Flavors of 4Ts

[Mikebert]

I am working on a paper that seeks to achieve some sort of synthesis between the generational cycle concept proposed by S&H and others with the secular cycle concept proposed by Turchin and others.  I am having all sorts of difficulties, particularly with the interface between what Sean Love dubbed saeculum I and saeculum II, that is, the transition from generations that averaged 26-27 years in length with the more recent generations that averaged 20 years in length. Anyways, that is not the issue for this thread.  The issue is how this 4T may play out, assuming the S&H concept is valid.

I start with the observation that the previous six 4Ts fall into only three categories. As 4T's all fit the definition of a secular crisis: a period when society focuses on reordering the outer world of institutions and public behavior.  Four of the historical 4Ts produced a reordering of the state achieved through either a civil war or a revolution.  Another (Depression & WW II) accomplished the same politically though crushing electoral defeats.  Finally, one 4T (Armada) did not involve an internal reordering of the English state (as would happen in the next 4T), but rather a reordering of the position of England in European politics, in that England became a great power.

Some guy (I believe) proposes this third (Armada) type.  That is, this 4T won't achieve major changes in the state domestically, but rather in the US position in the international order.

I believe that this 4T (if the concept is valid) will involve a domestic re-ordering to be accomplished politically, not through internal war (that is, the Depression & WW II model).

Many have pointed out a similarity of tone to the Civil War 4T.  I see the similarity, but are they saying this 4T will be resolved through internal military conflict (i.e. civil war/revolution)?

Please weigh in.

[Warren Dew]

(01-27-2017, 04:51 PM)Mikebert Wrote: Some guy (I believe) proposes this third (Armada) type.  That is, this 4T won't achieve major changes in the state domestically, but rather in the US position in the international order.

I look forward to his response to this.

I think that if handled properly, the US could bring this about.  I question whether the US has the institutional expertise to do this.

[pbrower2a]

Some not ours:

1. The French Revolution: a Civic generation pushes aside older generations in a display of exaggerated (but harshly amoral) rationality. The revolutionaries reject tradition as superstition, but the pure reason that the revolutionaries support proves inadequate.

2. Tai-ping Rebellion in China (1861, major civil war) in China.

3. Europe c. 1870. Italian and German unification, including the wars between Prussia and both Austria and France; Paris Commune. Connected -- Franco-Mexican war (Juarez vs. Maximilian). Related: Meiji Restoration in Japan

4. Russian Revolutions of 1917 followed by the horrible civil war between Reds and Whites. After a short respite, Stalin's collectivization of Soviet agriculture.

5. Spanish Civil War -- a nation that has alternated between Left and Right polarizes into modernist and traditionalist camps that decide that each other are demonically evil (does this sound familiar, America?), and the winners subject the losers to pariah roles should the losers be granted the privilege of survival. China has something similar, only with an international war to do great carnage and destruction of such little economic stability as there had been.

6. Evil (Fascist) Empire. The most ruthless, amoral figures take over, turn their countries to armed camps with military regimentation and brutality toward dissidents and pariahs, and then go on murderous campaigns of empire-building that go badly wrong. Obviously we Americans are too sophisticated and moral for such -- right? So thought the Germans in 1932 and 1933.

[pbrower2a]

(01-27-2017, 05:40 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-27-2017, 04:51 PM)Mikebert Wrote: Some guy (I believe) proposes this third (Armada) type.  That is, this 4T won't achieve major changes in the state domestically, but rather in the US position in the international order.

I look forward to his response to this.

I think that if handled properly, the US could bring this about.  I question whether the US has the institutional expertise to do this.

If handled badly, then analogies for the victors could be of the Japanese naval victories over the Mongols of Bunei (1274) and Koan (1281) as well as the Spanish Armada. Over-extension? Poor intelligence?

[Eric the Green]

(01-27-2017, 04:51 PM)Mikebert Wrote: I am working on a paper that seeks to achieve some sort of synthesis between the generational cycle concept proposed by S&H and others with the secular cycle concept proposed by Turchin and others.  I am having all sorts of difficulties, particularly with the interface between what Sean Love dubbed saeculum I and saeculum II, that is, the transition from generations that averaged 26-27 years in length with the more recent generations that averaged 20 years in length. Anyways, that is not the issue for this thread.  The issue is how this 4T may play out, assuming the S&H concept is valid.

I start with the observation that the previous six 4Ts fall into only three categories. As 4T's all fit the definition of a secular crisis: a period when society focuses on reordering the outer world of institutions and public behavior.  Four of the historical 4Ts produced a reordering of the state achieved through either a civil war or a revolution.  Another (Depression & WW II) accomplished the same politically though crushing electoral defeats.  Finally, one 4T (Armada) did not involve an internal reordering of the English state (as would happen in the next 4T), but rather a reordering of the position of England in European politics, in that England became a great power.

Some guy (I believe) proposes this third (Armada) type.  That is, this 4T won't achieve major changes in the state domestically, but rather in the US position in the international order.

I believe that this 4T (if the concept is valid) will involve a domestic re-ordering to be accomplished politically, not through internal war (that is, the Depression & WW II model).

Many have pointed out a similarity of tone to the Civil War 4T.  I see the similarity, but are they saying this 4T will be resolved through internal military conflict (i.e. civil war/revolution)?

Please weigh in.

My working hypothesis has been that this 4T will be resolved through a less-drastic civil war, consisting of a 2020s new Left government putting down a violent right-wing rebellion. That of course assumes that Trump will inspire a turn to the left, rather than institute a permanent turn to the right. I predict the former, but obviously I don't know for sure. I suspect any such violence will happen AFTER 2025, and not a moment before then. Unrest in some form should continue for the next 2 or 3 years.

I suspect that this 4T, again in 2025-26, might also include dealing with foreign threats or attacks. I would say this will be a combination of civil war and revolution, since the original revolution was also a foreign invasion-- although of our former overlords. The civil war was much the same thing, from the point of view of Dixie.

[David Horn]

Thanks Mike.  We need to discuss something concrete, even though we are not likely to agree as a group.  Allow me to muddy the waters even further by mentioning the two most critical issues, neither of which seems tied to the rhythm of politics or culture. 

First, AGW.  Let's agree that this is an issue of increasing importance that will trigger real change at some point, but is entirely outside the boundary of politics.  Yes, we can make political decisions that will slow or speed the process, but the process is based in physics.  It can't be bargained down or delayed by popular vote.  On the political side, we do have two takes on dealing with the issue: (1) move with a little due speed, and (2) ignore the problem.  Only the scientific community is duly worried, and they have no political clout to speak of.  What we do know: at some point the situation will be beyond our ability to ignore.  I'm assuming that the timing for this is outside the current 4T window, so I'm also assuming the issue is delayed until <insert you best guess for the time when the SHTF>.

Second, automation.  We are already seeing the less educated up-in-arms about their economic futures (as they should be), but the solutions being offered are both inadequate and straight out of cloud-cuckoo-land imprecise.  We can see that the process is ongoing and likely to accelerate, so what do we do to accommodate millions of under employed citizens?  Let's agree that closing the borders and blaming others won't get us there.  Since this issue is already on the 4T menu, how does it push us toward a resolution?  Will we resolve anything? 

Both of those issues are unique to this 4T.  Both are extremely difficult to address ... or even understand, for that matter.  The normal dynamics running through the political and social structures are still there too: no direct memory of a existential war, and no recent experience with low inequality and political comity.  So we're going to fight the old battles and fresh ones to boot.  If Trump actually manages to sell a massive infrastructure build-out, he may be able to use that to solidify his position through the next 1T.  After that, the deluge.

I don't claim to know how this all plugs into one of Mike's reference models ... if it does at all.

[SomeGuy]

Due to a quirk in my browsing history, the default landing site for this website that autocomplete provides me is the "Who's Online" page.  As a result of that, I would like to thank Dave Horn for cluing me into the existence of this thread in the first place, where I was referenced by name (or nom de keyboard, as it were), twice no less.  Thanks, Dave!


Mike,

I don't necessarily agree with the sharp distinctions you are drawing between flavors of turnings, though the idea of categorizing them according to the dominant thread is an interesting one which I support.

I mean, many of the domestic reorderings, be they through civil war or overwhelming political victory of one side over another, involved a strong foreign component as well.  And even the Elizabethan era involved internal tensions, plots, rebellions, and other "domestic issues".  Old Bess and her ministers just happened to be unusually competent.  And the Armada crisis was part of a rising on Britain's part, whereas I don't think we are in the same situation.  A better example of a successfully managed crisis with a strongly foreign component would be the British one in the mid-to-late 19th century (1850s-1871 or so).  I am not sure we have that sort of leadership in place, although it is possible.

And given the extent of our assets and industry overseas, any foreign crisis of any significance could bring about a strong domestic restructuring as well.

I can see the similarities to the Civil War build-up as well, but since we should be well into the Bloody Kansas period in that case the only equivalent I could see would be if BLM actually morphed into a general uprising (as the occasional provocateur has tried to spark already), which I don't think would have the tenor and outcome a lot of left-wing people here and elsewhere would be hoping for.

So, I generally view 4Ts as having components of all of the above, and it is only the relative proportion and importance of those segments that changes from crisis to crisis.

Warren,

I appreciate the sentiment.  As I noted above, like you, I question whether our institutions have the skill and foresight to bring a positive conclusion about.  I suppose we'll have to wait and see.

PBrower,

Over-extension and hubris have traditionally been the methods of hegemonic decline.  So, in a gross breach of my standard operating procedures, I am going to agree with you here.  Don't let it go to your head. 

Eric,

Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?).  It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort.  A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s?  Also a possibility.

Dave Horn,

I agree that DJT's prime chance of consolidating his political victory rest in successfully managing a big infrastructure buildout, and that automation and GW could (and probably will) become salient issues a little further down the line, though I don't think they will play as much of a role in the next 10 years as they will in another 20-30 years or so.

[Mikebert]

(01-28-2017, 01:07 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I mean, many of the domestic reorderings, be they through civil war or overwhelming political victory of one side over another, involved a strong foreign component as well.  And even the Elizabethan era involved internal tensions, plots, rebellions, and other "domestic issues". 

Don't all turnings feature these things?

Quote:And the Armada crisis was part of a rising on Britain's part, whereas I don't think we are in the same situation.

I was thinking of us as Spain.

 

Quote:A better example of a successfully managed crisis with a strongly foreign component would be the British one in the mid-to-late 19th century (1850s-1871 or so).

Why do you think there was a crisis then?

[SomeGuy]

Quote:Don't all turnings feature these things? 

Some more than others.

Quote:I was thinking of us as Spain.

The parallels are not exact, but it's a thought.

Quote:Why do you think there was a crisis then?

Would you prefer if I said 4T instead?  I generally view the West as all being roughly on the same timeline (although I am looking at you, Ireland, for fucking that up!).  Depression/WWII was one, Revolutionary period another, and in the middle we have the unifications of Germany and Italy, the fall of the Second Empire, the US Civil war, and a few others in that general period.  It would be very odd if Britain just skipped a saeculum.

[Mikebert]

Quote:David Horn: First, AGW.  Let's agree that this is an issue of increasing importance that will trigger real change at some point, but is entirely outside the boundary of politics.  Yes, we can make political decisions that will slow or speed the process, but the process is based in physics.  It can't be bargained down or delayed by popular vote.  On the political side, we do have two takes on dealing with the issue: (1) move with a little due speed, and (2) ignore the problem.  Only the scientific community is duly worried, and they have no political clout to speak of.  What we do know: at some point the situation will be beyond our ability to ignore.  I'm assuming that the timing for this is outside the current 4T window, so I'm also assuming the issue is delayed until <insert you best guess for the time when the SHTF>.

A problem here is there are lags. For example in the second half of this century it is possible a 4C world will become inevitable. This doesn’t mean it will be 3C warmer than it is now in 2100.  It means that changes will have been introduced that will mean a global temperature 4C above that of 1900 will arrive at equilibrium, which will take time to manifest.  Nobody knows how fast.  Past examples suggest climate can change in a way that sea level rises an average of 2 inches per year for 400 years.  The CO2 rise we are seeing is faster than any previously so the process will probably be faster than that, but even if it is twice as fast that is still centuries.  So it is unlikely the shit is ever going to hit the fan.  It’s more like the boiling frog.
 

Quote:Second, automation.  We are already seeing the less educated up-in-arms about their economic futures (as they should be), but the solutions being offered are both inadequate and straight out of cloud-cuckoo-land imprecise.  We can see that the process is ongoing and likely to accelerate, so what do we do to accommodate millions of under employed citizens?

An important problem, fortunately, one which a 4T can tackle.
 

Quote:Let's agree that closing the borders and blaming others won't get us there.

I will assume this refers to closing the borders and tariffs.  It is true that neither will get us all the way there, but they are a start.  Both were elements in play last time we dealt with this issue.  Since I don’t really know how what we did last time worked, a conservative approach would be to restore all the elements in play then and hope they interact in similar way this time.  It like when you are running a new process in the plant and its going to hell.  You start throw stuff at it, you try this and that.  This is what FDR did.
 
[quote]I don't claim to know how this all plugs into one of Mike's reference models ... if it does at all.[/quotes]
Issues do not plug in.  The quantities in the models are things like generational membership, population, elite number, sociopolitical instability etc.  Only some can be empirically defined or measured (e.g. population).  The others are either represented by proxies, assessed by correlations or analogies, or sometimes given by model output.

[Mikebert]

(01-28-2017, 02:52 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Would you prefer if I said 4T instead?  I generally view the West as all being roughly on the same timeline (although I am looking at you, Ireland, for fucking that up!).  Depression/WWII was one, Revolutionary period another, and in the middle we have the unifications of Germany and Italy, the fall of the Second Empire, the US Civil war, and a few others in that general period.  It would be very odd if Britain just skipped a saeculum.

No, I meant 4T.  You are using the exact same approach I was using 17 years ago.  I saw the unit at which the 4T operated as the world system, not the nation state.  But as I looked into Britain more deeply, when I was writing my paper on British secular cycles, it became less clear.  Granted my study ended in 1870, but nothing like showed up in measures of internal sociopolitical turmoil.  In contrast America heaved with unrest in its two 4Ts prior to 1870, and so did Britain in the Glorious 4T and WotR 3T.  Didn't happened for the Armada 4T, there were peaks in crime levels then.  Of course that's not the whole story. 

There is political support for the three American 4Ts.  All three featured fundamental changes in the American system of government.  These has been interpreted by some political scientists as the the beginnings of a new republic making us on the third republic.  The concept of critical elections and the cycles described by Arthur Schlesinger Sr. and especially Daniel Elazar dovetail with the idea of recurrent 4Ts. 

There is also financial/economic cycle support.  If you accept the 2008 trigger for this 4T, I would assume you are referring to the financial crisis as the triggering event. Well two the previous 4Ts also had financial triggers.  The last one was the 1929 crash.  The the Revolutionary 4T had the London crisis of 1772, which put the politically-well connected East India Company in a financial bind, which led to the passage of the Tea Act, which inflamed American merchants and directly led to the 1773 tea party, which S&H point to as their trigger.

What I am getting at is there is a LOT of support for the idea of recurrent American crises that are remarkably evenly spaced.  My research into the English and American secular cycles also supports the idea that the Glorious Revolution and WotR, as well the Amer Revolution, Civil War and Depression and WW II were secular cycle turning points which are supposed to be a time of state collapse and reformation (i.e. a fundamental reordering of the external world of institutions or 4T).  As you know there is good support for the Armada 4T from M&T considerations.  So the 4Ts as laid down by S&H is pretty solid.

But move to Britain as this ceases to be true.  It's really hard to show an 1857-71 4T (this is the consensus of the historians that used to contribute to the old old T4T site back in the nineties).  Sociopolitically it was a time of calm compared to earlier in the century.  Politically, we saw a stepwise expansion in voting rights all throughout the 19th and early 20th century.  There is no particular clustering of these events that would mark one 20 years period as special.  I am not aware of any political cycle concepts for Britain along the lines of the many such things for the US.  Maybe there are such things and I don't know about them.  There have been lots of financial panics, but none that act like the ones here did.  Although the post-1929 Depression happened there too it was not as severe.  For example their secular bull market peak was in 1937, not 1929 like in the US.  Their economy was shitty in the 1920's and was not much different in the 1930's--very different from the pattern in the US. 

I haven't studied them in the same detail as I have the US, but I was aware of the clarity of the US crisies before I ever read Generations.  I did not need to do much research to see this.  After see much more that I needed to conclude that there were American 4Ts when S&H said there were, I still don't see the British ones (if they exist) with similar clarity.

[SomeGuy]

Mike,


Some points.  I do NOT see the turning cycle as operating on a global scale, I think it roughly corresponds to nation states.  I am just noting that a lot of countries seem to have their cycles roughly aligned, most particularly Western Europe/the US outside Ireland.

I largely agree with your remaining assessment.  Britain in the 1850s-1860s is unusual, in that it had lots of things going on overseas, but managed to avoid getting tangled in any of them.  The Chartist movement kind of evaporated in this time frame, and the economy was booming (This period is generally thought of as the "Golden Age" of Victorian Britain.

So, since the US and Britain were presumably on the same secular track up through the Revolution, and then again with WWII, and have had similar social movements since (the 60s in both places, Thatcher/Reagan, Blair/Clinton, Trump/Brexit), we are left with the conclusion that Britain either decided to take the rest of the 19th century off, or it just had unusually competent leadership during the period when the rest of the West was in crisis, defusing both social movements like the Chartists and war scares with the US, France, Prussia, or what have you.

Take your pick.

[Warren Dew]

(01-28-2017, 04:25 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: So, since the US and Britain were presumably on the same secular track up through the Revolution, and then again with WWII, and have had similar social movements since (the 60s in both places, Thatcher/Reagan, Blair/Clinton, Trump/Brexit), we are left with the conclusion that Britain either decided to take the rest of the 19th century off, or it just had unusually competent leadership during the period when the rest of the West was in crisis, defusing both social movements like the Chartists and war scares with the US, France, Prussia, or what have you.

I'm not sure it's correct to consider Britain to be a separate nation from the US, then or now.  Separate states, yes, separate nations, not so sure.  For that reason, the US Civil War may have served as a crisis war for the UK just as WWII served as a crisis war for the US, despite being overseas wars in both cases.  The Civil War did have a domestic impact on the UK, primarily through the cutoff of cotton from the confederacy, and it threatened cutting off much of their food supply as well.

The UK was also indirectly involved in the Taiping Rebellion, an even bigger conflict than the Civil War, and directly in the Second Opium War.  It was not a peaceful period for the British Empire, even if it was for the British homeland.

If we believe Turchin's theories about elite overproduction and we believe that fourth turning crises resolve the elite overproduction, then we should remember that elite overproduction can be resolved either by removing some of the elites, or by reducing the density of elites through expansion of the domain over which the elites exert influence.  That suggests that the UK's expanded influence in the far east and other areas of the world may have resolved their elite overproduction without requiring culling - again assuming that Turchin's theories about elite overproduction apply to generational crises.

I also strongly suspect that the continuity represented by the British Monarchy and in particular Queen Victoria's reign helped moderate British foreign policy and avoid some of the errors that can precipitate crises.

I think that if the US handled the current crisis era expertly, we could similarly resolve the crisis by growing into the role of worldwide trade hegemon.  We became the world's only superpower at the end of the Cold War, but we never really took advantage of it; the window to take advantage of it is still open, if only for a few more years.

[pbrower2a]

(01-28-2017, 01:07 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Mike,

I don't necessarily agree with the sharp distinctions you are drawing between flavors of turnings, though the idea of categorizing them according to the dominant thread is an interesting one which I support.

I mean, many of the domestic reorderings, be they through civil war or overwhelming political victory of one side over another, involved a strong foreign component as well.  And even the Elizabethan era involved internal tensions, plots, rebellions, and other "domestic issues".  Old Bess and her ministers just happened to be unusually competent.  And the Armada crisis was part of a rising on Britain's part, whereas I don't think we are in the same situation.  A better example of a successfully managed crisis with a strongly foreign component would be the British one in the mid-to-late 19th century (1850s-1871 or so).  I am not sure we have that sort of leadership in place, although it is possible.

And given the extent of our assets and industry overseas, any foreign crisis of any significance could bring about a strong domestic restructuring as well.

I can see the similarities to the Civil War build-up as well, but since we should be well into the Bloody Kansas period in that case the only equivalent I could see would be if BLM actually morphed into a general uprising (as the occasional provocateur has tried to spark already), which I don't think would have the tenor and outcome a lot of left-wing people here and elsewhere would be hoping for.

So, I generally view 4Ts as having components of all of the above, and it is only the relative proportion and importance of those segments that changes from crisis to crisis.

Black people know well that they cannot successfully rise against "Whitey" and survive. Black people are right to challenge police forces where such is possible (media, protests, and official inquiries) for being more trigger-happy with black suspects than with white suspects. Provoking the police is not good for survival, whatever one's ethnicity. If after the last good President, black lives are somehow less precious than other lives, then we have some huge soul-searching as a nation.

Quote:PBrower,

Over-extension and hubris have traditionally been the methods of hegemonic decline.  So, in a gross breach of my standard operating procedures, I am going to agree with you here.  Don't let it go to your head. 

It won't. The further back I go in discussing history the more neutral I get, and the more I notice patterns. That's one good reason for studying  other nations and other times. History around the time of Julius Caesar could be very relevant to contemporary America. A big difference: we abolished slavery.

Quote:Eric,

Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?).  It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort.  A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s?  Also a possibility.

More of a concern is that the Republican Party, closely attached to the most rapacious interests and to the most superstitious sentiments, might decide that it dare not lose. It is far too early to say whether there will be a free and fair general election in 2020. The model of the winners enriching themselves at the expense of the losers of a political struggle hardly causes domestic tranquility. People with nothing to lose in the event of defeat, people who know that they will be imprisoned or allowed to starve, people who believe that should they lose all dignity and freedom that death solves all their problems, are the most dedicated revolutionaries.

Quote:Dave Horn,

I agree that DJT's prime chance of consolidating his political victory rest in successfully managing a big infrastructure buildout, and that automation and GW could (and probably will) become salient issues a little further down the line, though I don't think they will play as much of a role in the next 10 years as they will in another 20-30 years or so.

President Trump's victory allows him to do what politicians of the worst kind have always done -- using the government as patronage for supporters and $crewing the rest. If the President has a plan, then it is heavily in show projects from which favored contractors will wax fat and for which the rest of us will pay dearly. His economic policies might create more jobs -- but through pay cuts that spread more work, but less pay around.

Tariffs are taxes. Never forget that.

[Warren Dew]

(01-28-2017, 06:33 PM)pbrower2a Wrote:

Quote:Dave Horn,

I agree that DJT's prime chance of consolidating his political victory rest in successfully managing a big infrastructure buildout, and that automation and GW could (and probably will) become salient issues a little further down the line, though I don't think they will play as much of a role in the next 10 years as they will in another 20-30 years or so.

President Trump's victory allows him to do what politicians of the worst kind have always done -- using the government as patronage for supporters and $crewing the rest. If the President has a plan, then it is heavily in show projects from which favored contractors will wax fat and for which the rest of us will pay dearly. His  economic policies might create more jobs -- but through pay cuts that spread more work, but less pay around.

This is exactly what happens with all massive government spending plans.  It happened with Obama's "infrastructure" spending; it will happen if Trump manages to get a massive "infrastructure" spending plan passed as well.  Let's hope he doesn't.

[SomeGuy]

(01-28-2017, 06:30 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 04:25 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: So, since the US and Britain were presumably on the same secular track up through the Revolution, and then again with WWII, and have had similar social movements since (the 60s in both places, Thatcher/Reagan, Blair/Clinton, Trump/Brexit), we are left with the conclusion that Britain either decided to take the rest of the 19th century off, or it just had unusually competent leadership during the period when the rest of the West was in crisis, defusing both social movements like the Chartists and war scares with the US, France, Prussia, or what have you.

I'm not sure it's correct to consider Britain to be a separate nation from the US, then or now.  Separate states, yes, separate nations, not so sure.  For that reason, the US Civil War may have served as a crisis war for the UK just as WWII served as a crisis war for the US, despite being overseas wars in both cases.  The Civil War did have a domestic impact on the UK, primarily through the cutoff of cotton from the confederacy, and it threatened cutting off much of their food supply as well.

The UK was also indirectly involved in the Taiping Rebellion, an even bigger conflict than the Civil War, and directly in the Second Opium War.  It was not a peaceful period for the British Empire, even if it was for the British homeland.

If we believe Turchin's theories about elite overproduction and we believe that fourth turning crises resolve the elite overproduction, then we should remember that elite overproduction can be resolved either by removing some of the elites, or by reducing the density of elites through expansion of the domain over which the elites exert influence.  That suggests that the UK's expanded influence in the far east and other areas of the world may have resolved their elite overproduction without requiring culling - again assuming that Turchin's theories about elite overproduction apply to generational crises.

I also strongly suspect that the continuity represented by the British Monarchy and in particular Queen Victoria's reign helped moderate British foreign policy and avoid some of the errors that can precipitate crises.

I think that if the US handled the current crisis era expertly, we could similarly resolve the crisis by growing into the role of worldwide trade hegemon.  We became the world's only superpower at the end of the Cold War, but we never really took advantage of it; the window to take advantage of it is still open, if only for a few more years.

You can throw in the Indian Mutiny while you're at it.  The Crimean War and the Great Game as well.  The UK has a war scare in 1861 over the US Civil War as well, and was involved on the edges with the unification of Italy and Germany, too.

The real surge in Imperial holdings took place after this period though, particularly in Africa.  But I think the larger point that Britain did not have the elite overproduction issues because of its surging economy and imperial possessions, which also served as outlet valves for its booming (non-elite) population as well, is worthy of consideration.

[Eric the Green]

(01-28-2017, 01:07 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Eric,

Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?).  It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort.  A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s?  Also a possibility.

Distinctly possible, and predicted as possible by me already.

Although the left is definitely ideological, it has taken a social-justice slant big time because of who the major party nominees were in 2016 and who is president now. But I don't see an out-of-power violent left wing revolution as likely to succeed in the USA. The resistance to Trump is on, but it's mostly non-violent, and whether it can depose Trump before 2020 or even 2024 depends largely on Trump's own behavior. So I think an unsuccessful right-wing violent revolt against a left government that succeeds Trump is more likely, especially since the right-wing is focused on keeping their guns and thus is more-violent. And again, not until 2025-26.

And one side or another seceding is distinctly possible. William Strauss posted here long ago that the borders of the USA after this 4T might not be the same as before it. This prediction of mine dates back 4 decades. I don't say I am certain of it, but what I predicted is that people might be proposing it. This was unthinkable back in the 20th century. Now, it's not.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:Black people know well that they cannot successfully rise against "Whitey" and survive. Black people are right to challenge police forces where such is possible (media, protests, and official inquiries) for being more trigger-happy with black suspects than with white suspects. Provoking the police is not good for survival, whatever one's ethnicity. If after the last good President, black lives are somehow less precious than other lives, then we have some huge soul-searching as a nation. 

Except that they aren't really more trigger-happy with blacks than they are with whites.  And I think you underestimate the aggressiveness of a minority of progressive "activists".  I do agree that it would be incredibly foolish and counter-productive for them to do so.  We will see how things go.

Quote:It won't. The further back I go in discussing history the more neutral I get, and the more I notice patterns. That's one good reason for studying  other nations and other times. History around the time of Julius Caesar could be very relevant to contemporary America. A big difference: we abolished slavery.

Slavery served largely the same function in the Classical world that automation/mechanization serves in the Modern West.  And I don't think we are quite THAT late in the Republic.  More the era of Sulla than Caesar, if you will, though I don't think a search for direct analogues would be fruitful.

Quote:More of a concern is that the Republican Party, closely attached to the most rapacious interests and to the most superstitious sentiments, might decide that it dare not lose. It is far too early to say whether there will be a free and fair general election in 2020. The model of the winners enriching themselves at the expense of the losers of a political struggle hardly causes domestic tranquility. People with nothing to lose in the event of defeat, people who know that they will be imprisoned or allowed to starve, people who believe that should they lose all dignity and freedom that death solves all their problems, are the most dedicated revolutionaries. 

I have told you before, and will tell you again, that I don't think this sort of thing is good for you.  How is that widow doing?  Did she go to the march after all?

Quote:President Trump's victory allows him to do what politicians of the worst kind have always done -- using the government as patronage for supporters and $crewing the rest. If the President has a plan, then it is heavily in show projects from which favored contractors will wax fat and for which the rest of us will pay dearly. His economic policies might create more jobs -- but through pay cuts that spread more work, but less pay around. 

Tariffs are taxes. Never forget that.

So, business as usual, then? 

Tariffs ARE taxes, indeed, they were the primary form of federal taxation for most of our history.  I haven't forgotten.

[SomeGuy]

(01-28-2017, 07:20 PM)Eric the Green Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 01:07 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Eric,

Could be, or could be a violent left-wing (well, really at this point more of an ethnic rather than ideological faction) uprising to a re-elected Trump (another Electoral College win/Popular vote loss?).  It's a possibility, as is a foreign conflict coinciding with an internal revolt of some sort.  A collapse in America's geopolitical position due to an internal conflict of some sort in the 2020s, setting the stage for the victor of the same to try and contest (or not) the new order in the 2030s or 2040s?  Also a possibility.

Distinctly possible, and predicted as possible by me already.

Although the left is definitely ideological, it has taken a social-justice slant big time because of who the major party nominees were in 2016 and who is president now. But I don't see an out-of-power violent left wing revolution as likely to succeed in the USA. The resistance to Trump is on, but it's mostly non-violent, and whether it can depose Trump before 2020 or even 2024 depends largely on Trump's own behavior. So I think an unsuccessful right-wing violent revolt against a left government that succeeds Trump is more likely, especially since the right-wing is focused on keeping their guns and thus is more-violent. And again, not until 2025-26.

And one side or another seceding is distinctly possible. William Strauss posted here long ago that the borders of the USA after this 4T might not be the same as before it. This prediction of mine dates back 4 decades. I don't say I am certain of it, but what I predicted is that people might be proposing it. This was unthinkable back in the 20th century. Now, it's not.

Oh, there's plenty of violence on the left, too.  But we are in agreement that both are possibilities for which one could draw plausible scenarios.  The question is indeed how the next 4 years go.

[Eric the Green]

(01-28-2017, 06:50 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 06:33 PM)pbrower2a Wrote:

Quote:Dave Horn,

I agree that DJT's prime chance of consolidating his political victory rest in successfully managing a big infrastructure buildout, and that automation and GW could (and probably will) become salient issues a little further down the line, though I don't think they will play as much of a role in the next 10 years as they will in another 20-30 years or so.

President Trump's victory allows him to do what politicians of the worst kind have always done -- using the government as patronage for supporters and $crewing the rest. If the President has a plan, then it is heavily in show projects from which favored contractors will wax fat and for which the rest of us will pay dearly. His  economic policies might create more jobs -- but through pay cuts that spread more work, but less pay around.

This is exactly what happens with all massive government spending plans.  It happened with Obama's "infrastructure" spending; it will happen if Trump manages to get a massive "infrastructure" spending plan passed as well.  Let's hope he doesn't.

Why shouldn't it, in your view, since you are not so concerned about debt? Such a plan if passed by Trump with Democratic Party support would be stimulative and good for business long-term. It didn't happen under Obama only because Obama was a Democrat.

If Trump's plan is for tolls, show projects, tax breaks for contractors and such, then not only will it not be very massive and not stimulative, but it will be different than any government spending plan.

His "infrastructure plans" so far consist of oil pipelines and a border wall, which will do nothing for the people of America.