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#21
One other thing is Trump has quieted down as compared with during the election and during his first couple of months in office. Fewer tweet storms and resultant shit storms.
#Leach2020
#Pence2017
#ProsecuteTreason
#HUAC2.0
#RealNationalism
#NaziPunksFOff


Mark 13:22 - "For there shall rise false Christs and false prophets, and they shall give signs and wonders, to seduce, if possible, also the chosen."


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#22
(04-16-2017, 12:07 PM)The Wonkette Wrote: The number of postings has really dropped.  More notably, I haven't seen any female posters in quite a few days.  Even the obituary thread failed to note the passing of the last survivor of the 19th Century. Is it time to bury the forum?

I'm not a Facebook fan, but the group there seems to post a lot more than this forum does.  I'm a tangential member.  I get notices, but I don't post or read it either.  As far as this forum, I'm only an occasional poster here.  I'm not the best one to comment on longevity, but your point is well taken.
Intelligence is not knowledge and knowledge is not wisdom, but they all play well together.
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#23
and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....
1984 Apollonian Civic
ISFP - The Artist.






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#24
I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.

I have a new modeling result. Look at the figure below. Shown is the model output (dashed line) and a measure of sociopolitical instability obtained from a weighted average of Turchin's database of political violence, and Chas's and my database of "cultural instability"--new conceptions of religious meaning and associated enthusiasm (revivals, alternative lifestyles, founding of new religions and denominations). To understand the significance of what I am presenting, note that these results have no additional adjustable constants (fudge factors) beyond what Turchin's model uses, but fit the data pretty well.

[Image: Instability-cycle-model.gif]

Background:
Peter Turchin proposed a model for generational cycles of instability (related to but not exactly the same as turnings) that is based on models developed for the spread of infectious disease. The population is divided in three categories: naïve people, radicals and moderates, who correspond to uninfected, infected and recovered populations in an epidemic. Basically the idea is there are radical ideas that can spread to naïve people by social engagement with radicals, which convert them into radicals. Every year a certain fraction of radicals lose their radicalism and become moderates. Radical formation is proportional to the number of radicals (more radicals mean more exposure of naïve people to radical ideas). The proportionality constant is modified by the number of moderates--more moderates suppresses radicalization. The result of this process is periodic bursts of radicalism that burn out in time.

This process operates on a range of ages from coming of age (assuming to be 21) and retirement from political life, AR. In addition the process of radical conversion to moderates occurs after lag period (it takes time to become disgusted with radicalism). Turchin shows that will some sets of parameters, regular cycles of 50 years length can be obtained. He also reports that cycle length is largely dependent on AR and the lag period.

My version:
I implemented Turchin's model with two modifications. First instead of a fixed AR as Turchin used, I set AR = AL+10 where AL is the average leader age obtained from data provided by Neil Howe at his website and which I have previous discussed. Thus AR rises from the late fifties around 1790 to 72 today. This has the effect of increasing cycle length as time progresses. The second modification was I increased the radicalization parameter (the propensity of naïve people to become radicalized upon contact with radicals) for the first year when a new liberal generation of leaders came to power (as forecast by the generational model). These dates were 1802, 1831, 1862, 1896, 1933, 1968, 2008. They are simply 1775 (assumed to the start of a "revolutionary generation coming of age) with AL-21 added to it successively.

The result of this boost was nil when it happened in a "down period". When it happened in an "high" period it adjusted the date of peak radicalization slightly closer to the dates when the new generation comes to power. For the recent period I added a boost in 2001 for 911 in addition to the boost for the 2008 coming to power of the Boomers--as defined by the generational model. Thus, the next peak in instability is forecast for the middle of next decade (without these additions it would be later, around 2030).

Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.
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#25
(04-23-2017, 05:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote: I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.



Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.

Does this model interact with his/your inequality model?  It doesn't appear to, as 20s and 60s saw rising inequality.
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#26
(04-23-2017, 03:32 AM)taramarie Wrote: and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....

Can anyone advise on how to join the Facebook group?  Thanks.
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#27
(04-23-2017, 12:36 PM)ChrisP Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 03:32 AM)taramarie Wrote: and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....

Can anyone advise on how to join the Facebook group?  Thanks.

It is not an open group for obvious reasons. The only way to join is to know someone in the group.
1984 Apollonian Civic
ISFP - The Artist.






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#28
I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites. This is especially so when economic rent is a big chunk of economic activity. People paying heavily for the privilege of coexisting with economic elites are unlikely to like the reality. Economic rent includes organized crime, political corruption that enriches corrupt officials, monopolistic profits, and a bulk of payments (above maintenance costs and a normal rate of return of investment costs) of rural magnates and urban landlords.

Urban California is very left wing because people are being gouged for rent. See also the Acela corridor, the Three C's of Ohio, Greater Chicago, and South Florida. Even in Texas, the liberal areas are the more expensive urban areas (Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and El Paso). Such is not a big problem in rural areas. If a big chunk of your income is not going to rent, then you might be a conservative unless your living depends upon the welfare state for a big chunk of your pay.

To most tenants rent looks like a reward for a passive investment. Whether that is a fair assessment of reality may be a different matter. But as a rule, people who make huge incomes off passive investments defend their incomes as fervently as people who make their income in more difficult ways, like owning and operating manufacturing or retail/ food service business.

If you are money ahead to leave California with what looks like a well-paying job for retail sales or restaurant work in Nebraska -- we obviously have a gross imbalance of costs and pay.
"The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool" -- William Shakespeare, As You Like It, V.i


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#29
(04-23-2017, 01:31 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites. This is especially so when economic rent is a big chunk of economic activity. People paying heavily for the privilege of coexisting with economic elites are unlikely to like the reality. Economic rent includes organized crime, political corruption that enriches corrupt officials,  monopolistic profits, and a bulk of payments (above maintenance costs and a normal rate of return of investment costs) of rural magnates and urban landlords.

Urban California is very left wing because people are being gouged for rent. See also the Acela corridor, the Three C's of Ohio, Greater Chicago, and South Florida. Even in Texas, the liberal areas are the more expensive urban areas (Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and El Paso).  Such is not a big problem in rural areas. If a big chunk of your income is not going to rent, then you might be a conservative unless your living depends upon the welfare state for a big chunk of your pay.

To most tenants rent looks like a reward for a passive investment. Whether that is a fair assessment of reality may be a different matter. But as a rule, people who make huge incomes off passive investments defend their incomes as fervently as people who make their income in more difficult ways, like owning and operating manufacturing or retail/ food service business.  

If you are money ahead to leave California with what looks like a well-paying job for retail sales or restaurant work in Nebraska -- we obviously have a gross imbalance of costs and pay.

Woody Guthrie made mention of California's high costs in his classic song "If you ain't got the do-re-mi". If not, look in less expensive places such as those he mentioned in that song.
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#30
(04-23-2017, 12:35 PM)ChrisP Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 05:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote: I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.



Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.

Does this model interact with his/your inequality model?  It doesn't appear to, as 20s and 60s saw rising inequality.

No it doesn't, as you correctly noted.  Turchin has a version in which the propensity to radicalize is proportional in inequality.  But he didn't try to fit it to data, perhaps for the very reason you noted.
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#31
(04-23-2017, 01:31 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites.
Yes and no.  Yes in that several of the periods of relatively high instability do correlate with periods of relatively high inequality (civil war, 1910's and maybe the Revolutionary period).  No in that others do not (ca. 1830 and 1960's).  And then there is the period of high inequality in the late 1920's and early stages of the Depression in which instability was relatively low.
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