Report Card for Donald Trump

[Marypoza]

Ok Guyz, l have been following your war game with China. Do y'all think that is why the Donald is buddy buddy with Putin,  while the USN keeps China busy in the South China Sea, the Red Army swoops down from the north. Forcing China into fighting a war on 2 fronts? Which would decrease China's chances of victory?

[Mikebert]

(01-28-2017, 10:48 AM)SomeGu Wrote: You're making up rules that don't exist again.  The Napoleonic Wars occurred almost entirely in a 1T, as did the War of the Spanish Succession.  Besides, I believe Howe conclusively came out in support of a 2008 start date.  So, no, your point is incorrect.

What rules?  Did M&T not project the Macrodecision phase or 2025-2050?  I could have sworn it was so.  S&H projected the 4T start for 2005, OK I had 2006.  They have since then identified 2008 as the start.  As for the end they never projected that.  One can use various methods to gets dates all throughout the 2020's.  2024 is produced by one I am currently using so I put that down.  One can get a variety of results depending on your assumptions, YMMV.

Of the six 4T's two have macrodecison era issues as key compoents (Armada and WW II).  The latter of these has complete overlap with the Macrodecision phase, so plenty opporunity for  interaction. The Armada 4T had a decent amount of overlap as well. Of the 4T that did not feature global war as a key element, three (WotR, US Rev & USCW) were mostly or entirely outside of a macrodecision phase and so there was no opportunity for interaction.  For the Glorious Revolution there is no significant overlap between the secular crisis (1675-92) (see Generations) and the Macrodecision phase.  S&H extended the turning to 1704 in T4T, 12 years after the end of the secular crisis social moment, which gives some overlap.  Since I view Generations as the foundational text from a theoretical pov, I tend to focus on what they wrote then, when they were still writing in a scholarly vein.

The turnings are anything if not flexible and one could draw this 4T from 2008-36 and obtain lots of overlap.  This doesn't "break" any rules of precedent.  There have been five past turnings this long or longer, but not recently.  The recent 3T was already the longest turning in 200 years. But that's not the issue.  The whole idea they had was that these generations they identified would play significant roles in the times to come.  Warren turns 60 (the average age at which power is wielded these days) in2020 and he's the last of the line for the Prophets.  We can expect the torch to pass to the Xers in the early 2020's and to the Millies 20-25 years after that.  By the time the Macrodecison era comes to an end and the hegemony issues settled mid-century, the Heroes will be in charge.  That's a 2T configuration. 

You can call a period in which Nomads have been calling the shots for a decade a 4T, but does it fit the concept of the cycle as generational--as S&H proposed?

[Mikebert]

(01-28-2017, 10:48 AM)SomeGuy Wrote: The Napoleonic Wars occurred almost entirely in a 1T, as did the War of the Spanish Succession. 

Exactly.  And neither were a significant element of the previous 4T.  That's my point. I expected am M&T Macrodecision phase wll occur almost entirely in a 1T, which means the 4T isn't going to be about the Macrodecision issues. Don't you see the 4T Climax as being part of an M&T Macrodecision phase?  I could have sworn this is your view.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:What rules?  Did M&T not project the Macrodecision phase or 2025-2050?  I could have sworn it was so.  S&H projected the 4T start for 2005, OK I had 2006.  They have since then identified 2008 as the start.  As for the end they never projected that.  One can use various methods to gets dates all throughout the 2020's.  2024 is produced by one I am currently using so I put that down.  One can get a variety of results depending on your assumptions, YMMV.

Macrodecision was roughly projected from 2030-2050.  S & H had a crisis from some point in the 2000s to some point in the 2020s.  Given a start date in 2008, this leads to an end date in the 2024-2028 timeframe or so.

Quote:Of the six 4T's two have macrodecison era issues as key compoents (Armada and WW II).  The latter of these has complete overlap with the Macrodecision phase, so plenty opporunity for  interaction. The Armada 4T had a decent amount of overlap as well. Of the 4T that did not feature global war as a key element, three (WotR, US Rev & USCW) were mostly or entirely outside of a macrodecision phase and so there was no opportunity for interaction.  For the Glorious Revolution there is no significant overlap between the secular crisis (1675-92) (see Generations) and the Macrodecision phase.  S&H extended the turning to 1704 in T4T, 12 years after the end of the secular crisis social moment, which gives some overlap.  Since I view Generations as the foundational text from a theoretical pov, I tend to focus on what they wrote then, when they were still writing in a scholarly vein.

The macrodecision phase during that period leading to Britain I extended from 1688 to 1714, as per M & T.  It included not just the War of the Spanish Succession but the 9 Year's War as well.  When Louis XIV sent his troops across the Rhine this freed William to go to Britain, bringing a sometime ally/vassal of the French into the Grand Alliance.  The events of 1688 were rather critical to the setup of the macrodecision.  The debt racked up during the French intervention on behalf of the Americans (which loaded on top of all the other issues with ancien regime finances) led rather swiftly to the French Revolution, which in turn set up the Napoleonic Wars.  The War of the Roses and the USCW occurred entirely outside of macrodecisions.

Quote:The turnings are anything if not flexible and one could draw this 4T from 2008-36 and obtain lots of overlap.  This doesn't "break" any rules of precedent.  There have been five past turnings this long or longer, but not recently.  The recent 3T was already the longest turning in 200 years. But that's not the issue.  The whole idea they had was that these generations they identified would play significant roles in the times to come.  Warren turns 60 (the average age at which power is wielded these days) in2020 and he's the last of the line for the Prophets.  We can expect the torch to pass to the Xers in the early 2020's and to the Millies 20-25 years after that.  By the time the Macrodecison era comes to an end and the hegemony issues settled mid-century, the Heroes will be in charge.  That's a 2T configuration. 

I expect a crisis to flare up into a climax during the 2020s.  I expect the 4T to conclude during that period as well.  I expect the overall resolution of the macrodecision phase to extend well into the 1T, as has been historically normal.  Warren may turn 60 in 2020, but the men in the White House right now are both Boomers, as are the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders.  It is entirely possible to see Boomer control of most of the high offices until well into the 2020s, and the transition to reactive control was indicated by S & H to occur late in a 4T, not at the beginning of the 1st.

Quote:You can call a period in which Nomads have been calling the shots for a decade a 4T, but does it fit the concept of the cycle as generational--as S&H proposed?

I have no idea what you are talking about.  Which Xers do you anticipate passing the torch to, Paul Ryan?  In the absence of an Xer Dem victory in 2020, the replacement of Schumer and McConnell with Xers, I'm not seeing it occurring till later.  And the Xers are supposed to come in a little after the climax begins, not once it ends.  Read the book again.

Quote:Exactly.  And neither were a significant element of the previous 4T.  That's my point. I expected am M&T Macrodecision phase wll occur almost entirely in a 1T, which means the 4T isn't going to be about the Macrodecision issues. Don't you see the 4T Climax as being part of an M&T Macrodecision phase?  I could have sworn this is your view.

This is a very odd reading of history.  The French Revolution was not a significant factor in the Napoleonic Wars, the Glorious Revolution not a significant factor in the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV?  I disagree.

I anticipate a crisis climax setting in motion the macrodecision phase, with some overlap.  How exactly that plays out remains to be seen.

[SomeGuy]

(01-28-2017, 01:40 PM)Marypoza Wrote: Ok Guyz, l have been following your war game with China. Do y'all think that is why the Donald is buddy buddy with Putin,  while the USN keeps China busy in the South China Sea, the Red Army swoops down from the north. Forcing China into fighting a war on 2 fronts? Which would decrease China's chances of victory?

The Red Army no longer exists, hasn't in decades.  As my conversations with John indicate, I don't see Russia and China going to war anytime soon.  I think, to the extent that future conflict figures into it, it's more a matter of reducing the number of adversaries, rather than building more alliances.

So, not Russia/US vs China, but rather avoiding China/Russia vs US.

Then again, I really don't think DJT has a grand plan for WWIII that he's following.

[Marypoza]

(01-28-2017, 02:42 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 01:40 PM)Marypoza Wrote: Ok Guyz, l have been following your war game with China. Do y'all think that is why the Donald is buddy buddy with Putin,  while the USN keeps China busy in the South China Sea, the Red Army swoops down from the north. Forcing China into fighting a war on 2 fronts? Which would decrease China's chances of victory?

The Red Army no longer exists, hasn't in decades.  As my conversations with John indicate, I don't see Russia and China going to war anytime soon.  I think, to the extent that future conflict figures into it, it's more a matter of reducing the number of adversaries, rather than building more alliances.

So, not Russia/US vs China, but rather avoiding China/Russia vs US.

Then again, I really don't think DJT has a grand plan for WWIII that he's following.

-- me neither actually. The man wrote The Art of the Deal afterall. I expect him to cut deals

[Warren Dew]

(01-28-2017, 07:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-27-2017, 07:11 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I dunno, Mike, why did we invade Vietnam?  Iraq?  Why did the British intervene on the Continent at the outset of WWI? 

For WW I, because they thought they could win.  The British ended up winning the war. 

For WWI, because they thought that the Germans could win otherwise.  At the time, the British were still playing balance of power politics for Europe.  By coming in on the French side, they prevented a hegemon from taking over the continent.

The US needs to learn balance of power politics, because that is the game we need to play throughout Eurasia.

[Warren Dew]

(01-28-2017, 10:37 AM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:I agree it's an open question with respect to carriers versus attack submarines.  It doesn't matter that much since we've got the advantage in both - for now.

Which might provide a back-of-the-mind incentive for America to stake out a stronger position now, as opposed to 20 years from now.

Agreed.  We left a big power vacuum on the high seas for half a decade; we need to avoid another half decade of that if we're to retain our preeminent global position.

[SomeGuy]

(01-28-2017, 04:21 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 07:41 AM)Mikebert Wrote:

(01-27-2017, 07:11 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: I dunno, Mike, why did we invade Vietnam?  Iraq?  Why did the British intervene on the Continent at the outset of WWI? 

For WW I, because they thought they could win.  The British ended up winning the war. 

For WWI, because they thought that the Germans could win otherwise.  At the time, the British were still playing balance of power politics for Europe.  By coming in on the French side, they prevented a hegemon from taking over the continent.

The US needs to learn balance of power politics, because that is the game we need to play throughout Eurasia.

Exactly.  The rapprochement with Russia (vis China, just as we had a rapprochement with China vis the USSR), Iran and Saudi Arabia, Japan and China, the pieces are in place: It remains to be seen if our politicians can manage it.

Quote:Agreed.  We left a big power vacuum on the high seas for half a decade; we need to avoid another half decade of that if we're to retain our preeminent global position.

It's worse than that.  The post-Cold War draw-down in the 90s, and the distraction of the GWoT during the 2000s, ended up shedding a lot of capabilities we used to train regularly, that are needed for great power politics as opposed to police actions.

[Warren Dew]

(01-28-2017, 04:30 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:Agreed.  We left a big power vacuum on the high seas for half a decade; we need to avoid another half decade of that if we're to retain our preeminent global position.

It's worse than that.  The post-Cold War draw-down in the 90s, and the distraction of the GWoT during the 2000s, ended up shedding a lot of capabilities we used to train regularly, that are needed for great power politics as opposed to police actions.

I think I agree but I am interested in what examples you are thinking of.  The kinds of things the Seawolf class was intended to address?  The F-22?  Or things more general?

[Eric the Green]

(01-28-2017, 04:23 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 10:37 AM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:I agree it's an open question with respect to carriers versus attack submarines.  It doesn't matter that much since we've got the advantage in both - for now.

Which might provide a back-of-the-mind incentive for America to stake out a stronger position now, as opposed to 20 years from now.

Agreed.  We left a big power vacuum on the high seas for half a decade; we need to avoid another half decade of that if we're to retain our preeminent global position.

If Trump's policies prevail, then the USA has no more moral authority in the world. It is that which has made our preeminent position possible, as well as military strategy and resources.

Trump's election insures that my long-term prediction about this era was correct: domestic rather than foreign emphasis. Civil war or Revolution possible. It looks like we are going to have unrest as long as Trump is in office. And after that, what will happen? A more drastic swing left, I think, to the dismay of the Republican entitlement syndrome.

[SomeGuy]

(01-28-2017, 06:55 PM)Warren Dew Wrote:

(01-28-2017, 04:30 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

Quote:Agreed.  We left a big power vacuum on the high seas for half a decade; we need to avoid another half decade of that if we're to retain our preeminent global position.

It's worse than that.  The post-Cold War draw-down in the 90s, and the distraction of the GWoT during the 2000s, ended up shedding a lot of capabilities we used to train regularly, that are needed for great power politics as opposed to police actions.

I think I agree but I am interested in what examples you are thinking of.  The kinds of things the Seawolf class was intended to address?  The F-22?  Or things more general?

The Seawolf thing isn't that big a deal, the Virginia class is proving quite capable, and relatively cheap (for DoD values of the same, of course).  The cancellation of the F-22/continuing saga with the F-35 doesn't help, though both of those planes are a little short-ranged for the Pacific.

I was thinking more along the lines of our atrophying EW, anti-submarine, and anti-surface capabilities, and the shrinking Navy in general.  The whole point of the "From the Sea" thing promulgated by the US Navy in the 90s was an assumption that sea-control was a given and that they should train primarily for power projection.  Which was an accurate description of the period and its immediate future, but which is giving them a bit of an "Oh Shit!" moment now.

[Mikebert]

Quote:This is a very odd reading of history.  The French Revolution was not a significant factor in the Napoleonic Wars, the Glorious Revolution not a significant factor in the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV?  I disagree.

I anticipate a crisis climax setting in motion the macrodecision phase, with some overlap.  How exactly that plays out remains to be seen.

You are reversing the direction of causation.  A 4T outcome can play an important role in a subsequent Macrodecision phase (MDP) without the MDP playing a role in the 4T, particularly if the 4T occurs entirely before the MDP.

An example of an MDP playing a role in a 4T was the last 4T.  Without involvement in WW II, the New Dealers could not solve the problem of the Depression, which was what triggered the crisis initially.

In contrast, the structural changes in state finance that occurred following the Glorious Revolution played a big role in England's willingness and ability to play a major role in the subsequent MDP.  But the need to fight these conflicts was not the reason for the financial restructuring.  This was the long-standing conflict with the monarchy over taxation and spending. The English Civil War had been precipitated by fiscal crisis over Parliaments unwillingness to vote funds to the King.  Such issues had been a long standing problem dating back to the constitutional crisis of 1297.  The Glorious Revolution finally solved them by establishing national accounting, a formal budget and a central bank for rationalizing government finance.  That such things were very useful for prosecuting war was apparent to William of Orange, but this was not the reason they had been pursued.

My understanding of your views is you believe that foreign policy actions in the future will constitute a key element of the 4T (the climax I believe) after which it will come to an end.

4Ts are not simply periods containing big events that occur at the right time.  They are periods of significant restructuring of the political and economic order.  If the first concept was valid then we would date the start of the 4T from 911. George Bush came into the White House with a plan to expand the GOP base by appealing to Latinos through a combination of pre-growth policies and a new set of programs branded "compassionate conservativism".  At that time this era was mapping into a liberal era with the passage of things like No Child Left Behind and Medicare Part D, and his push for immigration reform. The Iraq war derailed his program and the financial crisis put the final nail into Bushism.

There would be no 4T restructuring along the Bush lines, so the 4T date gets moved up to the next big event, the financial crisis in 2008.  Like Bush, Obama had his own plan to inaugurate a liberal era.  It now looks like this will go down, just like Bush's.  The 2016 election was also big thing--a magnified version of the 2000 election. If a second 911 or 2008-scale event occurs, why shouldn't we move the date up yet again?  Suppose its another financial crisis.  If we have another crisis, why should the one in 2008 be more special than the new one?  Shouldn't we judge which one is the trigger based one what happens after?  Suppose a crisis happens, Trump deals with it successfully, gets relected and is succeed by another two-term president.  This would make Trump greater than Reagan.  Wouldn't it make sense for the crisis era to begin in 2016 and last (at least) until the second Republican leaves office?

[Emman85]

(01-30-2017, 09:31 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

Quote:This is a very odd reading of history.  The French Revolution was not a significant factor in the Napoleonic Wars, the Glorious Revolution not a significant factor in the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV?  I disagree.

I anticipate a crisis climax setting in motion the macrodecision phase, with some overlap.  How exactly that plays out remains to be seen.

There would be no 4T restructuring along the Bush lines, so the 4T date gets moved up to the next big event, the financial crisis in 2008.  Like Bush, Obama had his own plan to inaugurate a liberal era.  It now looks like this will go down, just like Bush's.  The 2016 election was also big thing--a magnified version of the 2000 election. If a second 911 or 2008-scale event occurs, why shouldn't we move the date up yet again?  Suppose its another financial crisis.  If we have another crisis, why should the one in 2008 be more special than the new one?  Shouldn't we judge which one is the trigger based one what happens after?  Suppose a crisis happens, Trump deals with it successfully, gets relected and is succeed by another two-term president.  This would make Trump greater than Reagan.  Wouldn't it make sense for the crisis era to begin in 2016 and last (at least) until the second Republican leaves office?

What you are saying right here would literally discredit the notion of generations as outlined by Howe/Strauss, 2016 is way too late for the fourth turning catalyst, I would argue the crash of '08 catalyzed the circumstances we see today, like rising authoritarian populism, election of Trump, Brexit, ect. This is pretty much what to expect during a fourth turning, it's not like all problems get solved at once, it's a process that takes a generation(20-22 years).

[Eric the Green]

That's right. The Crisis of 08 gave us the conditions we see today, in Europe and America. I also keep pointing out that you need to see our times most clearly as a repeat of the 1850s. We can't have a regeneracy like 1933 because our nation is stalemated and divided like it was in 1853. We are stuck, and the breakthrough will only come near the end of the 4T in the mid to late 2020s, which will have analogies to the early 1860s. To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).

The depression of this 08 era also extended to the Middle East, where drought and starvation as well as rising youth activism from the late 00s aroused the Arab Spring revolts, and this was to a large extent a worldwide phenomenon from 2011-2015. The resulting civil wars (especially in Syria) continue and have helped bring on Brexit and Trumpism in Europe and America because of the refugees.

[Ragnarök_62]

(01-31-2017, 12:35 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: That's right. The Crisis of 08 gave us the conditions we see today, in Europe and America. I also keep pointing out that you need to see our times most clearly as a repeat of the 1850s. We can't have a regeneracy like 1933 because our nation is stalemated and divided like it was in 1853. We are stuck, and the breakthrough will only come near the end of the 4T in the mid to late 2020s, which will have analogies to the early 1860s. To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).
<snip>

Or we get a neo-Gilded age like the one after the ACW. The neo-progressive era would be the next 3T.

[Marypoza]

(01-31-2017, 12:54 AM)Ragnarök_62 Wrote:

(01-31-2017, 12:35 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: That's right. The Crisis of 08 gave us the conditions we see today, in Europe and America. I also keep pointing out that you need to see our times most clearly as a repeat of the 1850s. We can't have a regeneracy like 1933 because our nation is stalemated and divided like it was in 1853. We are stuck, and the breakthrough will only come near the end of the 4T in the mid to late 2020s, which will have analogies to the early 1860s. To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).
<snip>

Or we get a neo-Gilded age like the one after the ACW. The neo-progressive era would be the next 3T.

-- l'm betting the Donald ushers in a neo-Gilded Age (call or put?)

[Eric the Green]

(01-31-2017, 12:54 AM)Ragnarök_62 Wrote:

(01-31-2017, 12:35 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: That's right. The Crisis of 08 gave us the conditions we see today, in Europe and America. I also keep pointing out that you need to see our times most clearly as a repeat of the 1850s. We can't have a regeneracy like 1933 because our nation is stalemated and divided like it was in 1853. We are stuck, and the breakthrough will only come near the end of the 4T in the mid to late 2020s, which will have analogies to the early 1860s. To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).
<snip>

Or we get a neo-Gilded age like the one after the ACW. The neo-progressive era would be the next 3T.

There's not the slightest chance of that. Progressive eras don't come in 3Ts. The Gilded Age was a 1T. YOu can take to the bank and bet all your money that the 2020s will not be a 1T era (except of course the last year, and even that will be more like 1866 than 1877 or 1955).

[Eric the Green]

(01-31-2017, 01:05 AM)Marypoza Wrote:

(01-31-2017, 12:54 AM)Ragnarök_62 Wrote:

(01-31-2017, 12:35 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: That's right. The Crisis of 08 gave us the conditions we see today, in Europe and America. I also keep pointing out that you need to see our times most clearly as a repeat of the 1850s. We can't have a regeneracy like 1933 because our nation is stalemated and divided like it was in 1853. We are stuck, and the breakthrough will only come near the end of the 4T in the mid to late 2020s, which will have analogies to the early 1860s. To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).
<snip>

Or we get a neo-Gilded age like the one after the ACW. The neo-progressive era would be the next 3T.

-- l'm betting the Donald ushers in a neo-Gilded Age (call or put?)

I'll take your bet. But I warn ya, I have a good crystal ball!

[Ragnarök_62]

(01-31-2017, 01:08 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: Or we get a neo-Gilded age like the one after the ACW. The neo-progressive era would be the next 3T.

There's not the slightest chance of that. Progressive eras don't come in 3Ts. The Gilded Age was a 1T. YOu can take to the bank and bet all your money that the 2020s will not be a 1T era (except of course the last year, and even that will be more like 1866 than 1877 or 1955).

Eric The Green Wrote:To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).

Huh,  The ACW = 4T, silly, so by default I said the neo-Gilded age would be a 1T, whenever the 1T starts.
And. The 1900's is yeah part of a 2T, but the progressive era was from the 1890's to about 1920, so it's both a 2T/3T event.

Trump likes gilded stuff anyhow.