Report Card for Donald Trump

[pbrower2a]

Gikled Age, end of 1880:

elders -- Transcendental    (Idealist)  59+ ... largely pushed aside, blamed for the Civil War 
mid-life -- Gilded (Reactive-Civic)      38-58... took the Civic role, but not particularly well
rising adult -- Progressive (Adaptive) 21-37...able but timid
youth -- Missionary (Idealist) to 20, still being born... sparks will fly     

  Crisis of 2020, end of 2016 -- and we are clearly in a Crisis now --   

post-elders, Silent (Adaptive) 74+... some still leading, but never a politically-strong generation     
elders -- Boom (Idealist, 56-73)... three of the last four Presidents, and the current one
mid-life -- Gen X (Reactive, 34*-55)... if you think Boomers are rifted, wait till you see them
rising adult -- Millennial (Civic, 15*-33*)... still shut out of top leadership roles
youth -- Homeland (Adaptive, to 14* and still being born) -- probably on the sidelines when the Big Events take place

*age boundaries not yet defined.

What's the difference? Life spans are about 20 years longer today than they were 136 years ago due to improved living standards, better nutrition, less alcoholism, less smoking, better medical attention, people remaining active longer in life (the Silent fit the GI pattern on that), and less obesity. late-wave Boomers have NOT had big roles in public life, but they still have time -- especially if you-know-who lays a big fat egg as a political leader. In view of the Executive Orders that do not pass Constitutional muster, a despotic style of management, and psychological hollowness I find my worst fears about him exceeded -- "bigly".

We have four generations of adults on the scene, and thus the full complement of generational archetypes; as when the Millennial Generation took the young-adult role in life as GIs aged out of the scene, so it will be with the Homeland Generation supplanting the Silent.

[SomeGuy]

(01-30-2017, 09:31 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

Quote:This is a very odd reading of history.  The French Revolution was not a significant factor in the Napoleonic Wars, the Glorious Revolution not a significant factor in the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV?  I disagree.

I anticipate a crisis climax setting in motion the macrodecision phase, with some overlap.  How exactly that plays out remains to be seen.

You are reversing the direction of causation.  A 4T outcome can play an important role in a subsequent Macrodecision phase (MDP) without the MDP playing a role in the 4T, particularly if the 4T occurs entirely before the MDP.

No, no, this is my fault, I must have been unclear.  I expect big things to happen starting in the 2020s on a foreign policy level, due to authors previously listed (S & H, M & T, Chase-Dunn and Pobodnik, etc.).  I expect the climax of the S & H Crisis to begin and end in the 2020s.  I expect the macrodecision phase to begin in the 2020s and continue on to the 2040s or so.  Because of this overlap, and just by looking at the news (I know, I know, <science> blah blah blah), I think that the crisis climax will have a foreign policy component, IMO.  I expect the outcome of that 4T to play an important role in the coming macrodecision phase, which I think will start before the crisis ends.  How that plays out, I don't claim to know.

If the US has an internal crisis in the 4T, this could cause a vacuum in the international sphere that spurs a macrodecision period, as revisionist powers move to settle regional scores.  The US could then become active in this during its 1T, and a new order would stabilize around mid-century.

The US could have an external crisis in the 4T, fight one war, which would end, disrupting the international order, there would be a lull, and then a new phase could begin with another way 15-20 years down the line.  The analogue in this case being the previous macrodecision, which had two wars that lasted several years spaced 20 years apart.

It could be a combination of the two, it could be something different.  I am only telling you the types of things I think should happen, operating under the distinct paradigms of M & T, S & H, et al. and how I think they should interact based on previous confluences of 4T/Macrodecision phases.

Quote:An example of an MDP playing a role in a 4T was the last 4T.  Without involvement in WW II, the New Dealers could not solve the problem of the Depression, which was what triggered the crisis initially.

In contrast, the structural changes in state finance that occurred following the Glorious Revolution played a big role in England's willingness and ability to play a major role in the subsequent MDP.  But the need to fight these conflicts was not the reason for the financial restructuring.  This was the long-standing conflict with the monarchy over taxation and spending. The English Civil War had been precipitated by fiscal crisis over Parliaments unwillingness to vote funds to the King.  Such issues had been a long standing problem dating back to the constitutional crisis of 1297.  The Glorious Revolution finally solved them by establishing national accounting, a formal budget and a central bank for rationalizing government finance.  That such things were very useful for prosecuting war was apparent to William of Orange, but this was not the reason they had been pursued.

You need to read Paul Kennedy again.  Military expenditures were the overwhelming bulk of state spending and debts during the early modern period.  Earlier, even.  What did you think the state was spending money on?  In this case, Britain and France and Holland had been fighting with each other for the entire second half of the 17th century, sometimes on one side, sometimes the other.  There was also a significant religious component of both the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution that you're leaving out.  The Macrodecision phase, which encompassed the 9 Year's war, a brief gap, and the WotSS, started immediately with the events of Louis crossing the Rhine and William the Channel, and conclusively set England on the side of the Dutch, as opposed to the French-speaking crypto-Catholic Stuarts.  The English and Scots never would have joined the League of Augsburg (subsequently the Grand Alliance) without the Glorious Revolution.

Likewise with Revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic Wars.  You don't get the one without the other.

Quote:My understanding of your views is you believe that foreign policy actions in the future will constitute a key element of the 4T (the climax I believe) after which it will come to an end.

I think that is likely to be true, if by it you mean the climax.  The crisis of the post-WWII liberal order is a big part of the 4T here in the US and Europe.  And US actions in the Middle East have helped create the refugee flows that are helping destabilize the European version of the liberal project, the EU.  Similar crises in East and South Asia (whose big political realignments also date back to WWII and its immediate aftermath [Chinese Civil war, US occupation of Japan, Independence and Partition, etc.]) will also impact this.  I don't expect things to stabilize at the global level till the end of the macrodecision phase, long after the 4T has ended.  But I do expect for the way the 4Ts play out to play a big role in the macrodecision phase which will continue on through the 2030s and into the 2040s.

Quote:4Ts are not simply periods containing big events that occur at the right time.  They are periods of significant restructuring of the political and economic order.  If the first concept was valid then we would date the start of the 4T from 911. George Bush came into the White House with a plan to expand the GOP base by appealing to Latinos through a combination of pre-growth policies and a new set of programs branded "compassionate conservativism".  At that time this era was mapping into a liberal era with the passage of things like No Child Left Behind and Medicare Part D, and his push for immigration reform. The Iraq war derailed his program and the financial crisis put the final nail into Bushism.

There would be no 4T restructuring along the Bush lines, so the 4T date gets moved up to the next big event, the financial crisis in 2008.  Like Bush, Obama had his own plan to inaugurate a liberal era.  It now looks like this will go down, just like Bush's.  The 2016 election was also big thing--a magnified version of the 2000 election. If a second 911 or 2008-scale event occurs, why shouldn't we move the date up yet again?  Suppose its another financial crisis.  If we have another crisis, why should the one in 2008 be more special than the new one?  Shouldn't we judge which one is the trigger based one what happens after?  Suppose a crisis happens, Trump deals with it successfully, gets relected and is succeed by another two-term president.  This would make Trump greater than Reagan.  Wouldn't it make sense for the crisis era to begin in 2016 and last (at least) until the second Republican leaves office?

As Emman pointed out, you are basically abandoning the S & H model of turnings.  The 4T is not a collection of big events so much as it is a change in mood.  The two big candidates for that were 2001 and 2008.  The big protest movements which one would expect (Tea Party, Occupy, BLM, etc.) date from this period.  Likewise for Western Europe the EU didn't seem to really go off the rails until the financial crisis, which due to the setup of the Euro and ECB has been much more of a rolling crisis over there than it is here.  The whole crisis there dates from that point.

Here in the US we had an intensified period of political conflict that just saw one party seize the majority of offices, state and federal, under the aegis of the oldest and most outlandish presidential winner in US history, a living incarnation of 80s Boomerism.  As far as the orthodox S & H model goes, I am satisfied that we are still following the model as predicted.  Questions of what events occur in the future, and how we should interpret past events in light of them, should probably wait until said events have gone to the trouble of actually happening, you know?

[pbrower2a]

Practically a paraphrase of something a man much reviled in history books said.

[Eric the Green]

(01-31-2017, 01:39 AM)Ragnarök_62 Wrote:

(01-31-2017, 01:08 AM)Eric the Green Wrote: Or we get a neo-Gilded age like the one after the ACW. The neo-progressive era would be the next 3T.

There's not the slightest chance of that. Progressive eras don't come in 3Ts. The Gilded Age was a 1T. YOu can take to the bank and bet all your money that the 2020s will not be a 1T era (except of course the last year, and even that will be more like 1866 than 1877 or 1955).

Eric The Green Wrote:To a lesser degree the 2020s will also rhyme with progressive decades: 1900s and 1960s (and maybe the 1840s, and especially the 1770s and 1780s too).

Huh,  The ACW = 4T, silly, so by default I said the neo-Gilded age would be a 1T, whenever the 1T starts.
And. The 1900's is yeah part of a 2T, but the progressive era was from the 1890's to about 1920, so it's both a 2T/3T event.

Trump likes gilded stuff anyhow.

No question. He's the man.....

[SomeGuy]

(01-31-2017, 01:54 PM)pbrower2a Wrote:

Practically a paraphrase of something a man much reviled in history books said.

Although, you know, Goebbels and Hitler were accusing Britain and the Jews, respectively, of doing that.  It wasn't something they advocated for themselves.  It's bad propaganda.

[pbrower2a]

It doesn't have to be perfect propaganda. 51% of the people is enough under ordinary circumstances, and as with Mussolini, Hitler, Castro, and Trump it didn't take a majority. The incompetence of the Opposition is often enough.

[SomeGuy]

(01-31-2017, 03:22 PM)pbrower2a Wrote: It doesn't have to be perfect propaganda. 51% of the people is enough under ordinary circumstances, and as with Mussolini, Hitler, Castro, and Trump it didn't take a majority. The incompetence of the Opposition is often enough.

How is this a response to "It wasn't something they advocated for themselves.  It's bad propaganda."

Are you alleging that this is in fact something they advocated for themselves, or was the above solely in response to the claim "It's bad propaganda"?

[Mikebert]

(01-31-2017, 12:41 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: As Emman pointed out, you are basically abandoning the S & H model of turnings.  The 4T is not a collection of big events so much as it is a change in mood. 

What is a change in mood? Isn't mood in the eye of the beholder.  As for the model, a theory must be supported by the facts, not the facts interpreted so as to fit the theory.  How would you disprove the theory?
The way I look at is, 2001 was potentially a 4T trigger until future events proved otherwise.  2001 was not a perfect fit, but turnings can be off, there is a fair bit of slop in the model.  When 2008 came along it looked better, but it has since failed one of the tests. The 3 previous American 4Ts has critical election-type events near their beginnings (1174, 1860, 1932).  2008 had a number of the features of a critical election, high turnout, change in party control, and active policy-making immediately after.  Confirmation of a critical election would be a third Democratic term.  It didn't happen, strongly suggesting that 2008 was not a critical election.  Another indicator that 2008 was the 4T start was the financial panic.  If this is the only financial panic for 20 years after 2008 this would be significant.  But suppose there is another one in the next 2-3 years? We had panics in 1857, 1873. 1884, 1893 and 1907 giving spacing of 9-16 years (average 12.5) so there is precedent.

Quote:The two big candidates for that were 2001 and 2008.

So far.  Suppose we get another candidate--another crisis like suggested above or something else?  Why should 2008 be favored over the other two?  If you say 2008 fits the generations better, isn't that fitting the facts to the theory?

Quote:The big protest movements which one would expect (Tea Party, Occupy, BLM, etc.) date from this period.

Except these aren't big movements.  They are similar in scale to the Religious Right, Divestment and Anti-nuke protests of the eighties. Nothing we have seen is remotely on the scale or intensity as the protests of the 1960's and early 1970's.  There has been rising sociopolitical instability of a vastly larger scale in terms of violence.  These are the rampage killings.

Quote:Here in the US we had an intensified period of political conflict that just saw one party seize the majority of offices, state and federal,

A situation the Democrats had in 2009, and Republicans had in 2005.

Quote:under the aegis of the oldest and most outlandish presidential winner in US history, a living incarnation of 80s Boomerism.

The hysteria is much like that after the 1980 election.  Feels about the same to me.

Quote:As far as the orthodox S & H model goes, I am satisfied that we are still following the model as predicted.  Questions of what events occur in the future, and how we should interpret past events in light of them, should probably wait until said events have gone to the trouble of actually happening, you know?

Exactly.  But I've seen this rodeo before, after 2001, when we had the "Phoney Fourth" as Sean Love put it.

What I am getting at, is if there is something to this theory, it should be possible to predict that certain events will/will not happen as an experiment, so as the test the theory.  Otherwise how can you ever validate it?

[SomeGuy]

I really dislike it when you don't bother to respond to more than half of my post.  Makes me wonder why I write it.

*world's smallest fiddle plays in the background for me*

Alright, whatever, let's go:

Quote:What is a change in mood? Isn't mood in the eye of the beholder.  As for the model, a theory must be supported by the facts, not the facts interpreted so as to fit the theory.  How would you disprove the theory?

S & H as written by S & H defined a 4T thus.  They made qualitative predictions for how such a 4T would go, thus far I am satisfied that they are on to something.  Is it as formalized as Newton's Principia Mathematica?  No, and I look with interest on the efforts of people like you to manage that, but I am still posting on the S & H board, not on anyone else's.  I'll let it succeed or fail on its own terms.

Quote:The way I look at is, 2001 was potentially a 4T trigger until future events proved otherwise.  2001 was not a perfect fit, but turnings can be off, there is a fair bit of slop in the model.  When 2008 came along it looked better, but it has since failed one of the tests. The 3 previous American 4Ts has critical election-type events near their beginnings (1174, 1860, 1932).  2008 had a number of the features of a critical election, high turnout, change in party control, and active policy-making immediately after.  Confirmation of a critical election would be a third Democratic term.  It didn't happen, strongly suggesting that 2008 was not a critical election.

Emphasis mine.  These are YOUR indicators, YOUR tests, not S & H's.  They're interesting, but the definitions of a 4T are not defined by your pet metric du jour, and as interesting as I find them, this mix-and-match thing you do where you treat what they said and what you said as being the same thing gets a little old.  As I am getting tired of repeating.

Quote:If this is the only financial panic for 20 years after 2008 this would be significant.

Nope.  The Great Depression had a severe dip in '37, the big crash for the Civil War turning didn't happen until 1873, the 1780s were characterized by serious financial troubles, etc.  This is not a rule.

Quote:But suppose there is another one in the next 2-3 years? We had panics in 1857, 1873. 1884, 1893 and 1907 giving spacing of 9-16 years (average 12.5) so there is precedent.

So far.  Suppose we get another candidate--another crisis like suggested above or something else?  Why should 2008 be favored over the other two?  If you say 2008 fits the generations better, isn't that fitting the facts to the theory?

Suppose, suppose, suppose.  Are you really trying to claim that the 4T is invalidated by hypotheticals concerning future events?  

Quote:Except these aren't big movements.  They are similar in scale to the Religious Right, Divestment and Anti-nuke protests of the eighties. Nothing we have seen is remotely on the scale or intensity as the protests of the 1960's and early 1970's.  There has been rising sociopolitical instability of a vastly larger scale in terms of violence.  These are the rampage killings.

Although, outside a few cities over the last few years, these mass killings have coincided with a broad-based decline in the crime rate.  Doesn't mean they aren't significant, I believe we had a discussion a few years ago labeling mass killings as a form of protest for the information-age (and effective policing era), where the primary target is actually the media response it generates.

Quote:A situation the Democrats had in 2009, and Republicans had in 2005.

You're right.  We'll see what comes of it.  We can tell the significance of it more in a few years.

Quote:The hysteria is much like that after the 1980 election.  Feels about the same to me.

Wasn't there.  Reading some articles from the era I can see the similarities, but I also can't find evidence of 1968/2016 style riots afterwards, either.

Quote:Exactly.  But I've seen this rodeo before, after 2001, when we had the "Phoney Fourth" as Sean Love put it.

And we'll have to make those judgements as they come.

Quote:What I am getting at, is if there is something to this theory, it should be possible to predict that certain events will/will not happen as an experiment, so as the test the theory.  Otherwise how can you ever validate it?

I haven't read Generations, so I can't speak to predictions made there, but I reread T4T periodically, particularly the chapter "A 4T prophecy", and I continue to be impressed, and have since I first read it in 2009.  So have non-T4T people I have had read it.

But you're right, it is a qualitative assessment, and I don't think they've captured everything there is.  I support and will continue to support efforts to extend and refine it.  That being said, I wish you would stop speaking of your own modifications and test measures as if they were part of S & H proper.  There is a world of difference between "The definition of a 4T is..." and "MY definition of a 4T is..." that you have a tendency to elide.

[SomeGuy]

Yeah, I have (in my personal, non-orthodox S & H reading) always lumped Reagan, Teddy, and Jackson together as sort of mid-saeculum realigning presidents.  They are not identical, by any means, but that sort of 2T/3T transition has been ripe for somebody to set the tone of the era as the old paradigm from the last 4T dies/changes and the new coalition that wins the next one is not yet in evidence.  Like I said, it's not a view I hold other people to, but it is one that I hold myself.

Trump is not one of those figures.  He's either going to be the personification of the winning coalition or the face of the opposition the winning coalition triumphs over.  I say that both from the period that we are in and the circumstances of/reactions to his election.  Another result (Trump as an ordinary figure) would, in my view, tend to invalidate the idea of the 4T in general.  As I have stated to Mikebert previously.

EDIT Note that I don't mean that the 4T would be invalidated by my own private test, I mean that if the immediate future starts look less like what was predicted in T4T I will pay less attention to it.

[Mikebert]

Some Guy Wrote:There is a world of difference between "The definition of a 4T is..." and "MY definition of a 4T is..."

This is the definition S&H give on page 71 of Generations.

"A SOCIAL MOMENT is an era, typically lasting about a decade, when people perceive that historic events are radically altering their social environment. "

and

"There are two types of social moments: SECULAR CRISES, when society focuses on reordering the outer world of institutions and public behavior; and SPIRITUAL AWAKENINGS, when society focuses on changing the inner world of values and private behavior."
 
The reordering of institutions is the core part of the definition.  Nothing about “mood”.  They do use mood to EXPLAIN how secular crises arise, but a secular crisis is NOT defined by mood.  The definition is what they gave on page 71, which is the definition I am using.  They were pretty explicit, the definitions were offset from the bulk text and italicized.  Kind of hard to miss.

[SomeGuy]

(02-01-2017, 04:07 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

Some Guy Wrote:There is a world of difference between "The definition of a 4T is..." and "MY definition of a 4T is..."

This is the definition S&H give on page 71 of Generations.

"A SOCIAL MOMENT is an era, typically lasting about a decade, when people perceive that historic events are radically altering their social environment. "

and

"There are two types of social moments: SECULAR CRISES, when society focuses on reordering the outer world of institutions and public behavior; and SPIRITUAL AWAKENINGS, when society focuses on changing the inner world of values and private behavior."
 
The reordering of institutions is the core part of the definition.  Nothing about “mood”.  They do use mood to EXPLAIN how secular crises arise, but a secular crisis is NOT defined by mood.  The definition is what they gave on page 71, which is the definition I am using.  They were pretty explicit, the definitions were offset from the bulk text and italicized.  Kind of hard to miss.

As pointed out previously, I have not read Generations.  I have read T4T.  And in T4T it was very much a question of a change in mood.  I will go home this evening and check an exact page number.

Interesting that they define it in Generations in terms of about a decade, that would seem to imply that a "social moment" is rather shorter than a full turning.

[Mikebert]

Some Guy Wrote:Nope.  The Great Depression had a severe dip in '37, the big crash for the Civil War turning didn't happen until 1873, the 1780s were characterized by serious financial troubles, etc.  This is not a rule.

It’s not a rule.  The 1932 financial crisis produced the reordering of secular institutions that defines a 4T (see Generations p 71).  This reordering and those achieved by the prior 4Ts are acknowledged by some scholars fundamental changes in the American polity. The 2008 financial crisis has not done this, at least not here in the US. So, if another such event occurs it could have the potential to produce such a reordering.  Were it to do so then it would be a better candidate for a crisis trigger than 2008 according the definition of a 4T as given on page 71 of Generations.
 

Quote:Although, outside a few cities over the last few years, these mass killings have coincided with a broad-based decline in the crime rate.  Doesn't mean they aren't significant.

I didn’t say they were significant.  I simply said they were far more violent than the very mild protests we have seen in recent years.
 

Quote:You're right.  We'll see what comes of it.  We can tell the significance of it more in a few years.

Maybe, maybe not.  We haven't really learned the significance of these last two.  It can take a long time for consequences to play out. Remember all previous 4Ts were identified as such with many decades of hindsight.  S&H provides zero guidance for assessing such a period in real time.
 

Quote:Wasn't there.  Reading some articles from the era I can see the similarities, but I also can't find evidence of 1968/2016 style riots afterwards, either.

It is not valid to lump 1968 and 2016 riots in the same category.  The 1992 Rodney King race riots (3 events 62 dead) dwarf anything that happened in 2016, and were themselves considerably less than late 1960’s race riots. (1966-68 riots 29 events, 148 dead).  There was something like 1900 incidents of terrorism in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  In addition were the many hundreds of bombings carried out by domestic terrorists.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:It’s not a rule.  The 1932 financial crisis produced the reordering of secular institutions that defines a 4T (see Generations p 71).  This reordering and those achieved by the prior 4Ts are acknowledged by some scholars fundamental changes in the American polity. The 2008 financial crisis has not done this, at least not here in the US. So, if another such event occurs it could have the potential to produce such a reordering.  Were it to do so then it would be a better candidate for a crisis trigger than 2008 according the definition of a 4T as given on page 71 of Generations.

Well, strictly speaking, the crisis began in 1929, and the response didn't occur until 1933, with a relapse in 1937, and the issue wasn't truly fixed until the enormous buildup during WWII.  T4T, as I recall, suggested that the 4T had multiple parts: a catalyst, which led to an abrupt change in mood but no changes right away, a possible Great Devaluation/what-have-you leading to a bottoming out, a Regeneracy, then a Climax.

Quote:I didn’t say they were significant.  I simply said they were far more violent than the very mild protests we have seen in recent years. 

The level of domestic violence we've seen recently is truly far below that during the Awakening, which was enormous in historical terms.

Quote:Maybe, maybe not.  We haven't really learned the significance of these last two.  It can take a long time for consequences to play out. Remember all previous 4Ts were identified as such with many decades of hindsight.  S&H provides zero guidance for assessing such a period in real time.

Beyond the pieces I outline above, this is correct.  Which is why I try and reserve judgement one way or another until things have had more time to play out.

Quote:It is not valid to lump 1968 and 2016 riots in the same category.  The 1992 Rodney King race riots (3 events 62 dead) dwarf anything that happened in 2016, and were themselves considerably less than late 1960’s race riots. (1966-68 riots 29 events, 148 dead).  There was something like 1900 incidents of terrorism in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  In addition were the many hundreds of bombings carried out by domestic terrorists.

I dunno, the increase in murders in cities like Chicago and Baltimore after BLM protests against the police have been quite sizable.  But no, we are still not there yet.

[Mikebert]

(02-01-2017, 04:18 PM)SomeGuy Wrote:

(02-01-2017, 04:07 PM)Mikebert Wrote:

Some Guy Wrote:There is a world of difference between "The definition of a 4T is..." and "MY definition of a 4T is..."

This is the definition S&H give on page 71 of Generations.

"A SOCIAL MOMENT is an era, typically lasting about a decade, when people perceive that historic events are radically altering their social environment. "

and

"There are two types of social moments: SECULAR CRISES, when society focuses on reordering the outer world of institutions and public behavior; and SPIRITUAL AWAKENINGS, when society focuses on changing the inner world of values and private behavior."
 
The reordering of institutions is the core part of the definition.  Nothing about “mood”.  They do use mood to EXPLAIN how secular crises arise, but a secular crisis is NOT defined by mood.  The definition is what they gave on page 71, which is the definition I am using.  They were pretty explicit, the definitions were offset from the bulk text and italicized.  Kind of hard to miss.

As pointed out previously, I have not read Generations.  I have read T4T.  And in T4T it was very much a question of a change in mood.  I will go home this evening and check an exact page number.

Interesting that they define it in Generations in terms of about a decade, that would seem to imply that a "social moment" is rather shorter than a full turning.

I provided a link.  You did check it out, right.  DId it work?  If so, You can do this for the T4T reference you find my searching for a cluster of words specific to the page. It should come right up.  Then you can link to it like I did for the Generations reference.

I only read T4T once.  It seemed to me to be a rehash of Generations, with nothing new.  I wouldn't think they changed the definition in the six years between the two books.  What was significant to me was they explicitly defined turnings that encompassed social moments for  and the "inner-directed" and "out-directed" periods in-between (AND they added six more turnings--more data!). 

I am trying to write a paper that takes S&H seriously.  The only person who has done that is Dave Krein and the paper he wrote (that I thought was quite good) is the least cited of all those who wrote during his career.  Their material is difficult to work with because they are so hazy. T4T is not very usable since it is full of jargon.  In T4T they renamed the generational types: Idealist, Reactive, Adaptive, and Civic as Prophet, Nomad, Artist, and Hero archetypes.  Why?  I dunno.  They stopped talking about social moments and started talking about turnings, giving each an equal role in history formation, whereas initially it was the social moments that were key. I cannot recalll if they even discussed the idea of dominant and recessive generations in T4T.  Did they? Are you familiar with this concept?  If you haven't read Generations, I cannot see how you really be conversant with their theory, since they only lay that out in the Appendix in Generations.

[SomeGuy]

Quote:I provided a link.  You did check it out, right.  DId it work?  If so, You can do this for the T4T reference you find my searching for a cluster of words specific to the page. It should come right up.  Then you can link to it like I did for the Generations reference.

You did provide a link, I am looking through it further.  I checked T4T on Google Books, but it did not seem as if the entire book were up.

Quote:I only read T4T once.  It seemed to me to be a rehash of Generations, with nothing new.  I wouldn't think they changed the definition in the six years between the two books.  What was significant to me was they explicitly defined turnings that encompassed social moments for  and the "inner-directed" and "out-directed" periods in-between.  I am trying to write a paper that takes S&H seriously.  THe only person who has done that is Dave Krein and the paper he wrote (that I thought was quite good) is the least cited of all those who wrote during his career. 

T4T is not very usable since it is full of jargon.  In T4T they renamed the generational types: Idealist, Reactive, Adaptive, and Civic as Prophet, Nomad, Artist, and Hero archetypes.  Why?  I dunno.  They stopped talking about social moments and started talking about turnings, giving each an equal role in history formation, whereas initial it was the social moments that were key. I cannot recalll if they even discussed the idea of dominant and recessive generations.  Did they? Are you familiar with this concept?  If you haven't read Generations, I cannot see how you really be conversant with their theory, since they only lay that out in the Appendix in Generations.

So T4T is just a rehash of Generations, but not reading Generations is not enough to grasp the material?  I dunno, you only bothered to read LSWP once 16 years ago and that didn't stop you from lecturing me on its contents.   

Yes, Mike, I am familiar with the concepts of dominant and recessive generations, I have been posting and reading here for about 4 years now (Jesus, where does time go?).  I also favor using the other terms, and have used them extensively in posts made here.

So, is your gripe that the "social moment" has not yet started, rather than the 4T as laid out in T4T?  Looking at them, it doesn't seem to preclude a 2008 start to the 4T, with a "social moment" to have begun now or in the not-too distant future.  What are your thoughts on that?

[Ragnarök_62]

(02-01-2017, 04:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: <snip>

Quote:It is not valid to lump 1968 and 2016 riots in the same category.  The 1992 Rodney King race riots (3 events 62 dead) dwarf anything that happened in 2016, and were themselves considerably less than late 1960’s race riots. (1966-68 riots 29 events, 148 dead).  There was something like 1900 incidents of terrorism in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  In addition were the many hundreds of bombings carried out by domestic terrorists.

I dunno, the increase in murders in cities like Chicago and Baltimore after BLM protests against the police have been quite sizable.  But no, we are still not there yet.

How about this C*'s racists stuff?  How about introducing her to some white sheets? A pair made in heaven.

[Mikebert]

(02-01-2017, 04:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: Well, strictly speaking, the crisis began in 1929, and the response didn't occur until 1933, with a relapse in 1937, and the issue wasn't
The level of domestic violence we've seen recently is truly far below that during the Awakening, which was enormous in historical terms.

Was it?  Do you have evidence of this? The average number of deadly sociopolitical events over 1964-84 was 7 and the average death tolll was 32.  The average number of such events over 1908-1928 was 15 and the average death toll was 78. The average number of events for the prior 2T (1886-1908) was 11 events and 44 deaths. In other words the last 2T was violent, the previous 2T was more so, and the 3T was worse than both .

Quote:I dunno, the increase in murders in cities like Chicago and Baltimore after BLM protests against the police have been quite sizable.

 
Now you are adding another analytical category without comparing it to the rise murder rates in the previous period. Are these also dwarfed by what happened then? I think you will find they are.

[SomeGuy]

(02-01-2017, 05:47 PM)Ragnarök_62 Wrote:

(02-01-2017, 04:59 PM)SomeGuy Wrote: <snip>

Quote:It is not valid to lump 1968 and 2016 riots in the same category.  The 1992 Rodney King race riots (3 events 62 dead) dwarf anything that happened in 2016, and were themselves considerably less than late 1960’s race riots. (1966-68 riots 29 events, 148 dead).  There was something like 1900 incidents of terrorism in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.  In addition were the many hundreds of bombings carried out by domestic terrorists.

I dunno, the increase in murders in cities like Chicago and Baltimore after BLM protests against the police have been quite sizable.  But no, we are still not there yet.

How about this C*'s racists stuff?  How about introducing her to some white sheets? A pair made in heaven.

White Sheets?  Sounds racist.  What, no sheets of color allowed? 

[SomeGuy]

Quote:Was it?  Do you have evidence of this? The average number of deadly sociopolitical events over 1964-84 was 7 and the average death tolll was 32.  The average number of such events over 1908-1928 was 15 and the average death toll was 78. The average number of events for the prior 2T (1886-1908) was 11 events and 44 deaths. In other words the last 2T was violent, the previous 2T was more so, and the 3T was worse than both .

Ah, so you are restricting measures of violence to "sociopolitical events"?  Do you have a definition for that?  

Quote:Now you are adding another analytical category without comparing it to the rise murder rates in the previous period. Are these also dwarfed by what happened then? I think you will find they are.

That's what I was referring to above, the overall rise in murder rates.  What is the point, in your analysis here and now, in comparing the magnitude of violence now to then?