Trump, Bannon and the Coming Crisis

[SomeGuy]

(02-10-2017, 12:32 PM)X_4AD_84 Wrote:

(02-09-2017, 08:50 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Out of curiosity, have you actually read anything Dugin has written?

Read, watched YouTube clips, etc, etc.

I've been studying Duginism for over 10 years.

I knew much about it at a time when most American Idiots had never heard of him and barely knew who Putin was.

Uh huh.  What have you read?  ты говоришь по-русски?

I just find it a little odd, since you didn't seem to know what the SCO was until I pointed it out.  Previously, you were insisting on calling China+Russia the neo-Mongol Empire or what have you.

[Mikebert]

I've read a little bit about Bannon in recent weeks.  He seems to be a fan of S&H, Mencius Moldbug and "big history".  He'd be interested in a site like this, I think, were he not successful and powerful.
 
Bannon was a smart working class kid of an intellectual bent who made good at an early age, retired, and then indulged in his intellectual pursuits.  Anyways he correctly sees 4Ts as involving wars.  He also sees wars as intrinsic to the 4T, something which was not stated by S&H, but can be (and was) adduced from past examples. Hence, he feels a war is necessary.

I believe he is wrong, but the reason is subtle. The simple answer is for the first three of the four American 4Ts, the war occurred at the beginning of the 4T.  The Glorious 4T began with King Phillip’s war.  The Revolutionary War broke out in year 3 of a 22 year 4T.  The Civil War 4T began with the 4T. This pattern changed for the last 4T: WW II began in year 13 of an 18 year 4T. What this means is that the last 4T was not about WW II, whereas the Civil War and Revolutionary 4Ts were about the associated wars.

So what? Bannon (and you) might think.  In Generations p 71, S&H define the 4T as a “reordering” of secular institutions. The idea that there was substantial reordering of the American nation during the previous three 4Ts is obvious.  Why did this happen?  The answer is because they solved a problem that had emerged as an urgent concern in the previous 3T: American elite’s desire for self-rule, slavery, and the failure of the economic system to promote the general welfare. These problems eventually came to a head triggering a crisis: revolution, civil war, depression.  The 4T was then about retooling American institutions to solve the problem. 

To solve the 18th century 4T required British elites to capitulate to American elite desires for home rule. They were not willing to do that and so the only solution was force—the Revolutionary war.  To solve the 19th century 4T required Southern elites to capitulate to Northern elite demands for the end of slavery. They were not willing to do that and so the only solution was force—the Civil War. To solve the 20th century 4T required that the economy be restructured in such a way as to restore prosperity.  Nobody opposed this and so there was no recourse to war. A world war did happen in the 4T, but a world war happened in the previous 3T too, and the subsequent 1T and 2T had their wars.

[SomeGuy]

Which raises the question of what THIS 4T will be about.  Lot of people here will answer this or that, but I want to see is what organized coalition puts forth a problem and then presents a response.

Thoughts?

[Mikebert]

(02-10-2017, 04:48 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Which raises the question of what THIS 4T will be about.  Lot of people here will answer this or that, but I want to see is what organized coalition puts forth a problem and then presents a response.

Thoughts?

Well? ....

[SomeGuy]

(02-10-2017, 05:20 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(02-10-2017, 04:48 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Which raises the question of what THIS 4T will be about.  Lot of people here will answer this or that, but I want to see is what organized coalition puts forth a problem and then presents a response.

Thoughts?

Well? ....

Tough to say at the moment.  I mean on the one hand you have an increasingly radicalized left (students, BLM, various interest groups pushing issues related to LGBLT-etc. type stuff, etc.) that are very noisy and have well-placed supporters in the professional classes, the media, the universities, etc.  However, politically they have not been terribly effective, and have largely been in retreat or at least been held at bay since 2010 or so.  On the other you have an increasingly radical movement on the right from the Tea Party up to the election of Donald Trump that has basically lost most of the culture war issues, but has captured an overwhelming majority of elected offices.  So you have a political conflict that has been bitterly contested, but a long way from 4T style violence, and neither side has been able to effect a lasting realignment.  So either of those two parties is a maybe pending escalation or resolution of the conflict.

You also have my personal hobby horse, the US' maintenance of the liberal order, that has been under severe strain in the last 15 years or so, with the financial crisis, troubles in the EU, the GWOT, rising competitors, etc.  There has been a near continuous state of low-intensity warfare since the end of the Cold War, and a continuous one from 2001 on.  There has also been a fair amount of tension between the US and once-and-future? rivals Russia and China (we can throw Iran in there for a effect), so there's an issue that could be resolved one way or another, including via major war.

Since we have Bannon and Trump in the White House, and a nearly universally hawkish Congress (Republicans and Democrats alike), that's the one I'd place my money on.  And war could be the way it's resolved.

[SomeGuy]

No, no, it was definitely you, Xymox.  You kept making references to the "New Mongol Empire" and making weird, ill-fitting historical references.  I asked you what you were talking about, and you said it was the only political entity you knew of that encompassed both states.  I don't think the old forum archive is searchable, but I can make an effort if you want.  Seriously, it's how I remembered you.

Really, what books of Dugin's have you read?

[Mikebert]

Quote:Tough to say at the moment.  I mean on the one hand you have an increasingly radicalized left (students, BLM, various interest groups pushing issues related to LGBLT-etc. type stuff, etc.) that are very noisy and have well-placed supporters in the professional classes, the media, the universities, etc.  However, politically they have not been terribly effective, and have largely been in retreat or at least been held at bay since 2010 or so. 

I agree
 

Quote:On the other you have an increasingly radical movement on the right from the Tea Party up to the election of Donald Trump that has basically lost most of the culture war issues but has captured an overwhelming majority of elected offices

I might quibble with the culture issue, as my understanding that was not the focus of the Tea Party. But this is unimportant.
 

Quote:So you have a political conflict that has been bitterly contested, but a long way from 4T style violence, and neither side has been able to effect a lasting realignment.

OK
 

Quote:So either of those two parties is a maybe pending escalation or resolution of the conflict.

I don’t understand this.
 

Quote:You also have my personal hobby horse, the US' maintenance of the liberal order, that has been under severe strain in the last 15 years or so, with the financial crisis, troubles in the EU, the GWOT, rising competitors, etc.  There has been a near continuous state of low-intensity warfare since the end of the Cold War, and a continuous one from 2001 on.  There has also been a fair amount of tension between the US and once-and-future? rivals Russia and China (we can throw Iran in there for a effect), so there's an issue that could be resolved one way or another, including via major war.

This is true.

Quote:Since we have Bannon and Trump in the White House, and a nearly universally hawkish Congress (Republicans and Democrats alike), that's the one I'd place my money on.  And war could be the way it's resolved.

 Would it be fair to say that you see the secular institutional reordering that is a hallmark of a 4T will be centered on the liberal international order.  That you do not (so far) see an internal reordering as being in the cards?

[TeacherinExile]

(02-10-2017, 07:15 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

(02-10-2017, 05:20 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

(02-10-2017, 04:48 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Which raises the question of what THIS 4T will be about.  Lot of people here will answer this or that, but I want to see is what organized coalition puts forth a problem and then presents a response.

Thoughts?

Well? ....

Tough to say at the moment.  I mean on the one hand you have an increasingly radicalized left (students, BLM, various interest groups pushing issues related to LGBLT-etc. type stuff, etc.) that are very noisy and have well-placed supporters in the professional classes, the media, the universities, etc.  However, politically they have not been terribly effective, and have largely been in retreat or at least been held at bay since 2010 or so.  On the other you have an increasingly radical movement on the right from the Tea Party up to the election of Donald Trump that has basically lost most of the culture war issues, but has captured an overwhelming majority of elected offices.  So you have a political conflict that has been bitterly contested, but a long way from 4T style violence, and neither side has been able to effect a lasting realignment.  So either of those two parties is a maybe pending escalation or resolution of the conflict.

You also have my personal hobby horse, the US' maintenance of the liberal order, that has been under severe strain in the last 15 years or so, with the financial crisis, troubles in the EU, the GWOT, rising competitors, etc.  There has been a near continuous state of low-intensity warfare since the end of the Cold War, and a continuous one from 2001 on.  There has also been a fair amount of tension between the US and once-and-future? rivals Russia and China (we can throw Iran in there for a effect), so there's an issue that could be resolved one way or another, including via major war.

Since we have Bannon and Trump in the White House, and a nearly universally hawkish Congress (Republicans and Democrats alike), that's the one I'd place my money on.  And war could be the way it's resolved.

Not to put words in your mouth, but did you mean to say "US maintenance of the neoliberal order," instead?

[SomeGuy]

Quote:I might quibble with the culture issue, as my understanding that was not the focus of the Tea Party. But this is unimportant.

I agree that it isn't the focus of the Tea Party or Donald Trump.  I was simply pointing out that the issues that previously helped generate turnout for the Republicans have largely been lost.
The "Culture Wars" have largely been won by the left.

Quote:I don’t understand this.

We were discussing organized coalitions that could both effectively frame the issue of the problem the 4T is about and solve it.  I was suggesting that either of the two listed above could be candidates if one of them achieves some sort of lasting victory during the resolution of the 4T.  They would then be the people setting the narrative of what the turning was about and how it needed to be resolved.

Quote:Would it be fair to say that you see the secular institutional reordering that is a hallmark of a 4T will be centered on the liberal international order.  That you do not (so far) see an internal reordering as being in the cards?

I am suggesting that a drastic reordering of the international environment would necessarily include an internal reordering as well.  I tend to view many of the issues salient today (immigration, wars of choice, deindustrialization, etc.) stem from the logic of the US acting as global hegemon and guardian of the international order.  The US began setting up unequal trade relations with countries like Germany and Japan in order to boost their economies to prevent them from switching over to the other side during the Cold War.  FInancialization, like that that occurred in late Victorian Britain, is tied in with investments made overseas as a result of this.  Our lasting trade deficits have been supported by the dollar's place as the world's reserve currency.  Wars of choice stem from the US' self-proclaimed role as global policeman.  Politicians on the right and left wringing their hands over Trump's "Muslim ban" are just as likely to cite our need to preserve good relations with Muslim nations for our wars in the Middle East as they are to say "That's not who we are!".  Our gargantuan military budgets and attendant industrial complex stem from this same role, potentially crowding out other, more effective uses for the same funds.

Since Trump is in the driver's seat right now, let's look at what some of his proposed policies would entail on the domestic side.  Tariffs would be a huge shift, immigration restrictions would be another.  If he manages to end the US' hegemonic role (either via "aggressive withdrawal", or by pursuing a conflict with, say, China that goes poorly), think of the effects that would have on the domestic environment.  Tariffs, infrastructure spending, lower taxes, restricting the expansion of the supply of cheap labor, possibly enormous defense spending and a loss of US investments in China/East Asia during some sort of conflict, would lead to inflation, financial losses for many, rising jobs here at home.  It could resolve the present income imbalance in the US even (especially) if it eventually goes badly.  You would see a radically different US at the end of the period than you saw at the beginning, more isolationist, more nationalist, less thoroughly embedded in global affairs.  Hell, the Trump/Pence administration(s?) could be firmly repudiated by a Sanders/Gabbard style Democratic successor and still be the definer of the next party system, especially if they come in on a platform of higher wages, more domestic investment, fewer wars/interventions, ie their present platform, and the one Trump ran against to begin with.

The 4T would then be about the end of hegemony and empire, and the need to refocus attention here at home, with a thorough repudiation of both the neocons on the right and the (neo)liberal interventionists on the left, which one might think of as the Bush and Clinton wings of their respective parties.

Like I said, it's a possibility.  Doesn't mean it's going to happen that way, but right now I think it much more plausible than some farcical notion of a civil war between "red" and "blue".

[SomeGuy]

Quote:Not to put words in your mouth, but did you mean to say "US maintenance of the neoliberal order," instead?

No, I meant what I said, and said what I meant.  I appreciate that this is your new "buzzword", but in this case you are trying to draw a distinction where none exists.

[Mikebert]

(02-11-2017, 12:45 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: We were discussing organized coalitions that could both effectively frame the issue of the problem the 4T is about and solve it.  I was suggesting that either of the two listed above could be candidates if one of them achieves some sort of lasting victory during the resolution of the 4T.  They would then be the people setting the narrative of what the turning was about and how it needed to be resolved.
[Mike] Got it

I am suggesting that a drastic reordering of the international environment would necessarily include an internal reordering as well.  I tend to view many of the issues salient today (immigration, wars of choice, deindustrialization, etc.) stem from the logic of the US acting as global hegemon and guardian of the international order.  The US began setting up unequal trade relations with countries like Germany and Japan in order to boost their economies to prevent them from switching over to the other side during the Cold War.  FInancialization, like that that occurred in late Victorian Britain, is tied in with investments made overseas as a result of this.  Our lasting trade deficits have been supported by the dollar's place as the world's reserve currency.  Wars of choice stem from the US' self-proclaimed role as global policeman.  Politicians on the right and left wringing their hands over Trump's "Muslim ban" are just as likely to cite our need to preserve good relations with Muslim nations for our wars in the Middle East as they are to say "That's not who we are!".  Our gargantuan military budgets and attendant industrial complex stem from this same role, potentially crowding out other, more effective uses for the same funds.
[Mike]OK

Since Trump is in the driver's seat right now, let's look at what some of his proposed policies would entail on the domestic side.  Tariffs would be a huge shift, immigration restrictions would be another.  If he manages to end the US' hegemonic role (either via "aggressive withdrawal", or by pursuing a conflict with, say, China that goes poorly), think of the effects that would have on the domestic environment.  Tariffs, infrastructure spending, lower taxes, restricting the expansion of the supply of cheap labor, possibly enormous defense spending and a loss of US investments in China/East Asia during some sort of conflict, would lead to inflation, financial losses for many, rising jobs here at home.  It could resolve the present income imbalance in the US even (especially) if it eventually goes badly. 
Like I said, it's a possibility.  Doesn't mean it's going to happen that way, but right now I think it much more plausible than some farcical notion of a civil war between "red" and "blue".

We had a test of this.  WW I and the 1920's.  It didn't solve the internal structural problems (or inequality) as shown by what happened after.  Initially it appeared to work, inequality fell 16% by my measure from 1916 to 1920, but by 1928 was right back up to where it had been.  You cannot apply massive stimulus and low taxes without getting runaway inflation, which requires the Fed to induce a depression to contain the inflationary forces, where workers give back all the previous gains.  This happened in 1920-21, after which it was back to the prewar inequality building status quo.  And the apparent prosperity demonstrated after 1921 by the soaring market was a mirage, by 1932 it was back down to its 1921 depression bottom, and the Republican authors of the economic policies enabling the 1920's were sent to the political woodshed for a generation.

If you want to make America great again for working people you have to combine the sort of policies you mentioned with confiscatory taxes on high incomes in order to suppress inflation.  High interest rates work by suppressing wage growth, heading off demand-induced price inflation in goods and services (i.e. the things wage-earners buy).  High tax rates enable a balanced budget while pursuing government stimulus, which shrinks the ratio of federal debt to GDP over time, which exerts a deflationary effect that offsets the inflationary impact of the stimulus. If you pursue balanced budgets with low tax rates like in the 1990's you get asset bubbles that eventually lead to financial crises which can undo all the gains previously made (as happened in 2008). High taxes suppress wealth growth, heading off asset price inflation--preventing asset bubbles (which is why the secular bull market peak in 1966 had such a moderate valuation).  At least it appears to work this way.

I don't think the combination of high taxes and stimulation is a possible combination with the current political establishment. Whereas Democrats could pursue both of these, they wont pursue trade or immigration restriction, which would dilute the impact of the first two.  All of these elements were in place last time, and were contributed by both parties.  When I said Hoover was transformational, I meant it.  Without his (well the Republican) contribution, the postwar era of broadly shared prosperity might not have been possible.

[SomeGuy]

There's one example.  We could end up with a situation like the Gilded Age in the next 1T as well.  Or high tax rates could be applied in wartime as a "special" measure.  Or not, and you could have a depression in the late Pence administration that brings in a Gabbard or someone else who builds off the policies pursued previously (massive investment in [military] industry and infrastructure) by adding in the policies you propose.

It would also be worthwhile to look at what a conflict with East Asia, with mass nationalization of Western investments there, an interruption of the flow of goods from the region, and cyberattacks would do to asset values here, particularly if coupled with massive domestic investment  and high inflation.

[TeacherinExile]

This article was posted on the Quartz website this past week: "What Steve Bannon Really Wants"

After having watched Bannon's documentary Generation Zero and having pored over his past public comments,  I find much cognitive dissonance in Bannonism. For example, he has said that "enlightened capitalism" saved America from communism and fascism in the 1930s.  That's true enough, if by "enlightened capitalism" he meant an American capitalism incorporating social welfare.  But Bannon attributes our current troubles to our unmooring from capitalism, among other failings.  How, then, would he characterize the New Deal policies of FDR that saved capitalism from itself, if not as social democracy?  FDR's strident political opponents went much further than that, describing the New Deal as outright socialism.  Bannon's philosophy just doesn't hang together, and that worries me far more than any fascism that so many on the left ascribe to his worldview.  

I think an in-depth interview of Bannon by the print or broadcast media would benefit the public at large, maybe even allay some of the darkest fears that many people have about him.  Inquiring minds want to know, is Steve Bannon the political strategist the same person as Steve Bannon the former Breitbart propagandist?  (Putting "softball" questions to him won't get it done.)    

The Quartz article observes that--

There are a few loose ends in Bannon’s thinking—comments that seem consequential, but are vague or don’t fit clearly into any bigger vision.

In both his public comments and documentary, Bannon oversimplifies complex events, like the Crash of 2008, which Bannon seems to attribute to "white guilt."  Worse, Bannon often gets history very wrong, as in his justification for prohibiting Muslim immigrants from entering Europe and the US: “These are not people with thousands of years of democracy in their DNA coming up here.” 

Thousands of years?  Was European feudalism democratic?  Hmm...

Given the events of the past fortnight, it would be hard to disagree with Quartz's assessment of Bannon's political influence:

Even before he took charge of Trump’s campaign, in Aug. 2016, Bannon’s philosophies pervaded its rhetoric. If there was any question about the role his views would play in the Trump administration, the last two weeks have made it clear: The president’s leadership hangs from the scaffolding of Bannon’s worldview.

You can read further at this link: https://qz.com/898134/what-steve-bannon-really-wants/

[freivolk]

(02-11-2017, 12:45 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I agree that it isn't the focus of the Tea Party or Donald Trump.  I was simply pointing out that the issues that previously helped generate turnout for the Republicans have largely been lost.
The "Culture Wars" have largely been won by the left.

I admit the cultural shift of the last decades can´t be totally reversed. Still it seems to me, that 1T tends to be more social conservative then 3T/4T. And much of the winning of the left dependet on theSupreme Court, which could be soon gone lost, if Trump appointes in the next 4-8 years 3-5 new judges. I think its actally a way the "Culture War" could end. The Right has a highly symbolic success (repeal of Roe vs. Wade), declares victory and walks away.

[Eric the Green]

It's clear that Bannon and others around Trump are reactionary culture warriors, even if Trump by temperament is not. But Trump is a political opportunist, and has decided that the culture war is part of his route to power and self-aggrandizement.

[Eric the Green]

(02-11-2017, 12:45 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:I might quibble with the culture issue, as my understanding that was not the focus of the Tea Party. But this is unimportant.

I agree that it isn't the focus of the Tea Party or Donald Trump.  I was simply pointing out that the issues that previously helped generate turnout for the Republicans have largely been lost.
The "Culture Wars" have largely been won by the left.

Quote:I don’t understand this.

We were discussing organized coalitions that could both effectively frame the issue of the problem the 4T is about and solve it.  I was suggesting that either of the two listed above could be candidates if one of them achieves some sort of lasting victory during the resolution of the 4T.  They would then be the people setting the narrative of what the turning was about and how it needed to be resolved.

Quote:Would it be fair to say that you see the secular institutional reordering that is a hallmark of a 4T will be centered on the liberal international order.  That you do not (so far) see an internal reordering as being in the cards?

I am suggesting that a drastic reordering of the international environment would necessarily include an internal reordering as well.  I tend to view many of the issues salient today (immigration, wars of choice, deindustrialization, etc.) stem from the logic of the US acting as global hegemon and guardian of the international order.  The US began setting up unequal trade relations with countries like Germany and Japan in order to boost their economies to prevent them from switching over to the other side during the Cold War.  FInancialization, like that that occurred in late Victorian Britain, is tied in with investments made overseas as a result of this.  Our lasting trade deficits have been supported by the dollar's place as the world's reserve currency.  Wars of choice stem from the US' self-proclaimed role as global policeman.  Politicians on the right and left wringing their hands over Trump's "Muslim ban" are just as likely to cite our need to preserve good relations with Muslim nations for our wars in the Middle East as they are to say "That's not who we are!".  Our gargantuan military budgets and attendant industrial complex stem from this same role, potentially crowding out other, more effective uses for the same funds.

Since Trump is in the driver's seat right now, let's look at what some of his proposed policies would entail on the domestic side.  Tariffs would be a huge shift, immigration restrictions would be another.  If he manages to end the US' hegemonic role (either via "aggressive withdrawal", or by pursuing a conflict with, say, China that goes poorly), think of the effects that would have on the domestic environment.  Tariffs, infrastructure spending, lower taxes, restricting the expansion of the supply of cheap labor, possibly enormous defense spending and a loss of US investments in China/East Asia during some sort of conflict, would lead to inflation, financial losses for many, rising jobs here at home.  It could resolve the present income imbalance in the US even (especially) if it eventually goes badly.  You would see a radically different US at the end of the period than you saw at the beginning, more isolationist, more nationalist, less thoroughly embedded in global affairs.  Hell, the Trump/Pence administration(s?) could be firmly repudiated by a Sanders/Gabbard style Democratic successor and still be the definer of the next party system, especially if they come in on a platform of higher wages, more domestic investment, fewer wars/interventions, ie their present platform, and the one Trump ran against to begin with.

The 4T would then be about the end of hegemony and empire, and the need to refocus attention here at home, with a thorough repudiation of both the neocons on the right and the (neo)liberal interventionists on the left, which one might think of as the Bush and Clinton wings of their respective parties.

Like I said, it's a possibility.  Doesn't mean it's going to happen that way, but right now I think it much more plausible than some farcical notion of a civil war between "red" and "blue".

Postulating a US war with China is much more farcical. We're going to fight a war over some islands in the sea? No, but a small-scale civil war is already gearing up between red and blue. The country is divided and apparently irreconcilable, between progress and disaster. That's not a situation that can continue; we either resolve in favor of progress or disaster and decline, in a way that the other side won't like and will rebel against.

[Eric the Green]

(02-10-2017, 02:11 PM)Mikebert Wrote: I've read a little bit about Bannon in recent weeks.  He seems to be a fan of S&H, Mencius Moldbug and "big history".  He'd be interested in a site like this, I think, were he not successful and powerful.
 
Bannon was a smart working class kid of an intellectual bent who made good at an early age, retired, and then indulged in his intellectual pursuits.  Anyways he correctly sees 4Ts as involving wars.  He also sees wars as intrinsic to the 4T, something which was not stated by S&H, but can be (and was) adduced from past examples. Hence, he feels a war is necessary.

I believe he is wrong, but the reason is subtle. The simple answer is for the first three of the four American 4Ts, the war occurred at the beginning of the 4T.  The Glorious 4T began with King Phillip’s war.  The Revolutionary War broke out in year 3 of a 22 year 4T.  The Civil War 4T began with the 4T. This pattern changed for the last 4T: WW II began in year 13 of an 18 year 4T. What this means is that the last 4T was not about WW II, whereas the Civil War and Revolutionary 4Ts were about the associated wars.

So what? Bannon (and you) might think.  In Generations p 71, S&H define the 4T as a “reordering” of secular institutions. The idea that there was substantial reordering of the American nation during the previous three 4Ts is obvious.  Why did this happen?  The answer is because they solved a problem that had emerged as an urgent concern in the previous 3T: American elite’s desire for self-rule, slavery, and the failure of the economic system to promote the general welfare. These problems eventually came to a head triggering a crisis: revolution, civil war, depression.  The 4T was then about retooling American institutions to solve the problem. 

To solve the 18th century 4T required British elites to capitulate to American elite desires for home rule. They were not willing to do that and so the only solution was force—the Revolutionary war.  To solve the 19th century 4T required Southern elites to capitulate to Northern elite demands for the end of slavery. They were not willing to do that and so the only solution was force—the Civil War. To solve the 20th century 4T required that the economy be restructured in such a way as to restore prosperity.  Nobody opposed this and so there was no recourse to war. A world war did happen in the 4T, but a world war happened in the previous 3T too, and the subsequent 1T and 2T had their wars.

The conclusion is plausible, but the route you took needs some comment.

First of all, of course, whether you call the 1850s a 4T or a 3T, the fact is clear that the Civil War was a result of a long developing crisis that had already become violent, with a threat of civil war having already happened. It was not at the start of one.

World War II was a much larger war for the USA than any of the others, and truly existential. If the USA had lost that war, it would have eventually been conquered by the Axis. So WWII was at the heart of the Crisis, but not the start of it. But the depression and the world war were tied together historically; the latter would not have happened without the former. WWII was the last and exaggerated gasp of the old European order.

And of course, it's now painfully clear that the New Deal did NOT cure the problem of economic elites. We are back almost to square one, and now with Trump, headed toward an oligarchy more extreme than any in our history. A more extreme solution may be needed this time too.

This is the 4T of today, which has started in the same way as the last one, but without much action yet to resolve it. And it's true it will not likely be all about a foreign war, but both a smaller-scale civil war and smaller-scale foreign war are likely. They will both arise from the conflicts that have been building up over the last 40 to 50 years.

Bannon exaggerates the warlike nature of 4Ts, but he's just one actor and others will contribute to what actually unfolds, whether they know the S&H theory or not.

[Mikebert]

(02-11-2017, 04:13 PM)Eric the Green Wrote: World War II was a much larger war for the USA than any of the others, and truly existential. If the USA had lost that war, it would have eventually been conquered by the Axis.

No.  The US was stronger than Germany.  Also Germany was losing by the time the US entered the war.  Britain was a lot more powerful then than now.  She was well on her way to retaking North Africa for the Allies when the US joined the war effort. By invading the USSR Germany was not engaged in a vast country with more manpower.  Stalin's industrialization policy in the 1930's had yielded results.  Stalingrad (Aug 1942 to Feb 1943 ) is considered by some as a turning point in the war in Europe and that was achieved before the US had accomplished anything on the continent.

Had the US remained neutral, Hitler would still have been defeated, it would have taken longer, but he would still lose. The forces arrayed against him were too great and he was no Napoleon.

[Mikebert]

Quote:We could end up with a situation like the Gilded Age in the next 1T as well.

Sure.
 

Quote:Or high tax rates could be applied in wartime as a "special" measure.

WW I did have high taxes (73%) as a special measure. 
 

Quote:Or not, and you could have a depression in the late Pence administration that brings in a Gabbard or someone else who builds off the policies pursued previously (massive investment in [military] industry and infrastructure) by adding in the policies you propose.

Yes, and that depression would itself be an important crisis event, and dealing with it  would be part of the 4T.  And if Trump (who apparently didn't solve the problem is we have a depression) can start three a 12 year Republican era, then so can Gabbard. So we would have 2028-2040 included in the 4T.  I see no reason to start a 4T in 2008.  Better might be 2024, when the ill-fated Pence (Hoover) comes in.  I cannot see any scenario in which Trump is successful and 2008 is the 4T start.  I don't think it will ever make sense to add Obama era as an organic addition to a later Trump-Pence era in which all the 4T stuff happens.  Obama and Trump are like oil and water, they don't mix.
 

Quote:It would also be worthwhile to look at what a conflict with East Asia, with mass nationalization of Western investments there, an interruption of the flow of goods from the region, and cyberattacks would do to asset values here, particularly if coupled with massive domestic investment and high inflation.

Don’t the Chinese have more US investments than the US has Chinese investments?  Hasn’t the US  run trade deficits with China for a long time?  Trade imbalances in one direction have to be offset by investment imbalances in the other, otherwise the yuan would soar in value, making Chinese imports uncompetitive. Surely China must have more investments here than we there.

[freivolk]

(02-11-2017, 05:28 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

Quote:We could end up with a situation like the Gilded Age in the next 1T as well.

Sure.
 

Quote:Or high tax rates could be applied in wartime as a "special" measure.

WW I did have high taxes (73%) as a special measure. 
 

Quote:Or not, and you could have a depression in the late Pence administration that brings in a Gabbard or someone else who builds off the policies pursued previously (massive investment in [military] industry and infrastructure) by adding in the policies you propose.

Yes, and that depression would itself be an important crisis event, and dealing with it  would be part of the 4T.  And if Trump (who apparently didn't solve the problem is we have a depression) can start three a 12 year Republican era, then so can Gabbard. So we would have 2028-2040 included in the 4T.  I see no reason to start a 4T in 2008.  Better might be 2024, when the ill-fated Pence (Hoover) comes in.  I cannot see any scenario in which Trump is successful and 2008 is the 4T start.  I don't think it will ever make sense to add Obama era as an organic addition to a later Trump-Pence era in which all the 4T stuff happens.  Obama and Trump are like oil and water, they don't mix.
 

Quote:It would also be worthwhile to look at what a conflict with East Asia, with mass nationalization of Western investments there, an interruption of the flow of goods from the region, and cyberattacks would do to asset values here, particularly if coupled with massive domestic investment and high inflation.

Don’t the Chinese have more US investments than the US has Chinese investments?  Hasn’t the US  run trade deficits with China for a long time?  Trade imbalances in one direction have to be offset by investment imbalances in the other, otherwise the yuan would soar in value, making Chinese imports uncompetitive. Surely China must have more investments here than we there.

With the 4T don´t starting before 2024, we would have a 40 years 3T. Basicly it would mean the theory is obsolet.
Trump is no Harding/Coolidge "back to normality"-president. If his kind of right wing populism stays in power for 12 years or more, it would definitly shift the whole pardigmen of american. The next democratic president would just be an Eisenhower.
If Bannon really wants to radical  destroy Globalisation , a nice little naval war in the Westpac would be a good way for it. Then it would allow to blocade China and cut it of from world trade