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#21
One other thing is Trump has quieted down as compared with during the election and during his first couple of months in office. Fewer tweet storms and resultant shit storms.
#ImpeachTrump
#ProsecuteTreason
#HUAC2.0
#RealNationalism
#NaziPunksFOff


Mark 13:22 - "For there shall rise false Christs and false prophets, and they shall give signs and wonders, to seduce, if possible, also the chosen."


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#22
(04-16-2017, 12:07 PM)The Wonkette Wrote: The number of postings has really dropped.  More notably, I haven't seen any female posters in quite a few days.  Even the obituary thread failed to note the passing of the last survivor of the 19th Century. Is it time to bury the forum?

I'm not a Facebook fan, but the group there seems to post a lot more than this forum does.  I'm a tangential member.  I get notices, but I don't post or read it either.  As far as this forum, I'm only an occasional poster here.  I'm not the best one to comment on longevity, but your point is well taken.
Intelligence is not knowledge and knowledge is not wisdom, but they all play well together.
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#23
and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....
1984 Apollonian Civic
ISFP - The Artist.






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#24
I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.

I have a new modeling result. Look at the figure below. Shown is the model output (dashed line) and a measure of sociopolitical instability obtained from a weighted average of Turchin's database of political violence, and Chas's and my database of "cultural instability"--new conceptions of religious meaning and associated enthusiasm (revivals, alternative lifestyles, founding of new religions and denominations). To understand the significance of what I am presenting, note that these results have no additional adjustable constants (fudge factors) beyond what Turchin's model uses, but fit the data pretty well.

[Image: Instability-cycle-model.gif]

Background:
Peter Turchin proposed a model for generational cycles of instability (related to but not exactly the same as turnings) that is based on models developed for the spread of infectious disease. The population is divided in three categories: naïve people, radicals and moderates, who correspond to uninfected, infected and recovered populations in an epidemic. Basically the idea is there are radical ideas that can spread to naïve people by social engagement with radicals, which convert them into radicals. Every year a certain fraction of radicals lose their radicalism and become moderates. Radical formation is proportional to the number of radicals (more radicals mean more exposure of naïve people to radical ideas). The proportionality constant is modified by the number of moderates--more moderates suppresses radicalization. The result of this process is periodic bursts of radicalism that burn out in time.

This process operates on a range of ages from coming of age (assuming to be 21) and retirement from political life, AR. In addition the process of radical conversion to moderates occurs after lag period (it takes time to become disgusted with radicalism). Turchin shows that will some sets of parameters, regular cycles of 50 years length can be obtained. He also reports that cycle length is largely dependent on AR and the lag period.

My version:
I implemented Turchin's model with two modifications. First instead of a fixed AR as Turchin used, I set AR = AL+10 where AL is the average leader age obtained from data provided by Neil Howe at his website and which I have previous discussed. Thus AR rises from the late fifties around 1790 to 72 today. This has the effect of increasing cycle length as time progresses. The second modification was I increased the radicalization parameter (the propensity of naïve people to become radicalized upon contact with radicals) for the first year when a new liberal generation of leaders came to power (as forecast by the generational model). These dates were 1802, 1831, 1862, 1896, 1933, 1968, 2008. They are simply 1775 (assumed to the start of a "revolutionary generation coming of age) with AL-21 added to it successively.

The result of this boost was nil when it happened in a "down period". When it happened in an "high" period it adjusted the date of peak radicalization slightly closer to the dates when the new generation comes to power. For the recent period I added a boost in 2001 for 911 in addition to the boost for the 2008 coming to power of the Boomers--as defined by the generational model. Thus, the next peak in instability is forecast for the middle of next decade (without these additions it would be later, around 2030).

Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.
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#25
(04-23-2017, 05:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote: I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.



Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.

Does this model interact with his/your inequality model?  It doesn't appear to, as 20s and 60s saw rising inequality.
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#26
(04-23-2017, 03:32 AM)taramarie Wrote: and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....

Can anyone advise on how to join the Facebook group?  Thanks.
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#27
(04-23-2017, 12:36 PM)ChrisP Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 03:32 AM)taramarie Wrote: and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....

Can anyone advise on how to join the Facebook group?  Thanks.

It is not an open group for obvious reasons. The only way to join is to know someone in the group.
1984 Apollonian Civic
ISFP - The Artist.






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#28
I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites. This is especially so when economic rent is a big chunk of economic activity. People paying heavily for the privilege of coexisting with economic elites are unlikely to like the reality. Economic rent includes organized crime, political corruption that enriches corrupt officials, monopolistic profits, and a bulk of payments (above maintenance costs and a normal rate of return of investment costs) of rural magnates and urban landlords.

Urban California is very left wing because people are being gouged for rent. See also the Acela corridor, the Three C's of Ohio, Greater Chicago, and South Florida. Even in Texas, the liberal areas are the more expensive urban areas (Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and El Paso). Such is not a big problem in rural areas. If a big chunk of your income is not going to rent, then you might be a conservative unless your living depends upon the welfare state for a big chunk of your pay.

To most tenants rent looks like a reward for a passive investment. Whether that is a fair assessment of reality may be a different matter. But as a rule, people who make huge incomes off passive investments defend their incomes as fervently as people who make their income in more difficult ways, like owning and operating manufacturing or retail/ food service business.

If you are money ahead to leave California with what looks like a well-paying job for retail sales or restaurant work in Nebraska -- we obviously have a gross imbalance of costs and pay.
"The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool" -- William Shakespeare, As You Like It, V.i


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#29
(04-23-2017, 01:31 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites. This is especially so when economic rent is a big chunk of economic activity. People paying heavily for the privilege of coexisting with economic elites are unlikely to like the reality. Economic rent includes organized crime, political corruption that enriches corrupt officials,  monopolistic profits, and a bulk of payments (above maintenance costs and a normal rate of return of investment costs) of rural magnates and urban landlords.

Urban California is very left wing because people are being gouged for rent. See also the Acela corridor, the Three C's of Ohio, Greater Chicago, and South Florida. Even in Texas, the liberal areas are the more expensive urban areas (Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and El Paso).  Such is not a big problem in rural areas. If a big chunk of your income is not going to rent, then you might be a conservative unless your living depends upon the welfare state for a big chunk of your pay.

To most tenants rent looks like a reward for a passive investment. Whether that is a fair assessment of reality may be a different matter. But as a rule, people who make huge incomes off passive investments defend their incomes as fervently as people who make their income in more difficult ways, like owning and operating manufacturing or retail/ food service business.  

If you are money ahead to leave California with what looks like a well-paying job for retail sales or restaurant work in Nebraska -- we obviously have a gross imbalance of costs and pay.

Woody Guthrie made mention of California's high costs in his classic song "If you ain't got the do-re-mi". If not, look in less expensive places such as those he mentioned in that song.
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#30
(04-23-2017, 12:35 PM)ChrisP Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 05:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote: I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.



Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.

Does this model interact with his/your inequality model?  It doesn't appear to, as 20s and 60s saw rising inequality.

No it doesn't, as you correctly noted.  Turchin has a version in which the propensity to radicalize is proportional in inequality.  But he didn't try to fit it to data, perhaps for the very reason you noted.
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#31
(04-23-2017, 01:31 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites.
Yes and no.  Yes in that several of the periods of relatively high instability do correlate with periods of relatively high inequality (civil war, 1910's and maybe the Revolutionary period).  No in that others do not (ca. 1830 and 1960's).  And then there is the period of high inequality in the late 1920's and early stages of the Depression in which instability was relatively low.
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#32
(04-23-2017, 01:26 PM)taramarie Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 12:36 PM)ChrisP Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 03:32 AM)taramarie Wrote: and they play nicer over there than here hence why i have all but left this place as well as why others left long ago....

Can anyone advise on how to join the Facebook group?  Thanks.

It is not an open group for obvious reasons. The only way to join is to know someone in the group.

Hi, Is there anyone who would care to invite me to this Facebook group?  I have been a lurker on this site since 9/11 and would love to expand to Facebook, where I am more active.
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#33
(04-23-2017, 03:11 PM)Mikebert Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 01:31 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites.
Yes and no.  Yes in that several of the periods of relatively high instability do correlate with periods of relatively high inequality (civil war, 1910's and maybe the Revolutionary period).  No in that others do not (ca. 1830 and 1960's).  And then there is the period of high inequality in the late 1920's and early stages of the Depression in which instability was relatively low.

This may have something to do with the generational constellation of the time. In the 1920s and 1930s the rising adults were the GI Generation, and GIs showed their willingness to work within the system, whether with the corporate New Era politics of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era until the economy broke down -- before becoming enthusiastic supporters of the New Deal after the economy melted down and as it started to recover. GI's were not flaming radicals other than the Communists, and even those on the Right knew enough to give up on AmeriKKKlan (get it?) fascism as it discredited itself. Remember -- during the 1920s the KKK in America was much bigger both in absolute and relative numbers, and even had more political power, than the Nazis in Germany at the same time. The 1915 Klan was not a particularly GI phenomenon.

The Millennial Generation is not revolutionary. It is conformist. Obama is not a Millennial,  but he is a good match for a Civic culture. He tried to achieve it, but he didn't quite succeed. As the Tea Party protests showed, America was not quite ready for that. But give rational conformists a good reason to reject the leadership of the time, and they will do so. Just watch history unfold.

Millennial adults did not vote for Donald Trump. Unlike other generations they could see through him and see him as trouble. Millennial adults might support a New Era-style political norm so long as it brings them enough prosperity to raise their children adequately. But they are becoming the dominant generation in raising very-young children. The oldest half of Generation X  have completely left child-bearing years, and Millennial adults (now up to age 35) fully fill the prime years of childbirth. Civic parents are protective parents, and they will protect their children even against political ideologies. GI's could deal with the politics of an America that was much more reliant upon small business and family farms. Whether they can tolerate a plutocratic ideology that ravages children for the maximization of elite profit and gain  is another matter altogether. They can suffer for bosses and ownership. They might not tolerate demands that their children go ragged, cold, ignorant, and hungry.

I consider Donald Trump the antithesis of Civic values. He exemplifies the "every-man-for-himself" ideology that the GI generation would have never tolerated as public policy. In New Era politics and economics of the 1920s, the economy was still competitive (which prevented some excesses) and Big Business did not yet have the large bureaucratic elites that they now have. Today the economy is anything but competitive, and the economic elites insist on getting what they want first, the rest of us being obliged to endure severe privations in the event that something goes wrong. The elites are exempt from any personal sacrifice as if nobility in the worst sense of the word.

...So far I see Donald Trump as a one-term President, and not only due to his age. He offended enough constituencies that even facing a weak campaigner he fell short of even a plurality of the Presidential vote. He has done nothing to attract those who voted against him except for the tiny sliver of Americans in the economic elites who saw him as a dangerous demagogue and would have rather had some other conservative Republican as President. He has used Executive Orders to bypass Congress (even if he has a Congress that might concur so long as it votes strictly on Party lines) that have proved shady upon judicial rules. His economic policies are simply to enrich elites and promise pie-in-the-sky-when-you-die to the common man despite showing a complete lack of religious piety. He offends a coalition of feminists, environmentalists, the minority poor, the middle class of minorities of all kinds, unionized labor, government employees, people on the extreme high end of formal education, and clean-government types; it is easy to see such people as a majority coalition in the 2020s. Should global warming case a crop failure or two he could lose the farm vote and make rural interests part of the late-Crisis-era coalition. President Trump coulod be creating the American political norm of the 2020s, but a norm that rejects his ideology and priorities.

The geriatric quality of America's current political leadership will create a vacuum -- and Millennial figures will fill that vacuum as elected officials and political advisers, whether the first president of the 2020s is a late-wave Boomer or an early-wave X. Even the GI's faced limits on their political tenure. At one time I expected to see the scene in which someone like Dan Inouye or Frank Lautenberg as the last GI retiring from the Senate would greet the first Millennial entering the Senate. That did not happen. The Millennial generation is largely smart, pleasant, rational, and competent; by 2020 that will be much of the solution, even in places in which Boom and X reactionaries seem most entrenched.

Millennial adults have even more at stake with the rejection of a new feudalism that Donald Trump exemplifies, a feudalism that takes the inequity of the feudal era and melds it with the exploitation of a Soviet-style nomenklatura in commercial and administrative bureaucracies. Such elites can thrive in a climate of fear and superstition while all others suffer. But even Millennial adults have their limits. I can see them as revolutionaries of the amoral, anti-religious, iconoclastic French Revolution. They might even introduce their 21st-century equivalent of the guillotine for use against those who insisted upon extreme indulgence for themselves to be paid for with great suffering for others.

We Americans really messed up in the most important election since the Civil War. FDR and perhaps Obama were so obvious that people didn't have to think much. Many other elections weren't so severe in their consequences. The generational constellation made such turkeys as Harding and Dubya inevitable. The Gilded Age offered little worth writing about, but government was practically insignificant in those days except to the grafters. Reagan is understandable; someone had to cut American expectations down from the extravagant hopes of the Boom Awakening. Donald Trump is the worst President since at least Buchanan. If the core principles of good government are kindness, caution, and compassion, then Donald Trump lacks all three. So do his political allies who have shut out the rest of us for at least two years and probably four.
"The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool" -- William Shakespeare, As You Like It, V.i


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#34
(05-04-2017, 10:02 AM)pbrower2a Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 03:11 PM)Mikebert Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 01:31 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: I would suspect that one of the most radicalizing effect upon society is the perception of mass hardship in juxtaposition with conspicuous indulgence by economic elites.
Yes and no.  Yes in that several of the periods of relatively high instability do correlate with periods of relatively high inequality (civil war, 1910's and maybe the Revolutionary period).  No in that others do not (ca. 1830 and 1960's).  And then there is the period of high inequality in the late 1920's and early stages of the Depression in which instability was relatively low.

This may have something to do with the generational constellation of the time. In the 1920s and 1930s the rising adults were the GI Generation, and GIs showed their willingness to work within the system, whether with the corporate New Era politics of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era until the economy broke down -- before becoming enthusiastic supporters of the New Deal after the economy melted down and as it started to recover. GI's were not flaming radicals other than the Communists, and even those on the Right knew enough to give up on AmeriKKKlan (get it?) fascism as it discredited itself. Remember -- during the 1920s the KKK in America was much bigger both in absolute and relative numbers, and even had more political power, than the Nazis in Germany at the same time. The 1915 Klan was not a particularly GI phenomenon.

The Millennial Generation is not revolutionary. It is conformist. Obama is not a Millennial,  but he is a good match for a Civic culture. He tried to achieve it, but he didn't quite succeed. As the Tea Party protests showed, America was not quite ready for that. But give rational conformists a good reason to reject the leadership of the time, and they will do so. Just watch history unfold.

Millennial adults did not vote for Donald Trump. Unlike other generations they could see through him and see him as trouble. Millennial adults might support a New Era-style political norm so long as it brings them enough prosperity to raise their children adequately. But they are becoming the dominant generation in raising very-young children. The oldest half of Generation X  have completely left child-bearing years, and Millennial adults (now up to age 35) fully fill the prime years of childbirth. Civic parents are protective parents, and they will protect their children even against political ideologies. GI's could deal with the politics of an America that was much more reliant upon small business and family farms. Whether they can tolerate a plutocratic ideology that ravages children for the maximization of elite profit and gain  is another matter altogether. They can suffer for bosses and ownership. They might not tolerate demands that their children go ragged, cold, ignorant, and hungry.

I consider Donald Trump the antithesis of Civic values. He exemplifies the "every-man-for-himself" ideology that the GI generation would have never tolerated as public policy. In New Era politics and economics of the 1920s, the economy was still competitive (which prevented some excesses) and Big Business did not yet have the large bureaucratic elites that they now have. Today the economy is anything but competitive, and the economic elites insist on getting what they want first, the rest of us being obliged to endure severe privations in the event that something goes wrong. The elites are exempt from any personal sacrifice as if nobility in the worst sense of the word.

...So far I see Donald Trump as a one-term President, and not only due to his age. He offended enough constituencies that even facing a weak campaigner he fell short of even a plurality of the Presidential vote. He has done nothing to attract those who voted against him except for the tiny sliver of Americans in the economic elites who saw him as a dangerous demagogue and would have rather had some other conservative Republican as President. He has used Executive Orders to bypass Congress (even if he has a Congress that might concur so long as it votes strictly on Party lines) that have proved shady upon judicial rules. His economic policies are simply to enrich elites and promise pie-in-the-sky-when-you-die to the common man despite showing a complete lack of religious piety. He offends a coalition of feminists, environmentalists, the minority poor, the middle class of minorities of all kinds, unionized labor, government employees, people on the extreme high end of formal education, and clean-government types; it is easy to see such people as a majority coalition in the 2020s. Should global warming case a crop failure or two he could lose the farm vote and make rural interests part of the late-Crisis-era coalition. President Trump coulod be creating the American political norm of the 2020s, but a norm that rejects his ideology and priorities.

The geriatric quality of America's current political leadership will create a vacuum -- and Millennial figures will fill that vacuum as elected officials and political advisers, whether the first president of the 2020s is a late-wave Boomer or an early-wave X. Even the GI's faced limits on their political tenure. At one time I expected to see the scene in which someone like Dan Inouye or Frank Lautenberg as the last GI retiring from the Senate would greet the first Millennial entering the Senate. That did not happen. The Millennial generation is largely smart, pleasant, rational,  and competent; by 2020 that will be much of the solution, even in places in which Boom and X reactionaries seem most entrenched.

Millennial adults have even more at stake with the rejection of a new feudalism that Donald Trump exemplifies, a feudalism that takes the inequity of the feudal era and melds it with the exploitation of a Soviet-style nomenklatura in commercial and administrative bureaucracies. Such elites can thrive in a climate of fear and superstition while all others suffer. But even Millennial adults have their limits. I can see them as revolutionaries of the amoral, anti-religious, iconoclastic French Revolution. They might even introduce their 21st-century equivalent of the guillotine for use against those who insisted upon extreme indulgence for themselves to be paid for with great suffering for others.

We Americans really messed up in the most important election since the Civil War. FDR and perhaps Obama were so obvious that people didn't have to think much. Many other elections weren't so severe in their consequences. The generational constellation made such turkeys as Harding and Dubya inevitable. The Gilded Age offered little worth writing about, but government was practically insignificant in those days except to the grafters. Reagan is understandable; someone had to cut American expectations down from the extravagant hopes of the Boom Awakening. Donald Trump is the worst President since at least Buchanan. If the core principles of good government are kindness, caution, and compassion, then Donald Trump lacks all three. So do his political allies who have shut out the rest of us for at least two years and probably four.

If someone like me, a man of the Right, has been turned this ill by Trump's presence defaming the White House, then he may well be the worst President ever.
#ImpeachTrump
#ProsecuteTreason
#HUAC2.0
#RealNationalism
#NaziPunksFOff


Mark 13:22 - "For there shall rise false Christs and false prophets, and they shall give signs and wonders, to seduce, if possible, also the chosen."


Reply
#35
Yea, this discussion board is waning. I was an active member for a few years back. I left because the personal axe grinding between a good number of the members seemed to occupy most of the threads, as opposed to posts containing real content. While I do see insightful stuff here, it is still heavily laden with adolescent tit-for-tat flame wars.

I check in from time to time and there is one thing I have noticed...........nothing changes. This is the forum that time forgot! I still check in because I value some of what I see here. Yet, I find more vibrant and informed discussion on a number of other forums. T4T isn't as culty as it once was. Many people out there are familiar with the concepts and are in many cases less dogmatic about them.

I'll continue to check in, and may even post, but there is a reason these rooms are empty and it has very little to do with the subject matter.
There was never any good old days
They are today, they are tomorrow
It's a stupid thing we say
Cursing tomorrow with sorrow
       -- Eugene Hutz
Reply
#36
(05-05-2017, 09:42 AM)Skabungus Wrote: Yea, this discussion board is waning.  I was an active member for a few years back.  I left because the personal axe grinding between a good number of the members seemed to occupy most of the threads, as opposed to posts containing real content.  While I do see insightful stuff here, it is still heavily laden with adolescent tit-for-tat flame wars.

I check in from time to time and there is one thing I have noticed...........nothing changes.  This is the forum that time forgot!  I still check in because I value some of what I see here.  Yet, I find more vibrant and informed discussion on a number of other forums.  T4T isn't as culty as it once was.  Many people out there are familiar with the concepts and are in many cases less dogmatic about them.  

I'll continue to check in, and may even post, but there is a reason these rooms are empty and it has very little to do with the subject matter.

I have to agree in full.  The serious discussion is gone, or nearly so.  I don't see it returning.
Intelligence is not knowledge and knowledge is not wisdom, but they all play well together.
Reply
#37
(04-23-2017, 12:35 PM)ChrisP Wrote:
(04-23-2017, 05:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote: I have tried to interest some of the other folks in posting here since this site is better for serious posts, threads don't get buried for instance.  Also it is better from presenting data. People keep saying they want more theory.  Well here's a theory post I just made at the other site. Let's see if it gets any engagement over here.



Now this is not a turning model.  It is a model designed to fit the empirical instability data which shows that the last 4T was not a period with a lot of unrest. Thus, the fact that the model forecasts no period of instability for the last 4T. The period around 1920 had lots of unrest and the model predicts peak unrest in 1922.  The model explains low levels of violence during the Depression by suppression of radicalization by moderates, who peaked in the mid 1930's.). These moderates were Lost radicals of the teens and early 1920's who had become disenchanted with radicalism. This might be why we avoided fascism last time.

Does this model interact with his/your inequality model?  It doesn't appear to, as 20s and 60s saw rising inequality.

I have added an interaction between inequality and social contagion.  It uses a concept invented by Jack Goldstone to model the forces leading to state breakdown called the political stress index (PSI). Turchin developed a version of it for America and I simplified his model

PSI =e^2 / [INEQ(1-INEQ)]

where e is elites as a fraction of the population and INEQ in inequality as given in the figure below:

[Image: Secular-cycle.gif]

The elite number is derived from inequality through a differential equation.  The figure above shows inequality and PSI.  Now I took the basic social contagion model described above and I spiked the radicalization parameter to a higher value at the beginning of a secular crisis, which was defined as a political moment which begins at a time when PSI is in the top quartile of its values over a secular cycle. Spikes were added in only two years, 1861 and 1932.  Shown below is the effect of the spikes.

[Image: Instability-cycle-model.gif]

The new model shows how adding a spike in 1861, caused by the coming to power of a dominant generation during a time of high PSI, led to a very large spike in radicalization, implying a great deal of violence, which is what happened.  Another spike was added in 1932, for the exact same reasons as in 1861. But this spike fizzled, producing a little uptick which then degraded. The reason why (according to the model) it did not catch hold was that there were too many moderates in the population--burnt out former radicals left over from the violence of a dozen years earlier.  And this is what happened.  Huge changes occurring in political and economic institutions, and yet these were accompanied by little violence.

This brings us to the present political moment.  The political cycle model forecasts the start of a political moment in 2008.  PSI was not in the top quartile of values in 3008 and no spike was added. This makes 2008 like 1965, 1897, and 1829, all starts of political moments in which PSI was not high.  These last three are 2T-type political moments, implying that the moment beginning in 2008 is one also.  A later start for the political moment would put it into the 4T category.  But this would be contrary to the generational model that says when the grey champions arrive, the 4T begins.
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