sucks at TELs. We've never had a TEL that can support ICBMs. Meanwhile, Russia and the PRC have really good TELs. Not only can a TEL drive anywhere there are passable roads, it can be put on a plane, a train, or a ship. That is excellent flexibility. For example, what if, airlift suddenly set up a bunch of SS-18s or DF-41s on TELs in some African country. Talk about a chess move. We can't do that. The best we can do is have a sub slowly putt its way to a point in navigable waters.
When you use an acronym (TEL) you should spell it out in the first use, so the reader knows to what your are referring. Otherwise what you write is incomprehensible.
Transporter Erector Launcher.
As for the rest, TBC, I have to go back to work. 
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(01-27-2017, 01:33 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Quote:Disperse it where? Read my last few words, please. As I said, "back into the waves". The sand would sink back to the bottom where it was dredged up from in the first place.
With respect to radiation, a bomb has a few kilograms of fissionable material, while a power reactor has a few metric tons - several orders of magnitude more. If we could live with Fukushima without shutting down all the nuclear reactors in the world, the military will be able to live with a few bombs. That's assuming the decision makers will have "thought this through", which isn't something to be counted on once you get into a shooting war.
Note that I'm not advocating using nukes, just pointing out how it could happen. Keep in mind it's going to be Boomers making the ultiimate decision, not Silents who tend to think things through to the point of indecision.
So you have a reclaimed island with a massive harbor and an odd shape and one hit from a nuke and all of it is going to go right to the bottom of the sea? Do you have any sources for this claim, some sign that this has been contemplated by anyone, or are you just pulling this out of... I don't know what?
The blast radius of a 1MT warhead is about a mile; the crater radius is about half that. Superimposing this on Fiery Cross Reef, one of China's three main artificial islands in the middle of the South China Sea, the crater would cover all the built up area and the middle third of the runway, and the blast radius would cover the rest. The island would be left unusable and the depth of the crater would make it more difficult to rebuild than it was to build in the first place.
I grant that Mischief Reef might take two or three warheads, especially with today's new, improved, smaller warheads.
I didn't make any claims that it has been contemplated, but there are people in the Pentagon whose job it is to come up with outlandish contingency plans. They'd be remiss if they hadn't done this analysis.
And again, I'm not advocating it; I'm just pointing out that it could happen. If we get into a war over the South China Sea, which neoconservatives seem to want, and the choice is between losing three supercarriers taking out three artificial islands or use a few nukes, I guarantee you the admiral in charge of the men on the supercarriers is at least going to consider the nuclear option and may well advocate it. And let's not forget the stories that were circulated back in the primary about Trump asking military experts why we don't use nuclear weapons.
Quote:
Quote:We're talking about the South China Sea, not the Taiwan Strait. The Exocet's range is about 100 miles, which doesn't buy you much in a sea that's about 1000 miles across. That's why China is building the artificial islands.
Excuse me, but you're modifying your claim. The original claim made by you was that nukes would need to be used because:
Quote:How does China sink a US carrier? They don't have the conventional forces to do it.
They don't have cruise missiles, delivered by planes, submarines, and boats (range up to 300 miles from launch point)? Anti-ship ballistic missiles fire able from land covering most of the SCS (max range of 900 miles)? Considering the US is gaming out possible scenarios under the assumption that they shouldn't send capital ships within the first island chain, I can't help but feel that you're talking out of your hat, here.
I'm not saying that "OMG THE CHINEZ R INVINCIBLES!" because that would be nonsense, but neither are we. Ships would be lost, and unlike us the Chinese have the advantage of concentrating their forces, whereas ours are scattered throughout the world.
Quote:As for the fuzzy wuzzy formula - excuse me, the "Lanchester's Square Law" as it seems to be called nowadays - try applying it to the fact that the US Navy is about 10 times the size of the Chinese Navy. I think you'll quickly see how it supports my point that China loses any conventional naval conflict.
10 times the size of the PLAN as measured by how, tonnage? Try half that, a third of which is taken up by the 10 (once and future? 11) supercarriers. I don't think that's an effective proxy for combat power, particularly given the terrain. The US Navy is moving towards a "distributed lethality" concept precisely because even small ships can carry missiles capable of sinking even larger ships. And their ships ARE fairly numerous.
So sure thing, ignore actual Naval College models of how ship combat works in favor of going, "But, But, AMURKA!!" "Cause what do they know?
If you're going to accuse me of modifying my claim, you should quote the original claim in full, which made it clear that I was talking about naval battles away from the coast.
With respect to your question, 10 times the size of their Navy in terms of comparable ships. 10 supercarriers versus 1 carrier that is not a supercarrier. 75 nuclear submarines versus a dozen, some of which are diesel, etc. But even if we have only have 5 to 1 advantage, that still means that in an all out war, we rate to lose a few destroyers and submarines, and have a small chance of losing one carrier while destroying their entire navy. Again, that's assuming we don't have to deal with artificial islands.
Destroyers can carry weapons capable of sinking a supercarrier, though it might take more than one destroyer's worth. Iranian style speedboats cannot; the threat from those really small ships is suicide attacks, and even then they're more of a threat to destroyers than carriers. Supercarriers, and maybe attack submarines, are currently the most effective vessels in today's navies on a per ton basis.
Quote:Quote:The artificial islands do have the potential for making the South China Sea a no go zone for the US Navy, though, which is why they are such an issue.
How, it's not like they can carry weapons capable of sinking ships, the Chinese don't have those, amirite? 
As I've said several times now, the artificial islands change the picture. I don't classify them as naval assets because, well, they're not ships. China doesn't classify them that way either because, well, they claim they're for peaceful uses, despite the military grade air bases.
WWII absolutely taught us that land based air beats aircraft carriers absent overwhelming odds. That's why the artificial islands are a real threat to US maritime supremacy - much more so than the Chinese navy in its present state.
And for any people wandering here from John Xenakis' thread, this doesn't mean I think a China-US war is an especially strong candidate for the crisis war. The smart thing would be to negotiate a win/win solution, as I outlined in an earlier post. However, one needs to know potential worst case outcomes to establish the boundaries for negotiation.
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X_4AD_84 Wrote:We've never had a TEL that can support ICBMs. Meanwhile, Russia and the PRC have really good TELs. Not only can a TEL drive anywhere there are passable roads, it can be put on a plane, a train, or a ship. That is excellent flexibility.
Yes it is. But the TELs I saw in the Wiki article Justin linked to did not show TELs carrying strategic missiles—i.e. those capable of traveling 6000+ miles to their target. Strategic weapons must be able hit their targets in short notice from anywhere in the world. They have large ranges and are physically large. The Russian SS-18 is 95 ft long and 10 ft in diameter. Are you sure the Russians have TELs deployed that accommodate a missile of this size? And would they be willing to place it in a 3rd world country where it could be seized by terrorists?
If so, it’s a way to do on land what a strategic nuclear sub already does-a capability the US has had for more than fifty years.
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(01-27-2017, 04:14 PM)Mikebert Wrote: I would point out that the USSR engaged in military measures against the US after WW II up to the start of Korean in 1950--all at a time when the US did not yet have a sizable nuclear capability. They stopped doing so when this changed. After the change they operated strictly within their own sphere--backing down the one time they tried to do otherwise in Cuba. Now I see the Chinese actions in the South China Sea as them acting in their own sphere--its like the US in the Caribbean or the USSR in Hungary. I think they probably see this as their affair to be handled by diplomacy with the affected SE Asia nations--and none of America's business.
You may see it that way, and they may see it that way, but that implies that the US retreats from being the world's only superpower and the world's preeminent maritime power to being merely one of several regional powers. I question whether the US will or should accept that.
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Welcome to Donald Trump's Ignorant America
Arts and humanities get at the truth of things – so naturally Trump's administration plans to defund them
Of course he's getting rid of the NEA and the NEH. What use does Donald Trump have for the things that make life beautiful and good? He surrounds himself with gilded ugliness. He's a billionaire who hangs a Renoir reproduction in the $100 million abattoir he lives in, because why would he want an original? He has enough money and fame to access to the finest tailors in the world, and his suits don't fit. His hair is stupid.
I know, I'm petty. I'm a snob. I'm a liberal elitist, and elitist liberal snobbery is why Trump won. You know what? I don't care. I'm tired of shouldering the burden of cultural empathy when no one asks the folks who voted for the racist, misogynist manbaby to take two damn seconds to consider the moral implications of putting an ignorant pussy-grabber into the most powerful job on the planet.
We have a president who doesn't read books. He doesn't read books. Even George W. Bush read books, and he still managed to destroy the economy and entangle us in two unwinnable wars. What horrors will Trump visit upon the nation and the world? How will he change America for the worse?
Of course Donald Trump wants to destroy the government's (frankly meager) efforts to promote the humanities and the arts. It's not just that those things have never made the slightest impact on his life. (Imagine having a thoughtful discussion with Donald Trump about a piece of art. A painting. A song. A poem.) The arts and humanities are tools for getting at the truth of things. Trump hates the truth. He drapes himself in comforting lies about everything from the size of his hands to the size of his Electoral College victory. He doesn't just lie constantly, he labels the truth a lie, the tellers liars.
We won't fund public art programs, but we'll have Breitbart in the White House briefing room. We won't fund historical preservation projects or cultural explorations, but the president will attack journalists on Twitter.
Trump doesn't have plans to make America great again; he's going to remake America in his own image. He thinks art means plaster statues of eagles that look like they came out of SkyMall. He thinks news comes from Morning Joe and Fox & Friends. He separates books into two categories: those with his face on the cover and those without. (He doesn't read either kind.)
Trump doesn't represent a shift to the right; this is more cataclysmic than a simple change of party. Donald Trump represents the dark side of human nature: ugliness, ignorance and fear. He wants to build a giant wall, an act contrary to the idea of art. He won on the promise of banning a religion from immigrating, a rejection not just of an entire culture but of the idea of culture itself.
This is our new president: a man who revels in rejecting truth and anything that helps us find it. He wants to make America look more like him. We can't let that happen.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/fea...ca-w462019
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the dedicated Communist but instead the people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction, true and false, no longer exists -- Hannah Arendt.
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Quote:The blast radius of a 1MT warhead is about a mile; the crater radius is about half that. Superimposing this on Fiery Cross Reef, one of China's three main artificial islands in the middle of the South China Sea, the crater would cover all the built up area and the middle third of the runway, and the blast radius would cover the rest. The island would be left unusable and the depth of the crater would make it more difficult to rebuild than it was to build in the first place.
That makes more sense. Sorry, I was getting wrapped up in the word "sink" and was immediately skeptical.
Of course, they could just as easily just bomb the runways and other facilities with conventional missiles and avoid the escalation risk.
Quote:And again, I'm not advocating it; I'm just pointing out that it could happen. If we get into a war over the South China Sea, which neoconservatives seem to want, and the choice is between losing three supercarriers taking out three artificial islands or use a few nukes, I guarantee you the admiral in charge of the men on the supercarriers is at least going to consider the nuclear option and may well advocate it. And let's not forget the stories that were circulated back in the primary about Trump asking military experts why we don't use nuclear weapons.
It COULD happen. I just don't think it very likely. As I said, there are other ways to accomplish the same thing without breaking that particular taboo with all it would mean.
Quote:If you're going to accuse me of modifying my claim, you should quote the original claim in full, which made it clear that I was talking about naval battles away from the coast.
I agree that the US would have an overwhelming advantage in a straight up fight in the open ocean. The Chinese don't really have a true blue-wate navy, yet. It's why I don't think it would play out like that. It's also how I would envision what I was discussing with Mike earlier, a 2020s Crisis climax within an overall macrodecision phase ending (which is traditionally accompanied by the next hegemon maintaining 50%+ of global naval capacity) in the 2040s or so. China and the US drift to war, a war which could include proxy conflicts in places like Korea or Iran, and a naval conflict largely taking place in the East and South China Seas. Have, for instance, the Taiwan issue be the final catalyst, China hitting unhardened US bases in the Western Pacific with conventional munitions, but a lack of sufficient amphibious capacity and US/Japanese submarines/anti-air assets preventing it from seizing Taiwan. The US then, knowing the risks of bringing its surface ships in close proximity to the mainland, goes for a far blockade, blocking China from breaking out and commercial traffic from coming in. China in turn has to replace its seaborne imports, extend its supply lines deep into Inner Asia, and build up its forces to try and force their way out/wait for the US to lose interest. Anti-satelitte attacks, cyber-warfare, etc. could also feature. This conflict could coincide with similar 4T conflicts elsewhere (say, India/Pakistan) and conclude in the mid-to-late 2020s. The victor, let's say China for sake of argument, now faces the task of expanding its presence out into the ensuing void and stabilizing its immediate environment and sealanes to the point that basic trade for needed commodities could resume.
Or not, you can vary the victors (The US, or maybe the Chinese and Americans destroy themselves and someone on the sidelines jumps to the lead), the circumstances (nukes, Russia coming in on one side or another, political breakup of one or the other party), or what have you, the point I want to make is that if you look at Paul Kennedy, Chase-Dunn, Pobodnik, M & T, S & H, something like this is predicted to happen. It may not, but I have been satisfied with their reading of how events should go thus far, and so this is the type of thing I am looking out for.
Quote:With respect to your question, 10 times the size of their Navy in terms of comparable ships.
Interesting metric. Can you go into more detail?
Quote:10 supercarriers versus 1 carrier that is not a supercarrier.
There were questions among naval strategists well throughout the second half of the 20th century that aircraft carriers may no longer be the ne plus ultra of peer-level naval warfare. It was never put to the test, and they retain tremendous advantages in gunboat diplomacy/presence patrols/etc. so here we are. At some point, the question will eventually be put to the test, and we'll know for sure.
Quote:75 nuclear submarines versus a dozen, some of which are diesel, etc.
*blinks*
Your numbers are a little off on both ends. The US presently operates 69 submarines, and barring massive investment (which we will hopefully see from the Trump admin), that number is dropping and will for the next 15 years or so.
The PLAN operates 70 right now, and that number is growing. Granted, there are qualitative differences between the two, but the newer models are narrowing that gap and diesel-electric subs are not to be taken lightly, particularly within the confines of the East and South China Seas, where range is not so much of an issue.
Quote:But even if we have only have 5 to 1 advantage, that still means that in an all out war, we rate to lose a few destroyers and submarines, and have a small chance of losing one carrier while destroying their entire navy.
Sure, if they just drive all of them out into the Pacific Ocean and challenge us to a duel. Somehow, I don't think that would be the gameplan.
Quote:Again, that's assuming we don't have to deal with artificial islands.
Or, you know, the Chinese mainland. Again, I don't think the assumption of an open ocean fight on level terms has much bearing on the likely areas of conflict (Taiwan Straits, Senkaku/Diaoyu, SCS, etc.).
Quote:Destroyers can carry weapons capable of sinking a supercarrier, though it might take more than one destroyer's worth. Iranian style speedboats cannot; the threat from those really small ships is suicide attacks, and even then they're more of a threat to destroyers than carriers.
You're missing more than a couple of classes of ships in between.
Quote:Supercarriers, and maybe attack submarines, are currently the most effective vessels in today's navies on a per ton basis.
Probably submarines more than supercarriers, particularly if evaluated on a "per ton" basis.
Quote:As I've said several times now, the artificial islands change the picture. I don't classify them as naval assets because, well, they're not ships. China doesn't classify them that way either because, well, they claim they're for peaceful uses, despite the military grade air bases.
WWII absolutely taught us that land based air beats aircraft carriers absent overwhelming odds. That's why the artificial islands are a real threat to US maritime supremacy - much more so than the Chinese navy in its present state.
Glad we're on the same page, albeit different sections. The mainland is also an unsinkable aircraft carrier in its own right, and given that most of the US' air purchases for the last few decades were relatively short-range ones designed for a battle with the Soviet Union on the North European Plain we may experience issue there, should conflict occur (it's why the Navy brass' present footdragging on turning the UCLASS program into a long-range bomber is critically short-sighted).
Quote:And for any people wandering here from John Xenakis' thread, this doesn't mean I think a China-US war is an especially strong candidate for the crisis war. The smart thing would be to negotiate a win/win solution, as I outlined in an earlier post. However, one needs to know potential worst case outcomes to establish the boundaries for negotiation.
Worthy caveat. Please note that I don't think any of these scenarios I am detailing are good ideas, only that I think they are real possibilities worth contemplating.
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(01-27-2017, 05:16 PM)Mikebert Wrote: X_4AD_84 Wrote:We've never had a TEL that can support ICBMs. Meanwhile, Russia and the PRC have really good TELs. Not only can a TEL drive anywhere there are passable roads, it can be put on a plane, a train, or a ship. That is excellent flexibility.
Yes it is. But the TELs I saw in the Wiki article Justin linked to did not show TELs carrying strategic missiles—i.e. those capable of traveling 6000+ miles to their target. Strategic weapons must be able hit their targets in short notice from anywhere in the world. They have large ranges and are physically large. The Russian SS-18 is 95 ft long and 10 ft in diameter. Are you sure the Russians have TELs deployed that accommodate a missile of this size? And would they be willing to place it in a 3rd world country where it could be seized by terrorists?
If so, it’s a way to do on land what a strategic nuclear sub already does-a capability the US has had for more than fifty years.
*cough* Jordan *cough*
And you are mistaken, the RT-2PM Topol ICBM is mounted on MAZ-7917 TEL. I have seen reports that it may be reviving ICBMs mounted on train cars circulating along that nations vast railways in Siberia and the Far East.
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01-27-2017, 07:00 PM
(This post was last modified: 01-27-2017, 07:04 PM by SomeGuy.)
Hey, nuclear war IS a risk. And if Great Powers can compete with proxy conflicts, cyberattacks, attacks on C4istar assets in orbit (possibly leading to a Kessler syndrome type of deal), subversion, they remain capable of competing with conventional forces in support of objectives short of conquering the other's home territory. A blockade to strangle one into submission, a fight over a third party territory, a proxy conflict where both sides provide direct combat troops a la Korea (yup, brought it back, what?), etc. Neither side goes nuclear while they both think they can win the more limited conflict, and if one wins, the other concedes defeat, knowing the alternative was worse. Or, a little more complicated, they in fact bluster with their nuclear weapons, demand the other side stand-down, the other promises retaliation in the event of a launch, maybe other Great Powers weigh in, there is a horrible standoff where people wonder if the end is truly nigh, followed by a humiliating stand-down/negotiated settlement.
There are lots of ways things could shake out, without requiring either a nuclear exchange or an end to great power competition. The War of the Spanish Succession ended without the Habsburgs, Bourbons, Hohenzollerns, or Stuart (soon to be Hanoverians) being toppled. And yet it was still a great power/crisis war conflict.
Quote:Trump wants to clamp down on free trade and globalization. How would YOU do that? Maybe a clever strategy would be to buddy up with Russia, who do not export goods than compete with US manufacturers, and become cold with China in the hope that you can get them to do something that sufficiently provocative to justify a trade war in response. Such a war would crater our economy in the short term. If we can blame it on China and point out that a recession (even a serious one) is preferable to a nuclear war, maybe Trump's base won't abandon him.
And the Defense Production Act and other accouterments of a formal declaration of war would give a Trump Administration broad powers to commandeer and restructure the industrial base, and a way to press a Republican Congress to massively increase spending. I mean, barring a nuclear exchange, both powers could hypothetically come off of it better off, regardless of who "won".
Again, not recommending it as a course of action, just trying to fully explore all the possibilities.
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Quote:But where is the incentive to start the conventional conflict in the first place if there can be no winner.?
Who says there can't be a winner, if the goals of the conflict are short of mutual annihilation/total victory? Why couldn't they fight over some islands without resorting to a nuclear exchange in the event of a loss. It's not an existential issue for either of them, when you get right down to it.
Quote:I would point out that the USSR engaged in military measures against the US after WW II up to the start of Korean in 1950--all at a time when the US did not yet have a sizable nuclear capability. They stopped doing so when this changed. After the change they operated strictly within their own sphere--backing down the one time they tried to do otherwise in Cuba. Now I see the Chinese actions in the South China Sea as them acting in their own sphere--its like the US in the Caribbean or the USSR in Hungary. I think they probably see this as their affair to be handled by diplomacy with the affected SE Asia nations--and none of America's business.
I know they see it like that, they've published articles to that effect. Not sure the broader US decision-making parties see it the same way. I certainly agree that it would be more reasonable, but people have been doing unreasonable things for years.
Quote:That is, this issue is for us what the Cuban crisis was for the Soviets. We can't win, because they are in the geopolitical right. Since there can be no ultimate resolution (which would require nuclear war) why would the US decide a hot war response would make sense? Any hot war would give the results of a trade war, plus more lots of American servicemen getting killed for no damn good reason, why no just opt for the trade war, and keep all those American servicemen (that Trump says he cares about) still breathing?
I dunno, Mike, why did we invade Vietnam? Iraq? Why did the British intervene on the Continent at the outset of WWI? Fear, honor, and interest, my friend. The old standbys.
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(01-27-2017, 06:40 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Quote:The blast radius of a 1MT warhead is about a mile; the crater radius is about half that. Superimposing this on Fiery Cross Reef, one of China's three main artificial islands in the middle of the South China Sea, the crater would cover all the built up area and the middle third of the runway, and the blast radius would cover the rest. The island would be left unusable and the depth of the crater would make it more difficult to rebuild than it was to build in the first place.
That makes more sense. Sorry, I was getting wrapped up in the word "sink" and was immediately skeptical.
Of course, they could just as easily just bomb the runways and other facilities with conventional missiles and avoid the escalation risk.
That requires local air superiority. That's difficult to get with 10 carriers, which means 3 on station at a time. We could surge but we'd need to get everything coordinated just right, and then stage an actual invasion so we ended up holding the territory. Or we could use cruise missiles, but cruise missiles are more expensive than run way patches, so that's a losing technique in the long term, unless it enables us to stage an invasion.
Quote:Quote:10 supercarriers versus 1 carrier that is not a supercarrier.
There were questions among naval strategists well throughout the second half of the 20th century that aircraft carriers may no longer be the ne plus ultra of peer-level naval warfare. It was never put to the test, and they retain tremendous advantages in gunboat diplomacy/presence patrols/etc. so here we are. At some point, the question will eventually be put to the test, and we'll know for sure.
I agree it's an open question with respect to carriers versus attack submarines. It doesn't matter that much since we've got the advantage in both - for now.
Quote:Quote:But even if we have only have 5 to 1 advantage, that still means that in an all out war, we rate to lose a few destroyers and submarines, and have a small chance of losing one carrier while destroying their entire navy.
Sure, if they just drive all of them out into the Pacific Ocean and challenge us to a duel. Somehow, I don't think that would be the gameplan.
Quote:Again, that's assuming we don't have to deal with artificial islands.
Or, you know, the Chinese mainland. Again, I don't think the assumption of an open ocean fight on level terms has much bearing on the likely areas of conflict (Taiwan Straits, Senkaku/Diaoyu, SCS, etc.).
If they don't use their navy, they might as well not have built it in the first place.
As previously discussed, the Chinese mainland isn't close enough to control the entire South China Sea, especially the reaches such as near the Philippines.
The Taiwan Strait is a different story. The relevant forces would be based on the mainland and Taiwan.
The Daoyu are basically a nearly irrelevant sideshow, serving only as a possible irrational flashpoint.
From the US standpoint, it's the South China Sea that is relevant, not just for its resources, but because it contains critical routes for America's global trade empire. The trade routes are more important to the US; the resources are more important to China. There ought to be a win/win here somewhere; it's just a matter of whether we can get to it.
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01-28-2017, 07:41 AM
(This post was last modified: 01-28-2017, 08:35 AM by Mikebert.)
(01-27-2017, 07:11 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I dunno, Mike, why did we invade Vietnam? Iraq? Why did the British intervene on the Continent at the outset of WWI?
For WW I, because they thought they could win. The British ended up winning the war.
As for Iraq, note that this war started in 1991, not 2003. The 2003 conflict was just a continuation of the previous one, which we justified by Iraq not living up to the agreement made at the end of the first round of hostilities in 1991. So the decision on the Iraq war was made in 1990, when we decided to to to war against Iraq. Out stated objective was to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, which we accomplished. If we had stuck to the original goal and signed a peace treaty with Iraq after routing his forces we would have won the war. But we decided to move the goalposts and snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
We started the Iraq war in 1991 because we thought he would win. And we did win, but then threw it all away. It was the same silly hubris that made us think we could fight and win a war against North Vietnam with a partner that was half in the bag with the enemy. (S Vietnam was riddled with communist insurgents, while N. Vietnam did not have an anti-communist insurgent problem).
Can the US win a war with China in the seas close to their country? I don't think so. What do you think?
I would point out that in 40 years of facing down the Soviets, we never got any hubristic ideas about fighting a war with them. But now a war with China (over exactly what) is something the Pentagon is going to advocate? They are going to have to fight this war. And they can't blame their loss on insurgents who hide amidst civilian populations where we can't touch them. This will look like a straight up clash of militaries, for which there will be no excuses, it's career suicide.
Also I have this issue with your reasonably constructed cycle concept. The Macrodecsion phase is projected by M&T for 2025-2050. The 4T is projected for 2006-2024. Even with a few years of slop on both sides, there isn't a lot of overlap. As I see it, the S&H dating arguments against Macrodecision events playing a major 4T role; the 4T should be largely over by the time the Macrodecision phase gets rolling.
On the other hand, if we dump S&H and put in Turchin's cycle, then the disintegrative phase of the current American secular cycle is projected from 2006-2040. Lots of overlap.
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Quote:That requires local air superiority. That's difficult to get with 10 carriers, which means 3 on station at a time. We could surge but we'd need to get everything coordinated just right, and then stage an actual invasion so we ended up holding the territory. Or we could use cruise missiles, but cruise missiles are more expensive than run way patches, so that's a losing technique in the long term, unless it enables us to stage an invasion.
We may have given up formal control, but the USAF/USN still has access to Clark AFB and Subic Bay, and 3 supercarriers is a formidable force. The trouble with holding the islands is that, unlike ships, they are fixed positions, and within the range of Chinese conventional missiles/American counter-attacks. In an actual war they could prove difficult for either side to hold.
Quote:I agree it's an open question with respect to carriers versus attack submarines. It doesn't matter that much since we've got the advantage in both - for now.
Which might provide a back-of-the-mind incentive for America to stake out a stronger position now, as opposed to 20 years from now.
Quote:If they don't use their navy, they might as well not have built it in the first place.
There are tremendous uses for even a green-water or brown water navy, and they are actively trying to build theirs up.
Quote:As previously discussed, the Chinese mainland isn't close enough to control the entire South China Sea, especially the reaches such as near the Philippines.
The Taiwan Strait is a different story. The relevant forces would be based on the mainland and Taiwan.
The Daoyu are basically a nearly irrelevant sideshow, serving only as a possible irrational flashpoint
That was the whole point of the "trench warfare at sea" analysis I linked to earlier. Given the terrain, you could have the sort of conflict that lends itself better to defense than offense, with China and the First Island Chain constituting the trenches and the ECS/SCS a no-man's-land of missiles, planes, drones, mines, submarines, and fast attacks boats (something a little heavier than those Iranian speed-boats you mentioned, something more like this or the LCS). At which the conflict becomes a question of endurance, resources, and will.
Quote:From the US standpoint, it's the South China Sea that is relevant, not just for its resources, but because it contains critical routes for America's global trade empire. The trade routes are more important to the US; the resources are more important to China. There ought to be a win/win here somewhere; it's just a matter of whether we can get to it.
It would be nice. Am not sure it is in the cards. As you and I have both mentioned previously, there's a lot of room to fuck things up and bring about a sub-optimal outcome for everyone.
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Quote:For WW I, because they thought they could win. The British ended up winning the war.
As for Iraq, note that this war started in 1991, not 2003. The 2003 conflict was just a continuation of the previous one, which we justified by Iraq not living up to the agreement made at the end of the first round of hostilities in 1991. So the decision on the Iraq war was made in 1990, when we decided to to to war against Iraq. Out stated objective was to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, which we accomplished. If we had stuck to the original goal and signed a peace treaty with Iraq after routing his forces we would have won the war. But we decided to move the goalposts and snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
We started the Iraq war in 1991 because we thought he would win. And we did win, but then threw it all away. It was the same silly hubris that made us think we could fight and win a war against North Vietnam with a partner that was half in the bag with the enemy. (S Vietnam was riddled with communist insurgents, while N. Vietnam did not have an anti-communist insurgent problem).
Can the US win a war with China in the seas close to their country? I don't think so. What do you think?
In the short-run, sure? The US Navy maintains a qualitative advantage, and a broader alliance network. If it becomes an endurance contest, as GPCW tend to become, it becomes much more iffy. But the point is not whether I think it's a good idea, it's if the US government is willing to make the sorts of concessions necessary to avert it. As Warren pointed out earlier, I don't think there is enough support in the power-structure to do that unilaterally.
Quote:I would point out that in 40 years of facing down the Soviets, we never got any hubristic ideas about fighting a war with them. But now a war with China (over exactly what) is something the Pentagon is going to advocate? They are going to have to fight this war. And they can't blame their loss on insurgents who hide amidst civilian populations where we can't touch them. This will look like a straight up clash of militaries, for which there will be no excuses, it's career suicide.
And yet they are visibly planning for it. As are the Chinese. Doesn't mean it isn't going to happen, but it doesn't mean it definitely won't happen either.
Quote:Also I have this issue with your reasonably constructed cycle concept. The Macrodecsion phase is projected by M&T for 2025-2050. The 4T is projected for 2006-2024. Even with a few years of slop on both sides, there isn't a lot of overlap. As I see it, the S&H dating arguments against Macrodecision events playing a major 4T role; the 4T should be largely over by the time the Macrodecision phase gets rolling.
You're making up rules that don't exist again. The Napoleonic Wars occurred almost entirely in a 1T, as did the War of the Spanish Succession. Besides, I believe Howe conclusively came out in support of a 2008 start date. So, no, your point is incorrect.
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