11-23-2020, 11:16 AM
** 23-Nov-2020 World View: Guerrilla insurgencies
In my article, I mentioned that the South Vietnamese "strategic
hamlet" program was based on a British program in Malaya a decade
earlier. In the Malay counter-insurgency program, where the
insurgents were ethnic Chinese, the "new villages" were built on the
edges of the jungles, and the Chinese civilians were kept in the
villages where the British could tightly control them, and separating
them from the Chinese Communist insurgents. The insurgents, of
course, melted into the jungles. But they were unable to steal food
and resources from the Chinese in the villages, which made it easier
for the British to defeat them.
The British Malay counter-insurgency program was itself based on an
earlier program during the Boer War. The following source compares
the two:
-- The Boer War and Malayan Emergency: Examples of British
Counterinsurgency pre- and post-“Minimum Force”
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bo...st-minimum
(SmallWarsJournal, 20-Dec-2018)
What's interesting about this comparison is that in the Boer War, the
Boer population was treated very brutally, put into concentration and
detention camps, with poor sanitation, overcrowding and lack of food,
and were targeted with very punitive techniques for control by a
colonial power. As the article describes in detail, during the time
between the Boer War and the Malay emergency, British doctrine changed
away from a harsh, colonial a "butcher and bolt" approach, evolving to
a "minimum force" and "hearts and minds" doctrine. So in Malaya, the
concentration camps were replaced by "new villages" which were much
more benign.
I would point out that the Malay approach could not have worked in the
Boer War, and did work in Malaya because ethnic Chinese were easily
distinguished from indigenous Malays.
(11-21-2020, 11:04 PM)John J. Xenakis Wrote: > These conclusions are based on examination of the following wars:
> Vietnam War, Iraq war, and Afghanistan war. What these three wars
> have in common is that they're all guerrilla insurgencies -- internal
> rebellions against the government. Why were we able to win the Iraq
> war, while losing the Vietnam and Afghanistan war. This analysis does
> not apply to wars fought by opposing armies.
(11-22-2020, 09:37 PM)Warren Dew Wrote: > How would we test your theory against the "we do deserts, we don't
> do mountains (or jungles) theory?
In my article, I mentioned that the South Vietnamese "strategic
hamlet" program was based on a British program in Malaya a decade
earlier. In the Malay counter-insurgency program, where the
insurgents were ethnic Chinese, the "new villages" were built on the
edges of the jungles, and the Chinese civilians were kept in the
villages where the British could tightly control them, and separating
them from the Chinese Communist insurgents. The insurgents, of
course, melted into the jungles. But they were unable to steal food
and resources from the Chinese in the villages, which made it easier
for the British to defeat them.
The British Malay counter-insurgency program was itself based on an
earlier program during the Boer War. The following source compares
the two:
-- The Boer War and Malayan Emergency: Examples of British
Counterinsurgency pre- and post-“Minimum Force”
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bo...st-minimum
(SmallWarsJournal, 20-Dec-2018)
What's interesting about this comparison is that in the Boer War, the
Boer population was treated very brutally, put into concentration and
detention camps, with poor sanitation, overcrowding and lack of food,
and were targeted with very punitive techniques for control by a
colonial power. As the article describes in detail, during the time
between the Boer War and the Malay emergency, British doctrine changed
away from a harsh, colonial a "butcher and bolt" approach, evolving to
a "minimum force" and "hearts and minds" doctrine. So in Malaya, the
concentration camps were replaced by "new villages" which were much
more benign.
I would point out that the Malay approach could not have worked in the
Boer War, and did work in Malaya because ethnic Chinese were easily
distinguished from indigenous Malays.
